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To

FRANCIS LIEBER, LL.D.,

Professor of History and Political Science in Columbia College, New York.
MY DEAR LnrnER:

We have talked and written much to each other on this Habeas
Corpus question. It is a political rather than a legal question,a mixed political and constitutional question. On propositions
of this nature, you are a better authority than I am; that is to
say, you are an authority, and I am not: though, if it were a question of common law, you would understand it as well as if yo~
had been bred to the Bar. There are difficulties in the question,
arising mainly from the concise though comprehensive words of
the Constitution, referring to things understood to explain them,
without. explaining them itself with precision. No one should
be dogmatical, or very confident, in such a matter; but perhaps
one who has lived as long as I have under the Constitution, may
be permitted to put some of his thoughts into the common mass,
that the best opinion may be extracted from the whole. It is by
the elimination of errors, on both sides of a question, that we
come to the truth.
No one whom I know is more competent than yourself to detect the errors in this paper; and if you shall think that they
pervade or comprehend the whole argument, I shall still remain
With sincere regard and respect,
Your friend and servant,
HORACE BINNEY.
PHILADELPHIA .•

Dec. 23, 1861.

INTRO D U CTORY.
THE right of the President of the United States, in time of
rebellion, and when the public safety in his judgment requires,
to arrest and detain a freeman, in temporary denial or delay of
bail, trial, or discharge, that is to say, of his privilege of the
-Writ of Habeas Corpus, has been exhibited by writers in our
Journals, in three points of view :
1. As .the lawful exercise of military power, derived to the
President as commander in chief of the military force now on
foot for the suppression of insurrection :
2. As an incident of martial law, in time of war within the
country, repelling the interference of the civil authority in all
cases in which the restoration of order requires the application
of the military principle:
3. As a civil power springing from the Habeas Corpus clause
in the Constitution, and to be authorized by Congress, in like
manner as by the Parliament of England, by delegating to tho
President the power to arrest and detain persons, within the
limitations prescribed by tho Constitution.
The Attorney-General's opinion is not comprehended by this
division. That opinion is founded on the alleged co-ordination
of the three departments, and upon the co-equal authority of the
:BJxecutive, to interpret the Constitution in what regards the Executive duties and powers, and especially his duty and power to
protect and defend the Constitution, and to suppress insurrection
and rebellion against the government of the nation; and in the
execution of this duty and power, to arrest and detain persons
who are in either actual or suspected complicity with rebellion.
The bearing of the Habeas Corpus clause in the Constitution,
is not particularly expounded in that opinion, nor is it specially
relied upon for the President's authority; neither is the Presi-
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dent's power treated as a military power, but as a civil power,
exercised in the performance of the civil duties of his office.
It is not the purpose of the following remarks, to treat the
subject from either of the first two points of view, nor to affirm
or reject the argument of the Attorney-General. The exclusive
design of the writer is to consider the right of the President to
arrest and detain, of his own motion, in the required conditions,
as derived from the language of the Constitution, and from the
nature of the Executive office.
There are two modes of treating this matter. One of them is
the merely legal and artificial. The other is the constitutional
and natural.
In the first mode may be presented an argument against the
President's power, until Congress have authorized it, which it
may not be easy to answer, if the premises are admitted. The
argument is as follows :
The language of the Habeas Corpus clause in the Constitution,
says nothing, directly and explicitly, in regard to the department of government, which is to exercise the power it gives;
but it must be viewed in the light of Parliamentary law in England, and by reference to the customary sense in which such
language was received in the country from which we have taken
the great body of our laws. This, it must be presumed, was the
sense in which the Convention used this language in the formation of the Constitution.
Suspended, applied to the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, means the temporary withdrawal or withholding of the legal
operation of tha,t Writ from an imprisoned person. The Writ is
instituted by law. Law alone can withdraw or withhold its operation, in any case to which it applies. There must, therefore,
be a law or statute to countervail the law by which the Writ is
given, before the operation of the Writ can be withdrawn 01·
withheld from a person who is imprisoned.
To create a suspension of the privilege of the Writ in the case
of an imprisoned person, there must then be, 1, a statute or law
which withdraws the privilege from the contemplated case of
imprisonment; and 2, an arrest and imprisonment within the
purview of that statute. Effectual suspension is, therefore, a
conjoint operation of law and act; the operation of a law to suspend the Habeas Corpus privilege in reference to the contem-
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plated arrest, past, present, or to come, and the operation of the
act of arrest or imprisonment referred to by the law.
This is the meaning of Suspension of the privilege as it was
understood and practised in the Parliament of England, when
our Constitution was formed.
Although our Constitution does not expressly say which department of the government may suspend the privilege, it necessarily implies, by the use of such language, that the Legislature shall first pass the law, and that the executive officer shall
then perform or order the act of imprisonment and detainer.
This is the merely legal and artificial argument.
But the language of the Constitution, in this particular, was
not the customary language of the day, either in England or in
the United States; and the Parliamentary practice was the very
thing that was to be strenuously rejected ·and excluded. The
language of the Habeas Corpus clause in the Constitution was
new, and is peculiar; and it must be viewed in its own light, and
in the light afforded by other parts _of the same Constitution.
The Constitution does not use the word suspended in an artificial or technical sense, for it had none in this relation; nor as
consisting of two acts, an act of legislation, and an act of imprisonment; but as one thing under the sanction of the Constitution. The warrant of arrest, with the order that the party's
privilege be denied for a season, is suspension under the Constitution. A temporary denial of the privilege by a single act,
founded on the authority of the Constitution, is all that is necessary to suspend the privilege.
The power to imprison, and to deny or delay a discharge from
imprisonment, is an executive power. All the conditions of the
exercise of the power described in the Habeas Corpus clause,
are of executive cognizance, that is to say, rebellion or invasio~,
and the requirement of . the public safety in the time of either.
No legislative act is necessary or proper to give the cognizance
of these facts to the executive department. No act of Parliament
has ever been passed in England, or has been proposed in Congress, to take away or abridge the executive power in regard to
these facts. All the acts of Parliament which deprive persons of
the right to bail or trial, in derogation of the Habeas Corpus Act
of Charles II, leave {his power and discretion to the Crown.
They cannot be taken away by Congress without invading tho
constitutional limits of the .Executive office. They cannot be
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given by Congress to the Executive without supererogating what
the Constitution gives. The only thing required to bring this
power and discretion into operation in the conditioned cases,
against the privilege of the Writ, is an authority superior to the
law which authorizes, or may authorize, the Writ; and that is
the authority of the Constitution in the Habeas Corpus clause.
The power to suspend the privilege of the Writ, is moreover
inseparably connected with rebellion or invasion,-with internal
war. The direction of such a war is necessarily with the Executive. The office cannot be deprived of it. It is the duty of
the office, in both its military and civil aspects, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion. The power to suspend the
privilege, is supplementary to the military power to suppress
or repel. It is a civil power to arrest for privity or supposed
privity with rebellion, as the military power is to suppress by
capture for overt acts of rebellion. They should reside in the
same magistrate, as inseparable incidents of the Executive power,
in time of internal war. The aversion to this doctrine, where it
exists, is a reminiscence of the English practice, when the Crown
claimed the right to suspend the privilege in time of profound
peace and order; or it is a misconception of the grounds of Parliamentary action, since the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II.
The true character of every act of Parliament in this relation,
and of the only bill that has been proposed in Congress, has been
executive, and so it must be. They have said, in effect, and must
say, that the act of the King's Council, or of the President, shall
be final. The only aspect in which an act of Congress to this
effect can be regarded as legislative, is as the grant or creation of an authority to detain against the writ; but this is supererogation, because the Constitution gives it. The only question
is, to which department of the government, the exercise of it belongs, by the general scheme of the Constitution; and according
to the delineation of the departments in that instrument, the ex·
ercise of the power appertains to the President.
This is the broad constitutional and natural argument; and it
is in support of this hypothesis that the following remarks are
made.

THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT.
THE clause in the Constitution of the United States in regard
to the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Cotpus, is this:
" The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it."
The sentence is elliptical. When the ellipsis is supplied, it reads
thus:
"The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it; and then it may be suspended."
This is the necessary effect of the conjunction" unless," which
reverses the action of the preceding verb ; and it will be of perfectly equivalent import and effect if the clause be transposed as
follows: " The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus may be
suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion, when the public
safety may require it; and it shall not be suspended in any other
case."
The clause contains an expression that belongs to the law," The Writ of Habeas Corpus." "The Writ of Habeas Corpus,"
simply and without more, means the Writ of Habeas Corpus ad
subJiciendurn. This was and is the meaning universally when
we speak of a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States, without any affix.
This Writ commands that the body of a detained or imprisoned
person be brought before a court or judge, with the cause of his
commitment or detainer, to be subjected to the order of the court
or judge in regard to the disposal of his person. By Habeas
Corpus acts generally, the privilege of every freeman is to be
delivered on bail, put upon his trial, or discharged, without ar-
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bitrary delay ; and this is the privilege which the Writ of Habeas Corpus is used to enforce,-to be bailed, tried, or discharged
without arbitrary delay.
The United States, while the Constitution was in the course
of formation, had no Writ of Habeas Corpus, or Habeas Corpus
Act ; and the clause therefore does not refer to any particular
law, statute, or writ that was in operation or use in a particular
place. It used the expression generally as language of the law
in the States, in which it had a certain meaning.
The privilege mentioned in the clause is, therefore, the privilege of an imprisoned or detained person, of being bailed, tried,
·or discharged without arbitrary delay.
The words "shall not be suspended," as applied to the privilege, are not words of the common law, or of any other system
of law in particular. They are not technical. They arc words
in general or popular use; and whenever used in reference to a
privilege, signify the same thing as hung up, deferred, delayed,
denied for a season. It is not uncommon in England and in this
country to speak of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act,
a loose and inaccurate expression, because the Habeas Corpus
Act is never suspended. The Parliament of England, by its imprisonment acts, depriving certain persons, committed by warrant of the King's Privy Council or Secretary of State, of the
privilege of bail and trial, do not speak of suspending the
Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Charles II, or of suspending the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, or of suspending anything. Blackstone, in
one instance, speaks of " suspending the Habeas Corpus Act for
a short or limited time;" when, in fact, the Habeas Corpus Act
of England has never been suspended for a moment. He spoke
loosely and inaccurately. The English imprisonment Acts, made
during the rebellion for the Pretender, did suspend a Statute of
Scotland to prevent wrongous imprisonment, so far as ·regards
treason, in order to oust the jurisdiction of a local authority over
a particular crime ; and the expression was right. But they used
no such words as to the English statute or writ.
Suspending the privilege of the Writ, is not an English law
expression. It was first introduced into the Constitution of the
United States. The privilege is personal and individual, not
local, but subsists in remedy. The right of being exempt from
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arbitrary imprisonment is a natural right, and is predicable by
the Common Law of every freeman; and to hang up, defer,
delay, deny for a season, the privilege which a statute gives, or
is expected to give, in relief of imprisonment, is to suspend it in
the sense of this clause of the Constitution. Freedom is the
right, either absolute or qualified. The remedy is privilege.
This, then, is the whole meaning of the clause in our Constitution,-the privilege of being bailed, tried, or discharged from
imprisonment without dela.y, shall not be discretionally denied,
or hung up or deferred, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; and then, or in those
circumstances, it may be denied or deferred for a season, or temporarily.
The people of the United States have said this by their Constitution of government. The power to say this belongs to the
United States by the grant of the people. They have said that
the privilege of being bailed, tried, or discharged when in cases
of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it, may
be denied, deferred, or hung up for a season.
The Constitution of the United States authorizes this to be
done, under the conditions that there be rebellion or invasion at
the time, and that the public safety requires it. The Constitution does not authorize any department of the government to
authorize it. The Constitution itself authorizes it. By whom
it is to be done, that is to say, by what department of the government this privilege is to be denied or deferred for a season
under the conditions stated, the Constitution does not expressly
say; and that is the question of the day.
'.fhe Constitution uses the one word suspended, to signify one
act, by one agent or body, with one effect, consummate by one
ope1!ation,-imprisonment without bail, trial, or discharge, for
a season ; which act it authorizes in certain conditions of the
nation. It is impossible to suppose, that in speaking of suspending the privilege of the Writ, it meant by one act of law,
as if it had spoken of the Writ alone, or of the Habeas Corpus
Act. And it is equally impossible that it meant the general or
universal privilege in the United States at large. This would
have been an infinite absurdity, comprehending and involving all
freemen, friends as well as foes of the government, and even the
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very persons who should suspend the privilege. Neither did it
mean to speak of two acts, one of authority and one of execution, for its own words are the authority. The privilege is necessarily personal or individual; and by ordaining that this may be
suspended on certain conditions, it leaves nothing contingent except those conditions, and nothing unexpressed except the department by which the conditions were to be declared to exist,
and the act of imprisonment to be executed. The question is,
which is that department?
It must be remarked that this whole provision is unlike any
provision of the Constitution of England, or of the Common Law.
The bearing of the Constitution of England upon the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, and upon the executive power of the King to
suspend the personal privilege of a subject, supplies a very defective and a very deceptive analogy for the interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States; a very different Constitution as we know, and which has adopted new and quite original language in relation to the privilege.
The doctrine of the English Common Law is the universal
exemption of the freemen of England, at all times and without
any exception, from discretionary imprisonment by any body.
The language of the 39th clause of Magna Carta is to the same
effect: "NULL US LIBER HOMO capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletw·, aut aliqiw modo destruatur; nee super
eum ibimus, nee super eum mittemus, nisi per legale Judicium
parium suorum vel per legem terra:." '' From the era, therefore, of King John's charter," Mr. Hallam says, "it must have
been a clear principle of our Constitution that no man can be
detained in prison without trial.'' Midd. Ages II, 324. And
this conforms precisely to the two resolutions carried by Sir
Edward Coke in the House of Commons in 1628, which were
afterwards the foundation of the English Habeas Corpus Act of
31 Charles II.
I. That no freeman ought to be committed or detained in
prison, or otherwise restrained, by the command of the King or
the Privy Council, or any other, unless some cause of the commitment, detainer, or restraint be expressed, for which, by law,
he ought to be committed, detained, or restrained.
II. That the Writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be denied, but
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ought to be granted to every man that is committed or detained
in prison, or otherwise restrained, by the command of the King,
the Privy Council, or any other. 2 Parl. Hist. 259.
Exemption from discretionary imprisonment without bail or
trial, is therefore an undoubted principle of the Common Law.
Before the era of King John's Charter, there may be historical uncertainty in this matter. The previous age was one of
the exercise of large arbitrary power by the King. The Norman conquest sat down on the free code of the Saxons, in the
cunabula of the common law, and pressed it heavily. Temporary
imprisonment at the King's pleasure had doubtless occurred in
many cases; and in time of rebellion, of which the Norman
Kings had more than one sample, it is quite probable that such
imprisonment may have been acquiesced in for the public safety;
and that the King's right may thus have acquired some sanction
from usage, giving color to the exercise of the same power, when
there was no rebellion. But the English Barons, in their contest with King John, had the magnanimity to put the matter
beyond doubt, not only as to themselves, but as to the freemen
of England generally; and it is for this reason that Mr. Hallam
has signalized that epoch.
The principle allows of no exception or qualification on account of rebellion or invasion, when war is within the kingdom,
nor on account of any other cause or matter whatever, not even
the public safety in time of rebellion or invasion.
It is a glorious principle, and worthy of all aspiration, like
perfectness. But it is too perfect for human society, at least for
the condition which human society has usually assumed for several centuries. It was the occasion of fierce struggles between
kings and people in England before Magna Carta and after;
and the struggle was not finally ended until the fatter half of the
17th century, by the defeat of the King's arbitrary power, and
by the deposit of arbitrary power over the same principle, not
in the people who originally held it beyond all arbitrament, but
in the Parliament of England, as if they were incapable of
abusing it. Less likely Parliament may be; less able, Parliament
is not. The Constitution of England appears to be now what it
always was in regard to this principle; and English lawyers and
statesmen still say, that it is a principle of their Constitution, as

/
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it always was, that no man can be detained in prison without
trial. But there is another principle which they assert with equal
strength and constancy, that what Parliament declares to be
the Constitution of England, is the Constitution of England; or,
rather, that what Parliament enacts, the courts of England
cannot adjudge to be unconstitutional and void; and, therefore,
that although by the Common Law and Magna Carta and the
Constitution of England, no man can be detained in prison without trial, yet that Parliament may constitutionally, or imperially,
authorize the King's Privy Council, or one of his Secretaries of
State, or perhaps anybody at their pleasure, to imprison a freeman in time of peace, when there is neither rebellion nor invasion, nor anything like war in the kingdom, but only seditious
agitations for reform, or clamors against a ministry, with scarcity and derangement of trade, accompanied by treasonable or
suspected treasonable practices; and may detain him without
trial or bail for six months, or a year, or for any time they see
fit, renewable forever at the pleasure of Parliament.
The principle, therefor,e, of the old common law, that every
freeman is entitled at all times and in all cases, to be exempt
from discretionary or arbitrary imprisonment, has, in England,
come practically to this,-that he is entitled to it, unless Parliament shall, in their discretion, s'ee fit to take it away for a time,
by giving the power of such imprisonment to the King in Council, or to one of the King's principal Secretaries of State~ or
perhaps to anybody they see fit.
There is no intention in saying this, to find fault with the
English Constitution, which must be taken as ·a whole, and is
truly a magnificent work, the result of vast experience, wisdom,
and genius for the government of freemen; but the intention is
to state an indisputable fact, to which the people of these United
States were wide awake when they made their Constitution, and
regarded it as a very exceptionable fact, and wholly inadmissible
by them. They meant to exclude Parliamentary law, to qualify
the principle as ~he public safety of the country required, and to
declare the conditions or qualifications of the principle for themselves. To state this, is to clear away something from the deceptive analogy of the English Constitution and the course of Parliament.
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The formal con test for the possession of this discretion to imprison and detain without trial, was long in England; but does
not rcq uire long to state. It was first between the King and
the Lords or Barons, and then between the King and some of
the people, and finally between the King and the Parliament; and
this Parliamentary contest with the King began and ended with
that family of Kings, in whose reigns, or at the end of them,
Englishmen settled the great principles of their government.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Charles II, as well as a more
pointed and anti-regal statute of 16 Charles I, which followed
the Petition of Right, was made during this contest, in jealousy
of the Royal hereditary power, · as the Constitution of that
monarchy had immemorially established it. It was in jealousy
of the Royal hereditary power generally, but was quickened
and invigorated greatly by jealousy of the race of Kings then
on the throne. Nearly the whole of that century was an age
of transition from the irregular and disputed pretensions of the
English Crown, sometimes controlling and al ways menacing the
Commons, frequently using and perpetually threatening the use
of arbitrary power, to the principles of constitutional government as asserted by Parliament, and as denied by the Crown;
and Parliament succeeded. It cannot be said that the people
succeeded in the same degree. That nation has now arrived at
a stage, in which the contest for influence in the government is
between different classes of the people; and the great question
between them is, whether the people at large have as large a
share in the government of themselves as they ought to have and
can bear; but for nearly the whole period of the second Stuart
King, it was a contest between the Parliament and the Crown;
and the security of the person of the subject from arbitrary imprisonment by the King, and of his property from the arbitrary
exactions of the King, were the points upon which all political
movements turned.
Neither the 16 Charles I, nor the 31 Charles II, did more
than affirm the immemorial custom or principle of the common
law which has been adverted to, and the King's incapacity to
supersede it at his discretion; but the later statute has derived
its reputation and popularity from fencing the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus with the most jealous guards against the
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dependants of the King, his Judges, who held their offices during
his pleasure, and his officers of his sole appointment, who, in
subservience to his wishes, had, in conspicuous instances, made
the common law of no avail against the Crown. Two changes
in the Constitution of England, making good behavior the tenure
of judicial office, and requiring the assent of a branch of the
Legislature to the King's appointments to office, might perhaps
have obviated the necessity of nearly all the provisions of the
great Habeas Corpus Act. If anything makes this doubtful,
it is the constitutional power of the Crown, which is large and
has a pervading influence, though much of it is disguised from
our observation, by its exercise through ministers who are in
Parliament, and the leaders of that body. But with these provisions in the Constitution of the United States, and with the
Habeas Corpus clause just noticed, the Federal Constitution has
gone on for seventy years without a Habeas Corpus Act, and
without anything of that kind, but a naked authority to the
Courts and Judges of the Federal Judiciary, to issue, among
other writs, the writ of Habeas Corpus.
The jealousy toward the King in regard to this Writ, so
deeply rooted in the English heart during the struggle with the
Stuarts, has continued to exist, and still exists in the people of
that kingdom, as a principle, without the same personal causes
in the conduct of the reigning monarch; but considering what
the office of the King of England is by the settled Constitution
of the Kingdom, there is no doubt good reason for it even at
this day; and there always will be. The royal power in England, whatever we may say of it, is still a great power, and
must remain a great power if that nation would remain what it
is. With a people jealous of their personal liberty, and intent
upon maintaining it, this jealousy has, and will always have, a
foundation in a justifiable fear of the royal prerogatives and
influence.
The exclusive right to declare war, and to make treaties with
foreign powers without the advice and consent of either branch
of the legislature-the' power to build ships and to regulate a
navy-the power of calling forth the militia for any cause which
in the King's judgment makes it expedient-the sole and exclusive power of appointments to office, both civil and military-
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the power of appointment to great office in the established
Church-the power of conferring upon such subjects as the
Crown favors both rank and title, and hereditary authority as
law-makers in one branch of the legislature-and the power of
absolute veto upon acts of Parliament; it is these prerogatives
which make the King's hereditary office, in connection with an
hereditary aristocracy, a source of apprehension to the Commons
of England, and justify their jealousy in maintaining the guards
of the Habeas Corpus Act, and in extending them, as they did
so late as the 56 George III, from commitments for any criminal
or supposed criminal matter, to commitments for any cause whatever.
At the same time it must be remarked that the people of
England have not in this matter shown, or been permitted to
give effect to, the least jealousy whatever of the absolute power
of Parliament. While the 31 Charles II by express provision
places the Writ of Habeas Corpus at the call of anybody committed for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, and now
for any cause whatever by the 56 George III, so that the occurrence of rebellion or invasion, or any the most extreme crisis
of public danger, cannot deprive any one of the privilege of the
Writ for an instant, nor give the King the power to detain the
most reasonably suspected and dangerous man in the kingdom,
Parliament has an unlimited power to suspend the privilege
without either invasion or rebellion, or any crisis of danger,
other perhaps than such as may attend an unpopular ministry
for persevering in unpopular measures. Parliament is under no
guard or restriction whatever in point of time or circumstance.
Parliament and the people, in the late, or even present, condition
of representation in England, are not precisely the same. The
people and a majority of Parliament are not always the same in
sympathy.
·
It is no answer to this remark on the Constitution of England,
to say that the King and Parliament must unite before the privilege of the Writ can be interrupted. ~I.1he King may be a party
to it for purposes of his own, in opposition to the interests of his
people; and so may his ministry; and so may a majority of
Parliament, in a certain condition of representation in Parliament. This condition of government may last and has lasted
2
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for some years at different epochs, and has been exhibited clearly
and distinctly in the early part of the present century. In matters which concern anything so precious as personal liberty, and
its protection in general against arbitrary imprisonment, it is a
desideratum in every free Constitution, to guarantee the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, absolutely, to the whole extent that the government will be and remain in its normal condition of internal peace, and in the regular administration of
law. When it is thrown out of that condition by rebellion or
invasion, facts easily made certain beyond cavil, tending to the
derangement of the course of justice, and requiring a resort to
military force, and, to some extent, discretionary civil authority,
the security of both the people and the government demand a
temporary limitation of the privilege to prevent its being abused
to increase the disorder of the times. At such seasons it is of
less importance in what branch of government the power of applying the limitation is vested. That must depend upon the
nature of the government and upon the distribution of its powers;
but it should obviously be with that department of the government which is the least able of itself to abuse the power, and is
the most easily and directly made amena.ble to responsibility and
correction for abuse. In fine the Common Law principle requires qualification for modern times, and most of all in governments which are the least strong, and among a people who are
the most free. The English Constitution still asserts its universality, and restricts it at pleasure by the omnipotence of Parliament. Of course such a power is liable to abuse, and to be
without remedy, however rarely it may be abused.
In former years, after the Revolution of 1688, and when the
contest between classes in England was not as warm as it has become in more modern times,-from the time of the Revolution
to the close of the eighteenth century, the power of Parliament
was used very much in the spirit of the limitation adverted to;
but in the early part of the present century, in one or more instances, it is supposed to have departed from it.
When there was neither rebellion, nor invasion, nor war, and
when the danger of foreign war was removed by the overthrow
of Napoleon, the 57 Geo. III, 3 May, 1817, gave the power to
the King's Privy Council and Secretaries of State, to detain
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without bail or trial, persons committed by their warrant for
treasonable or suspected treasonable practices, during the limitation of the statute; and it was to a great extent a question of
the ministry, and of party. The country was deranged by scarcity and embarassments of trade, and agitated by their common
consequences, frame-breaking or rick-burning, and cries for
reform. There were probably treasonable practices at the same
moment; but the imprisonment statute in the 57th year of the
King, was obviously promoted, and but shortly preceded, by an
acquittal of Dr. Watson from the charge of treason, by a jury
of Middlesex, after a week's trial, strong evidence of his guilt,
and a pointed charge to the jury against him by Lord Ellenborough. The Courts were open and unobstructed; but the juries
could not be relied on to convict the guilty. It was a case of
immense party agitation. Sir Samuel Romilly, and others,
equally loyal to the Constitution, though not friendly to the
ministers, opposed the statute vehemently as a party or political
measure. So also they opposed the Seditions bill, a bill it might
be said, in pari materia, carried in the same month ; and the bill
for imprisonment without trial was continued by another statute
in the same session, to March in the following year. And this
is the scope of Parliamentary power over the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The Habeas Corpus Act of England, with this discretionary
power of Parliament, affords no analogy for the United States, ·
who have qualified the principle, so as to secure it against the
discretionary power of any body, except when the nation is
forced away from its normal and orderly condition by internal
war, rebellion, or invasion. In such a condition, the government cannot,-properly speaking, will not, and cannot extensively,-abuse the exception. Such disorders as rebellion or
invasion, touch the life of the government itself; and the ex-ception cannot be either usefully or constitutionally applied,
except to defeat a sympathy with domestic or foreign enemies,
to the overthrow of the fundamental institutions of the people.
More of this constitutional dependence of the exception upon
rebellion, presently.
There is another particular in which it is necessary to disregard the analogy of the English law, a particular in which we
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are most likely to be led astray, and have been, in fact, to some
extent, led astray, by supposing an analogy, where there is none.
It is the manner in which the privilege of the Writ is overruled
in England, and which must be done by a Legislative Act,-by
an Act of Parliament. It can be done in no other way.
The Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II is an Act of Parliament; and by the Constitution of England, nothing but a subsequent Act of Parliament can abolish, restrain, or impair such a
preceding Act. There is no Constitution above it, that imparts
an authority to arrest its operation in any case, nor upon the
occurrence of any event whatever, except in this one way, by a
subsequent Act of the same body which enacted it. If a written
Constitution in England, superior to an Act of the Legislature,
~if even the statute of 31 Charles II,-or any subsequent Act
of Parliament, had declared that the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it, and under
such a provision, it had been uniformly held that Parliament
alone could declare the fact of rebellion or invasion, and the
fact of public danger, or what the public safety required, there
would have been an analogy which we might examine and consider. But under our different Constitutions, there is none.
There is nothing of higher authority in England than the Statute
of 31 Charles II, except a subsequent statute; and until such
subsequent statute, its provisions are of absolute authority over
King, and Privy Council, and Secretaries of State, and everybody. That statute gives to everybody committed to prison for
any criminal or supposed criminal matter, which a subsequent
statute extends to every commitment, not only a right to the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, but a right to immediate bail, or speedy
trial, or discharge from imprisonment. The statute contains
no exception whatever. Nothing but a subsequent statute can
make an exception. There is no ground or place to argue that
the King's power to watch over the public safety, and to provide
for it by all the means at his disposal, or his authority to proclaim rebellion or invasion, or even to call out the Militia, has
any the least virtue to stay any part of the operation of the
Habeas Corpus Act. The Constitution of England is absolutely
silent, where the Constitution of the United States has at least
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spoken. The Constitution of England is more than silent in
this matter; it says that nobody but Parliament shall speak in
regard to it.
Our Constitution, on the contrary, speaks to all subordinate
authorities created by it. It does not say "the Wr·it of Habeas
Corpus,'' or '' the Habeas Corpus Act,'' shall not be suspended,
a Writ and Act of Legislative ordination, whether made or to
be made, and presumably to be repealed or suspended by similar
authority only; but it speaks of the privilege of the Writ, by one
word comprehending the whole protection of the principle, and
declares that it may be suspended; by this one word suspended,
also comprehending by the exception, all temporary and occasional
disturbances, by imprisonment, by denial, delay, or hanging up
for a season. Suspension is authorized by the Constitution by
the same clause which guarantees the principle; and as the expression of the principle includes all its rights, the expression of
the exception includes all temporary delays and denials of the
rights which are included in the exception. The Constitution
is itself the authority, and all that remains is to execute it in the
conditioned case.
In regard, therefore, to the qualified right of being exempt
from imprisonment without trial, unless in cases of rebellion
or invasion, when the public safety requires such imprison-.
ment, we must discard English analogy. The Constitution of
the United States must be judged by itself, by its own distribution and ordination of the powers of Government, by the jealousies or confidences which appear in it, by its own language in
fine, and not by the English Constitution or by the powers of
Parliament.
There is still another particular in which we must guard
against English analogy, when we come to examine the question
of power under the Habeas Corpus clause.
It has already been suggested that the great motive of England for pressing the Habeas Corpus power into its present condition, was jealousy of the Crown. It was this feeling, as every
one knows, that led Parliament in the 16th Charles I, to reduce
the King's power of detainer by warrant, expressly to the same
rank as that of any subject of the realm. It operated with more
than the same force at the close of Charles II, whom the nation,
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not twenty years before, and from their undoubted preference of
hereditary monarchy, had recalled from exile to the throne.
England deliberately preferred hereditary monarchy, with all its
powers and dangers, to any other form of government; but it
was the sense of these dangers, specially excited near the close of
his reign by the occurrence of a particular case-Jenks's caseand by the prospect of a Roman Catholic successor in the King's
brother, the Duke of York, afterwards James II, that impelled
them to drive home, as it were, every stake that would prevent
the King or his judges or officers, from removing the barrier of
the Habeas Corpus Act from between the King and the people.
The author of the 31 Charles II, Lord Shaftesbury, would have
altogether excluded the successor, the Duke of York, from the
throne, by act of Parliament; and so would the House of Commons that passed the Habeas Corpus Act, if the vote of that
house alone had been sufficient. But the House of Lords could
not be brought to concur.
Next to the benefit of exclusion was the benefit of the Habeas
Corpus Act; and they passed it with as little respect for the
Common Law principle, and with as much regard for their own
power as any Parliament that ever sat; for in the very next
year after that Act, the House of, Commons, by its own authority,
and by the speaker's warrant, seized in all parts of England and
imprisoned multitudes who had dared to express in their addresses to Charles, their deep abhorrence of those who had offensively importuned him to call a Parliament. They were called
abhorrers. The Parliament dreaded the King's power, and loved
their own, more than they loved the general liberty of the subject; and their fears were very reasonable.
But in regard to the power of the President, as the draft of the
Constitution had substantially settled it by major consent before
the Habeas Corpus clause was proposed, there was absolutely nothing in the powers of the office which could justly excite jealousy,
that he might abuse the power of suspending the Habeas Corpus
privilege with a view to enlarge his other powers. The President has no powers that can be abused or enlarged by himself, except with more danger to himself than to the country. Elected
directly or indirectly by the people for a short term of yearsunable to veto a law of ·congress if two-thirds of each House
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shall concur in passing it against his advice-unable to make
war, or to arm a soldier, or to call forth the militia for any purpose, or to build a ship, or enlist a sailor or marine-unable to
make a treaty, unless two-thirds of the Senators present concur,
or to appoint an ambassador, minister, consul, judge, or any
other officer, without the advice and consent of the Senate, unless it may be inferior officers, if Congress shall choose to grant
him the power-commander in chief of the army, but without
power to arm a. soldier-and of the navy, but unable to build a
ship-commander also of the militia of the States, if Congress
shall see fit to call them into the service of the United Statesunable to adjourn Congress unless both Houses disagree-and
impeachable for any misconduct in office by the House of Representatives, and triable and punishable by the Senate beyond
the power of pardon,-this is the array of Presidential powers,
as the draft of the Constitution substantially presented them,
when the Habeas Corpus clause was proposed and carried. We
cannot be surprised that in view of this scheme, an eminent
English statesman and man of letters has said, that our Constitution of government exhibits "the feeblest Executive, perhaps
ever known in a civilized community." Bulwer Lytton has said
this, after seeing the Constitution on its printed pages. M. de
Tocqueville has said the same, in more measured terms. We
who are living under i't, know that in the course of seventy years,
no President but Washington could have obtained the office for
a third term of four years, by the use of all the power of the
office whether in war or peace, or by the devotion of his patriotic
services. Whether Washington could have obtained it, remains
an historical doubt. His prudence, and his experience of the
office, withdrew him from the canvass. Jealousy of that office
during the earlier part of the Convention, and in certain of the
States before the adoption of the Constitution by nine States,
was a topic with t4ose who did not wish any Constitution or
Union; but for sixty years at least, it has been beyond any sensible man's power of face to profess it gravely.
It is but reasonable to give weight to this consideration when
the power of applying the exception shall be considered.
The Convention which prepared the Constitution were aware of
all the circumstances which have been noticed,-the universality
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of the Common Law principle, and the necessity of exception to
it in times of great public disorder and violence, when war should
be within the country, and the public safety placed in jeopardy,
as well as the ordinary course of justice impeded. They were
aware also of the manner in which the Constitution of England,
under the Statute of Charles II, had exposed the principle to
dangerous prejudice by the discretionary power of Parliament;
and they deemed it wise to qualify the principle itself so as to
protect the safety of the public in a season of great disorder,
and yet to prevent its defeat by any power in any other condition of the country. The Common Law principle was suggested
in the Convention in full universality, without exception of any
kind, and three States adhered to it in their final vote; but the
majority deemed it better for the Union to qualify and abridge
the principle constitutionally, by annexing to it an exception
most strictly limited to the occurrence of certain great and critical
disturbances in the public condition of the country, and to let
the public safety, at the times of such disturbance, and in those
only, overrule the principle for the time and season.
Their departure from the English Constitution and rule, altogether set them aside as a safe analogy in the application of the
clause finally adopted.
The history of the clause is not without interest, and pretty
strong application.
The Convention to form the Constitution began its session on
the 14th May, 1787, on which day there was no business done,
nor any subsequent meeting until the 28th May. On the following day, the 29th May, Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South
Carolina, exhibited a "Plan of a Federal Constitution," the 6th
article of which, concerning the legislature, contained the following paragraph :
"All laws regulating commerce shall require the assent of twothirds of the members present in each house. The United States
shall not grant any title of nobility. The legislature of the
United States shall pass no law on the subject of religion, nor
touching or abridging the liberty of the press ; nor shall the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus ever be suspended, except
in case of rebellion or invasion."
The different subjects of this paragraph have no common re-
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lation between them, except that they are all restrictive ; but
the last clause is substantially new in two respects: first, in
speaking of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and of
the suspension of the privilege, which are not expressions of tho
Common Law, nor of Blackstone, its commentator, nor of Parliamentary law; and, secondly, in limiting the privilege to the
case where there is neither rebellion or invasion. Deviating from
the English Constitution and practice also, it proposed this universal safeguard of the privilege, that it should never be suspended unless when rebellion or invasion was upon us, and war,
either foreign or civil, was within the country. War alone, if it
was not attended by invasion, was not to have any influence upon
the privilege; nor, perhaps, though in this respect the language
may be too indefinite for legal distinction, any of those local seditions against particular laws of government, which commonly
obtain the name ·of insurrections. The privilege was to remain
in rigor, and to be intangible by any power whatever, executive,
legislative, or judicial, except when a foreign enemy should invade the country, or when such formidable insurrections exist as
desenre the name of rebellion.
Derivatively, the word signifies a renewed war, an uprising in
war by a nation once subdued in war, which was the Roman
sense ; of course, a war against the Government of Rome. Dr.
Webster makes the discrimination between rebellion and insurrection, that "rebellion is an open and avowed renunciation of
the authority of the government to which one owes allegiance,
or the taking of arms traitorously to resist the authority of
lawful government; revolt. Insurrection may be a rising in
opposition to a particular act or law, without a design to renounce
all subjection to the government. Insurrection may be, but is
not, necessarily, rebellion.''
The Constitution, in defining the powers of Congress to call
forth the militia, uses the lower term, insurrection.,· and so do
the Acts of Congress of 1792 and 1795, which authorize the
President to call forth the militia of the States; and very properly, as it was necessary to provide for an outbreak in its lowest
type; and as all insurrections may become rebellion, the force
raised to suppress insurrection may lawfully suppress it in. all its
forms and powers.

26

This, it has been remarked, was a deviation from the English
Constitution, and from the Parliamentary practice or course also.
Nor is the variation factitious or fanciful merely. It is a just
political expression of the principle of the universal personal
liberty of freemen under laws of their own making, qualified by
the internal perils of their own government. War, generally,
was not to be a limitation of the privilege, and ought not to be.
War, beyond the limits of a country, leaves the courts and the
laws of the country in full operation; but invasion by a foreign
army, or rebellion against the government, overthrows or disturbs both the courts and the execution of the laws. In such
cases the personal liberty of the freemen of a country becomes
secondary to the public liberty of the nation, and must yield for
the time to a higher interest and a higher principle, the public
safety. As the Constitution finally reported says, it must yield
so far in particular instances, as "the public safety may require
it.'' The principle of the Common Law is not the principle of
the Constitution of the United States. The principle of the
English Constitution is not our Federal principle. Ours is a
qualification of that principle, universal and unchangeable in its
application. The principle of the English Constitution is universal in name, and changeable at the pleasure of Parliament.
Whether Mr. Pinckney was the first to express this limitation
of the right of personal liberty, is not material. He would be
more entitled to credit for first introducing it with his Plan of a
Federal Constitution, if he had not subsequently appeared willing to throw it away.
The import of his elause is, nevertheless~ in one respect obscure, by its imperfect grammatical dependence upon the previous
clause. It expressly prohibited the Legislature from passing any
law on the subject of religion, or touching or abridging the
liberty of the press; and then, uniting the clause with what preceded it by repeating the same conjunction, nor, he separated it
by a change of phrase, which is absolute in its meaning, and not
relative to the Legislature ; "nor shall the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion
or invasion.''
But from the form which Mr. Pinckney's proposition assumed
afterwards, on the 20th August, it seems to be free from doubt,
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notwithstanding the obliquity of the language and the imperfect
grammatical structure of the sentence, that the Legislature was
intended by the mover to be the suspending as well as the nonsuspending power; that is to say, that the Legislature was to be
the rein that should hold back or let free another power with
whom the executive function of arresting and imprisoning must
remam. The Legislature was to hold on to, or to relax the privilege. It is not improbable, therefore, that Mr. Pinckney used
the word "suspended" in the same sense with the legal argument
which has been already adverted to.
It is unnecessary to make further remark upon the clause
which is contained in Mr. Pinckney's "Plan of a Federal Constitution," as it did not come up directly a second time.
Three months afterwards, on the 20th August, 1787, the first
subsequent occasion in which the Habeas Corpus clause was mentioned in the Convention, and but about three weeks before the
final adjournment of the body, Mr. Pinckney moved, not the
adoption of his "Plan of a Federal Constitution," but a number
of propositions to be referred to the Committee of Detail. On
this occasion he gave to his Habeas Corpus proposition the following form:
"The privileges and benefits of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and
ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature,
except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a
· limited time, not exceeding
months."
This proposition indicated a disposition to throw away that
striking and important qualification of the privilege which had
been expressed in his Plan of a Federal Constitution, and to
substitute for it the discretion of the Legislature on the most urgent and pressing occasions, the omnipotent discretion of Parliament; and it would have brought the Constitution in this respect into perfect identity with the Constitution of England,
with a maximum limitation of time, instead of the pleasure of
Parliament.
It is this form of his proposition which indicates Mr. Pinckney' s design in its original form, to give Congress the power of
authorizing suspension; and certainly if the occasions of its exercise were to be indefinite, however urgent and pressing, as he
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now proposed, nothing would have exceeded the incongruity of
committing such a power to the Executive department of the
government. We shall see how by making the power perfectly
definite, and limited by conditions of executive cognizance and by
constitutional legislation in the clause which made it, the reference to Congress became an incongruity, and was abandoned.
When the subject was finally brought up in the Convention,
on the 28th August, we have from Mr. Madison but a brief and
meagre statement of what was said upon the occasion. Indeed,
Mr. Madison's minutes hardly deserve the name of "Debates in
the Federal Convention," which has been given to them. They
are a synopsis or general view, more or less full or impartial, according to the disposition of the writer, and to his own position
as a member of the body; and though the men of this Convention
probably reflected more and spoke less than any public body of
its importance will ever do again in this country, yet no one can
read Mr. Madison's work with attention, without surmising that
on some occasions much more was said than is recorded; and that
this probably was one of them.
The Convention on that day, the 28th August, were taking up
and acting upon any motions, either generally and independently, or in amendment of any article or section of the proposed
Constitution previously reported by the Committee of Detail, as
the delegates were disposed to suggest them; and it is thus, that
on a general or independent motion by Mr. Pinckney, the cause
of the debate on the Habeas Corpus is presented by Mr.
Madison.
"Mr. Pinckney, urging the propriety of securing the benefit
of the Habeas Corpus in the most ample manner, moved that it
should not be suspended but on the most urgent occasions, and
then only for a limited time, not exceeding twelve months."
Probably this motion was exactly in the form last proposed by
him, filling the blank with twelve. Mr. Madison does not quote
any part of Mr. Pinckney's remarks with inverted commas.
'' MR. RUTLEDGE was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolate. He did not conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same time in all the States."
This cannot have been all that Mr. Rutledge said. The conclusion of his remark is in apparent contradiction to the begin-
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ning, which expressed his opinion that the Habeas Corpus should
be declared inviolable. The latter part seems to regard suspension of the · Writ or Act as the object, and as being either local
or general and not as personal. It was a clear mistake. The
whole remark is, however, obscure; and there may be some
reason to doubt whether the reporter's mind, or the delegate's,
embraced the technical doctrine upon the subject.
The two paragraphs thus extracted from Mr. Madison's Debates, are all which they contain on the subject, before Mr. Gouverneur Morris made a motion, which disposed of the whole question.
It is impossible, however, to believe that this important question,
introduced on the second business day of the Convention, and
which had been in view of the delegates for three months, had
received as little of private consideration, as Mr. Madison's work
represents it to have had, of public comment in the house.
Enough, however, is recorded to show that it must have been in
the minds of the delegates under at least three aspects: 1. Suspension of the privilege and not of the Writ or Act. 2. Suspension by the Legislature, and only by the Legislature. 3. Suspension genera1ly, and by the department that would be intrusted
in rebellion or invasion with the safety of the public.
Immediately after Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Gouverneur Morris
moved that "the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless where (when) in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it."
Now, to show how inconclusive and unsafe it is to infer a particular view to Congress in this motion, or in the clause which
it proposed, from the position which is given to the words in the
ninth section of the first article of the Constitution, as now arranged, which treats of the legislative power, it may be found on
recurring to the Journal of the Convention, that Gouverneur
Morris made the motion expressly, and so it was adopted by the
Convention, as an amendment to the fourth section of the eleventh
article of the Constitution, as it had been reported by the Committee of Five on the 6th August, and which was the Judiciary
article. (Journal of Convention, Boston, 1819, page 301.) The
subsequent change by a Committee of Style and Arrangement
(this was the whole duty of the committee) in the numbers and
sections of the articles, was not int~nded to change, and could
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not change the import or meaning of any of them; but position,
in the intention of the mover of the clause, might have, and probably had, a bearing upon its meaning ; and this could hardly
have been any other than to admonish the judiciary of a restraint
upon their power over the Writ, which did not proceed from Congress, the body by which the particular details of the judicial
powers were to be made. Whatever was his intention, the place
assigned by him to the amendment, did, as it were, expressly
negative the bearing of Mr. Pinckney's motion, upon the Legislature.
This motion by Gouverneur Morris, rejected the reference to
the Legislature of the Union, and said nothing of a term or time
of suspension. Mr. Morris had taken up the substance of Mr.
Pinckney's proposition in his Plan of a Federal Constitution,
submitted on the 29th May, had struck out the oblique reference
to the Legislature which the clause in that Plan had contained, as
well as the direct reference to it contained in Mr. Pinckney's motion, on the 20th August, and again on the 28th August, and presented it in the words above given.
"MR. WILSON doubted whether in any case a suspension could
be necessary, as the discretion now exists with the judges, on
most important cases, to keep in gaol or admit to bail."
The delegate from Pennsylvania seems, from professional associations, to have thought the now superannua,ted discretion of
the judges in capital cases, was a good substitute for any power
of suspension, legislative or executive; and to have looked at
the suspension referred to, as an act, and a judicial act, dispensing with any interference by Congress.
The entire history of the clause, as recorded by Mr. Madison,
is thus closed:
"The first part of Mr. Gouverneur Morris's motion to the
word unless, was agreed to nem con. On the remaining part,
ayes, 7; no, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 3."*
Mr. Morris's clause is the same which now stands in the 9th
section of the 1st Article of the Constitution, wlien being in

*

There were four delegates from South Carolina, of whom three must have voted
against it. Probably Mr. Pinckney was one of the three, as his own motion was excluded by that of Mr. Morris.
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substitution of where, perhaps by the Committee on Style and
Arrangement.
Looking at this clause as it is contained in the Constitution,
with the a.id of its short history, it is the statement of a fundamental rule of personal liberty among freemen in the United
States, universal, but not unqualified, and not calling for any
legislative action to enforce or apply the qualifying exception.
The word Legislature, which was contained in Mr. Pinckney's
"Plan of a Federal Constitution," and probably also in his
motion, when the subject was finally disposed of, was thus cast
aside, and an entirely new form and new limitations were given to
the principle; the qualification or exception being founded on
public facts, upon the occurrence of which, the Constitution authorizes the suspension of the privilege, by the act of that
power which is competent to decide upon them.
What department or power should have the authority to declare what the public safety required in such a case, the Constitution neither expressly declares nor expressly intimates, by
any word or words whatever. The cla.use was a substitute for
Mr. Pinckney's original clause, which contained the word Legislature, as his second proposition did also, and rejected that
feature of it without the least ambiguity. If these propositions
of Mr. Pinckney intended to confer this power upon the Legislature, the substitute disclaimed the intention by rejecting it.
The clause has no phrase or word in it, which either directly
or by any fair and reasonable implication, gives or confines this
authority to Congress, or takes it away from the Executive.
The whole question of deciding with authority, when in cases
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires the suspension of the personal privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, is
left by this clause to the person, body, or power, invested by
other parts of the Constitution, with the care of the public safety,
to this intent and effect, in time of rebellion or invasion. There
can be no reasonable doubt about this.
We may argue from the nature of the right, or from the guarantee which it receives from the fundamental law of the Union,
or from the condition in which the government was to be placed
by internal war, from rebellion or invasion, that the authority
is to be exercised by this department of government, and not by

•
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that or by another; but we cannot argue reasonably that the clause
itself gives any color of authority to one department more than
another, except as one department of the government and not
another is more specially charged by other parts of the Constitution, with the care of the public safety upon the occasion
referred to ; nor can it be fairly argued upon principles of
analogy, drawn from the English Constitutional or Parliamentary history, for the clause is entirely un-English as it is truly
American. It is un-English, because it ties up the Legislative
power, as well as all other power; and it is American, because it
is of American. origin, and is conservative of personal freedom in
general, and also of the public safety in times of imminent internal danger of a specific character.
The present position of the cla.use in the Constitution is not
of the least importance. According to the Journal of the Con vention, the clause was offered as an amendment to the fourth section of the article on the Judiciary. If position as a section of
an article carries power to the article, then the original motion as
adopted carried power to the Judiciary, and must have regarded
suspension of the privilege as a judicial act, and not as dependent on a Legislative act. The simple and clear language of
the clause is, in what it directly expresses, restrictive of all
power; in what it inversely expresses, it is permissive of some
power,* and authoritative as to its application in the contingencies stated. It affirms the common law principle with an exception for the public safety, thus qualifying the absolute rule of

*
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If the negation of power by the clause had been complete, as according to Mr.
Madison's De bates was desired by North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, so
much the weaker had been the Government of the United States to suppress rebellion,
and the States none the stronger, except in ability to rebel, which is their weakness
also. The affirmative or permissive power in the clause is simply a power to suppress
rebellion, or to repel invasion. By attributing it to the Executive, the whole government of the Union is organically stronger in that arm which has the main labor and
control in both the contingencies ; and it is the only arm that is directed by a single
eye. If it had been given to Congress, not only would it have wanted that single
eye, but it would h~ve been liable to sway from extreme rigor to extreme relaxation,
by antipathy or sympathy for the constituents implicated in the internal war; and
would, moreover, have been productive of those agitations which mark the suspensions of the privilege by Parliament, as they must necessarily mark every large representative body at such a crisis. There are some striking and impressive remarks
upon the mere negation of power to government, in LrnnER's excellent work " On
Civil Liberty and Self-Government," enlarged edition, 1859, p. 372.
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the common law, and defending or withdrawing it from all other
restrictions. It is not from restriction or contingent permission
like this, that power can be fairly derived to Congress, by position in a section of an article which treats of Congress. The
power must depend infinitely more upon the nature of the
contingencies themselves, than upon position. It is a case, in
which neither the clause itself points directly to the power, nor
does the power given to any of the departments point directly
to the clause; but the effect of both is like a resultant in mechanics, proceeding from the two forces of the clause and of
that department, which, from the nature of the contingencieB, must
be one of the combining parties to produce it; and the Execu-.
tive alone is that department.
For the reason probably that the clause is directly restrictive,
the committee of Convention appointed to revise the style and
arrangement of the articles agreed to, placed it in the ninth section of the first article of the Constitution, which is restrictive
from beginning to end. With the exception of this clause, and
one that precedes it, and prohibits the prohibition by Congress
of the importation of slaves prior to 1808, there is not a paragraph in the section which does not begin with a restraining and
disabling No. Most of these paragraphs restrain and disable
Congress. One of them restrains the Executive department;
another of them restrains all persons who hold an office of trust
or profit under the United States, in whatever department.
In the first of the instances, the general negative of these restrictions is qualified by an express limited affirmation of the power
of Congress, to prevent a sweeping or unqualified disability; and
there is a limited affirmation which qualifies the general negative
in the Habeas Corpus clause; but with this remarkable difference,
that, while the power of Congress is expressly affirmed in the
first, it is not expressly affirmed in the second. The word Congress is not there. It existed in Mr. Pinckney's proposition and
was left out in Mr. Morris's. Considering the facility with
which it might have been introduced or retained, we may say it
was struck out. Position in the ninth section of the first article
of the Constitution is not only of no avail, but the argument
from position is more than countervailed by expression ; and is
emphatically overcome by the Journal of the Convention.
3
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But no instrument, moreover, permits the interpretation of its
clauses to be affected by position, less than the Constitution of
the United States. The matter of arrangement, especially as
to the independent propositions made and agreed to in Convention, and most especially as to the Habeas Corpus clause, which
was not contained in the draft of a Constitution reported by the
Committee of Detail on the sixth of August, when the great
plan and principles of the three departments had been discussed
and agreed to by a majority, had less consideration than any
other subject. The Committee on Style and Arrangement was
the best possible; but though several amendments to parts of
their report were offered in the Convention, no articulate consideration was given to the order and position of the different
sections and clauses, as reported by that Committee. From the
manner in which the amendments were made to the Constitution
after it was adopted, all but the 11th and 12th have no position
at all. One of these was intended to abridge the judicial power,
the other to alter the mode of electing the President. The whole
must have the same meaning wherever they may be placed.
Their most natural position is in the same section with the Habeas Corpus clause, as they are uniformly restrictive.
The most important differences between the Constitutions of
England and the United States in regard to the Habeas Corpus
privilege, and between the modes in which an exception to the
privilege is authorized, may now be recapitulated.
1. The Constitution of England, properly speaking, authorizes
nothing in this respect, nay, negatives suspension, by the universal principle of the Common Law, that there is no exception
under any circumstances to the right of bail, trial, or discharge,
without delay.
The Constitution of the United States affirms that principle,
with one exception, and authorizes a departure from it in that
excepted case.
2. The voice of Parliament, equal in the ears of the English
Courts, and more than equal, to the voice of the unwritten Constitution, authorizes Parliament, and under what circumstances
it pleases, to authorize a denial of the privilege.
The Constitution of the United States, unchangeable by Congress, declares by its own will, an exception to the privilege, and
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authorizes it to be made, and the privilege to be denied for a
season, in the excepted cases and in no others.
In other words, Parliament authorizes an exception to be
made, dependent for execution on the pleasure of the Crown.
The Constitution of the United States, establishes the exception
of rebellion or invasion, and the requirement of the public safety,
and authorizes the exception to be executed by the body that is
under the Constitution empowered to declare these facts ; but
without saying by what department it shall be made.
3. Under the Constitution of England, a law of Parliament
alone can make an exception in England, to be applied as Parliament directs. In the United States the exception is made by
the Constitution, with authority to one of the departments to
apply it, without expressly saying which.
4. In England the denial of the right of bail, trial or discharge, is the joint effect of the Statute and of the Act of arrest
and detention by the Crown.
In the United States it is the joint effect of the Constitution
and of the arrest and detention by the department, which is
competent to order it.
If the clause in the Constitution had said of the WRIT of
Habeas Corpus, or· of a Habeas Corpus AcT, enacted or to be
enacted, what it says of the PRIVILEGE of the Writ, there would
have been some ground for the Argument, that a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, and a Habeas Corpus Act, being the work of the Legislature, the suspension of the Writ or Act should be made by the
Legislature also. But the privilege, the personal privilege being
alone spoken of, an act of arrest and detention by the department which is competent to ascertain the conditions of the exception, together with the effect imparted by the Constitution,
is sufficient, and no legislative Act is necessary,-unless, and
this is the gist of the whole question, a legislative Act is necessary to ascertain the conditions of the exception.
The gist of the question seems then to be this, whether it
requires an Act of the Legislature, to declare that Rebellion or
Invasion exists in the Country, and that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege. If it does, then Congress
alone has the power to pass such an Act: if it does not, then
the power of enforcing the execution falls necessarily to the
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Executive. The judicial department cannot be the body to interpose, because its functions are not directly pointed to any of
the facts, either Rebellion or Invasion, or the demands of the
public safety on such occasions. Indirectly, and in cases, or
judicial controversies, they might take cognizan~e of each of
them.
This question of the power of Congress over· this matter, has
never been decided, authoritatively; and it has never been argued
with any care, or perhaps argued at all, by a Court, or by Counsel in Court. So far as authority goes, it is at this time, a
question of the first impression. There probably has been, and
still is, a strong professional bias, in favor of the power of
Congress, perhaps a }udicial bias, if that be possible. It was
not easy to avoid the bias under the influence of English analogy,
which some preceding remarks were intended to disqualify; but
there is nothing on the point, that is judicially authoritative.
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in M:erryman's case is not an
authority. This of course is said in the judicial sense. But it
is not even an argument, in the full sense. He does not argue
the question from the language of the clause, nor from the history of the clause, nor from the principles of the Constitution,
except by an elaborate depreciation of the President's office,
even to the extent of making him, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army called from the States into the service of the United
States, no more than an assistant to the Marshal's posse: the
deepest plunge of judicial rhetoric. The opinion, moreover, has
a tone, not to say a ring, of disaffection to the President, and to
the Northern and Wes tern side of his house, which it is not
comfortable to suppose in the person who fills the central seat
of impersonal justice. But this may be the apprehensiveness of
the reader.
The remarkable feature of this opinion, is that for proof of
the President's exclusion from the power, the Chief Justice dwells
upon the President's brief term of office-his responsibility, by
impeachment for malfeasance in office-the power of Congress
to withhold appropriations for the Army, of which he is Commander-in-Chief, and to disband it if the President uses it for

37
improper purposes -his limited power of appointment-his
limited treaty-making power-his inability to appoint even inferior officers, unless he is authorized by Congress to do so. Chief
Justice Taney has elaborately stated all this, without appearing
to perceive, that these very considerations may have, and certainly ought to have, induced the Convention to devolve upon
the President, exclusively, the trust and power of suspending or
not suspending the privilege in time of rebellion, as he should
think the public safety required. The constitutional limitations of the office make the President the safe and the safest depositary of such a discretion. There can be little danger of
abuse from an office of such powers. It was the great power of
a King of England, that was the operative motive with Parliament for taking the power of suspension from him ; and they
have left it in a body that is of equal power under the Constitution, and apparently on its way to greater.
Chief Justice Taney quotes the language of one whom he
justly calls his "great predecessor," as standing in place of argument and of other authority with him; and if that predecessor,
in a case properly bringing up the point, had discussed it after
argument by counsel, as he discussed all other constitutional
questions so brought up for judgment, all would have been silent;
and, faetoque h)c fine, there would have been rest to the question. He too, that great judge and statesman, had his bias,
though it was all on the side of the Constitution, and of its due
operation in all parts; but, with his vigorous mind and pure
heart, he drew himself up erect, to the elimination of that and
every other bias, when he pronounced judgment. There was
nothing thwart in his nature. The same straight and long limbs
of body and mind, which he had when he first drew his youthful
sword in defence of his country, he continued to have to the last
sands of his patriarchal life. It is the occasion of deep grief,
that he did not live to handle this and another question of Constitutional Law, that, more than all others, have agitated this
nation. His analysis and authority would have settled them
both forever.
But the language of Chief Justice Marshall, whatever be its
meaning, was not used in a case which brought up the question.
The case of Ex parte Bolman in 4 Cranch, could not bring up
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the question whether the President or Congress had the power
of suspending the privilege of the Writ in cases of rebellion or
invasion. There was no rebellion nor invasion at the time; and
no suspension of the privilege by 'either Congress or the President.
The question then before the Court, the first question in Ex
parte Bolman, was whether the Supreme Court, having no
original jurisdiction of the case, could issue a Writ of Habeas
Corpus to bring up the body of Bolman, and the record of his
commitment by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.
The Court was somewhat divided upon the point, and the writ
was issued, two judges out of the five dissenting; but the manner in which it was argued, not at all the necessities of the case,
induced the Chief Justice to say, "that if at any time the public
safety should require the suspension of the power vested by this
Act (the Judiciary Act of 1789), in the Courts of the United
States, it is for the Legislature to say so. ·That question depends on political considerations, on which the Legislature are
to decide. Until the Legislative will be expressed, this Court
can only see its duty and must obey the laws."
Perhaps there is nothing in this language that, taken with
reference to the case, is open to exception. The power to issue
tlte Writ was the question; and as the Legislature had given
this power to the Court, it was apparently reasonable to say,
that the Legislature only could suspend that power. The whole
language does however say further, that if the public safety
should require the suspension of the powers vested in the Courts,
adverting, perhaps, to the language of the Habeas Corpus clause
in the Constitution, it was for the Legislature to say so.
But there was nothing before the Chief Justice to raise the
distinction between Congress and the President; nor between
the privilege of the Writ as descriptive of a personal right, and
the Writ itself as authorized by law; nor between the operation
of the Constitution itself, and the operation of a law of Congress.
Certainly Chief Justice Marshall would not have said, that if
the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, had given to the
President the power to suspend the privilege, his Act would not
be as effectual upon the Courts, and upon the law of Congress
which gave power to the Courts to issue the Writ, as any Act of
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Congress would be. The proper question would then have been
between the Constitution and Congress, and not between an Act
of Congress and the Court. It was however altogether obiter,
whatever was the Chief Justice's meaning; and was no authority,
though it is aU that Chief Justice Taney cites as of }udicial decision.
Judge Story's remarks, which are also referred to in Merryman's case, are of even less weight; not from personal considerations, but as they are those of a Commentator, and not of a
Judge in his place. The point of them however is easily taken
away.
In commenting very briefly upon abuses of personal liberty in
England, including abuses by Parliament, and of the restraint
placed upon them by the clause in the Constitution of the United States, Judge Story remarks: "Hitherto no suspension of
"the Writ has been authorized by Congress, since the establish" ment of the Constitution.-It would seem, as the power is given
"to Congress (sic) to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus in case
"of Rebellion or Invasion, that the riglit to judge whether the
"exigency had arisen, must exclusively belong to that body."As this is printed in Judge Story's work, the last clause, which
begins diffidently enough, proceeds at once to do something
more than to beg the question. It demands or extorts it. The
very question, is whether the power is given to Gong'ress. Certainly no power is given in terms to any body to suspend the
WRIT.
There is more in the same sentence on which it is not
necessary to remark.
In the absence then of authority upon the point, it is necessary to repeat,-that the clause in the Constitution uses a wellunderstood phrase, to express a well-known meaning, independently of all legal forms. It means that bail, trial, or discharge
from imprisonment shall not be denied to any freeman, except
in a certain description of case ; but that when that case shall
occur, it may be denied for a season, if the public safety requires it.
Congress, under the Constitution, might adopt any form of
judicial relief, and endow its judicial department accordinglythe civil law process, "de homine libero exhibendo," or the
Spanish "el despaclw de manifestacion." If Congress had taken
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either, it would not have altered in the least the effect of the
clause in the Constitution. The privilege of "the Writ of Habeas Corpus" must necessarily have been understood .to assert
the privilege of relief from imprisonment by bail, trial, or discharge.
The writ of Habeas Corpus was better known in the States,
and therefore most appropriate ; but the privilege is not inseparably bound to that or any other specific remedy. The reference to the Writ, was to describe the privilege intelligibly, not
to bind it to a certain form.
The privilege is guaranteed to all freemen genera1ly by the
Constitution; and the denial, for a season, authorjzed.
The question is, by whom the denial or interruption may be
made ; and this must be decided by the constitutional powers
of the different departments, as that instrument has established
them, and as the nature of the conditions requires.
The clause does not by its necessary implication give power
to any department to authorize the suspension of the privilege,
but it gives power to suspend it in the cases conditioned,-that
is to say, to deny it temporarily, with the effect declared by the
Constitution. The Constitution itself authorizes the suspension
under the appointed conditions.
The suspension of the privilege under this constitutional
power, becomes an executive act, and not a legislative act. A
power by the Constitution to authorize the suspension of a privilege, would be a power to authorize it by legislation, and then
the suspension would be an executive act? under the legislative
authority. The Constitution itself authorized the suspension
under conditions, and therefore the suspension in the cases supposed, is an Executive Act. The same well-understood meaning of " the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," makes the
guarantee of the privilege mean what it does, though not expressed, and also makes the "suspension" of the privilege mean
what it does, though not expressed, namely, a denial for a season
of bail, trial, and discharge. Under the power given by the
Constitution, this denial is an executive act, and it can never
become anything but an executive act.
If the conditions under which the Act of denial for a season
is executed, do of themselves require legislation, or are legisla-
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tive in their character, then so far, it must be admitted, that
legislation must enter into the execution of the power; but Congress, personally, can never suspend the privilege, by act on the
person to be affected.
Parliament never does this. It authorizes the Crown to do it,
or declares the effect of what the Crown shall do. This is all
that Congress can do-give effect to an Act by the President or
somebody else-and this the Constitution does already.
The question is whether the conditions of rebellion and invasion, and the demands of the public safety in such a conjuncture,
require declaratory legislation to establish them. If they do,
then it would s~em that Congress alone has the power to establish them. If they do not,-if in this special conjuncture they
are within the proper functions of the Executive Department of
our Government, then the President may establish them, and the
power of denying the privilege for a season, belongs wholly to
his office, with the effect which the Constitution allows.
The special conjuncture is referred to, because the authority
of the Legislature to provide by law for the general safety of
the nation, will not be brought into question. But the conditions
under which this privilege may be denied, are peculiar, and demand consideration.
There are two conditions by the clause in the Constitution,
which are to precede the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege. Speaking with reference to the present day, they are
rebellion and the requirement of the public safety, that is, that
the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege. It is
not public safety in general, but public safety in that conjuncture
of rebellion that is referred to by the Constitution; for the
clause has connected inseparably the suspension of the privilege
with rebellion, or with invasion when that happens. Rebellion
and the suspension of the privilege are contemporaneous and conterraneous. They occupy the same country at the same time.
They are indissolubly connected as cause and consequence.
They have a necessary relation, not only' to give. existence to
the power of suspension, but in the exercise of it ; and to such a
degree, that if the power were exercised except for the defeat or
suppression of rebellion, it would be the widest possible departure from the spirit of the Constitution, and from official duty.
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If this power is devolved by the Constitution upon the President, no one can doubt, that if the President were to suspend
the privilege of any person, except upon reasonable ground of
belief, that to bail, try, or discharge him in that conjuncture,
would prejudice the public safety, in the very matter of the rebellion, it would be unconstitutionally suspended, and be attended by the grave responsibility which the Constitution asserts.
This is the Constitutional aspect of the suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and of the public safety
which is concerned in the exercise of the power.
Now to ascertain whether as to these two matters of rebellion
and the public safety as affected by it, the President is officially
competent to decide and declare them, there is no necessity to
analyze the powers of the Executive with any elaboration. That
the duties of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and to defend and protect the Constitution as
well as to support it, and both to decide the fact of rebellion,
and to measure the danger of the public arising from it, and
what the public safety requires in this behalf, do belong to the
Executive office of the President, we have the constant and continued voice of the Legislature, the voice of the law itself, for
sixty-five years, from the very next session of Congress after
the suppression of the Western Insurrection, in 1794, down to
the present insurrection, raised to its highest power of rebellion
against the Government.
That voice is to this effect, that not only is it the President's
power to declare the existence of rebellion, and what the public
safety requires in regard to it, but that it is his duty.
The power to do this is not granted to him by Congress, but
it is assumed by Congress to be both his power and his duty to
exercise it; and very large power is given to him upon that
hypothesis, to assist in the execution of what is manifestly a
Legislative power, namely, the calling forth the Militia.
It was the assumption of the Legislature in regard to invasion, from the very first moment that Congress, in the dawn of
the Government, provided for calling forth the Militia to repel
invasion or to suppress insurrection; that it was the President's
duty to declare and decide its existence. It was the assumption of Congress also, in regard to the President's power and
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duty to say what the public safety required, both in rebellion
and invasion. But in this first Act of 1792, in one of those
spasms of jealousy, by which party sometimes throws legislation
out of its Constitutional path, when the bill was before the House
of Representatives, an amendment of the most absurd kind was
proposed to the section which provided for the case of Insurrection, deviating from the course adopted by a preceding section
in regard to invasion, namely, that before the power given to
the President by the Act to call forth the Militia should arise,
an Associate Justice or a District Judge of the United States
should notify the President, that the laws of the United States
were opposed, or the execution of them obstructed, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshal by
the Act,-the posse of the districts.
It was an absurd provision; for the judges could have no materials for their judgment, except what they derived from the
Executive department; and in point of fact, before President
Washington could call out the militia to suppress the Excise Insurrection in Western Pennsylvania in 1794, the Executive department was obliged to exhibit the evidence of the fact to Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court, to obtain his fiat; he at the
same time, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, knowing no more
about the matter personally or officially than any other reading
man in the country. The insurrection had no relation to his
office. As one of the movements adverse to Washington in that
session of Congress, when persons, whom we may remember,
were laying the foundation of the State Rights party under a
different name, the amendment was carried, and this strange
feature given to the law. But in the very next ses& which
followed the Western Insurrection, the Act of 1792 was repealed ;
and by an Act of 28 February, 1795, which is still in force, and
was President Lincoln's authority for his recent calling forth of
the militia, insurrection and in-rnsion were placed, in respect to
the President's decision, upon the same footing.
And the footing is quite remarkable. The Act does not refer
the decision to the President nominatim. It does not grant to
the President the power of deciding the question of fact. It
assumes that it belongs to his office to decide each of these facts;
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and simply enacts, "that when the United States shall be invaded
or be in imminent danger of invasion," and "that whenever the
laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution
thereof be obstructed in any State, by combinations too powerful
to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,
or by the powers vested in the marshal by this Act, it shall be
lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the
militia of such State, or of any other State or States, as may be
necessary to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws
to be duly executed." The President, from the veq nature of
the facts, and the duty of his office, decides them himself; and
in the case of Van Martin v. Mutt, 12 Wheaton, the Supreme
Court decided that the President's judgment upon the facts was
conclusive upon everybody. He decides the fact of rebellion.
He declares the number of militia necessary to cope with the
insurrection.
And what other department can officially declare these facts 't
Which department is to take care, directly and universally, that
the laws be faithfully executed, and officially to know that the
execution is obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or can
anticipate the necessity for armies to suppress rebellion, and the
number required to that end, or is bound to devote his functions
constantly to the defence and protection of the Constitution?
Which department has the whole Executive power of the United
States, and with it the primary duty of deciding the facts which
regard the execution of the laws and Constitution of the country?
It is manifest then that there is no necessity for a law of
Congress to determine the great fact of rebellion or invasion,
or the
eral or particular danger to the public arising from it,
upon which the suspension of the privilege of the vY rit depends.
From the dawn of the Government, Congress has left these facts
with the President, and with him alone.
The President's rneans of acting upon his decision, the Army,
Navy and Militia, and their numbers, duration and support,
must depend upon Congress. This is their department. But,
if Congress were to take from him the power of deciding upon
the extent and necessity of these means, it would invade the
Executive Department, which is to sustain the execution of the
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laws. And if they were to deny him the means, the responsibility would be with Congress.
The President does not decide the facts conclusively upon
Congress, so as to command the means, or so that Congress
must follow him by providing the means ; but he decides them
officially; and that is all that is necessary to give effect to a
warrant of arrest by him, and a temporary denial of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
There is no necessity for supposing, in regard to the safety of
the Country, generally and at large, the great measures which
are to express the wisdom of the Legislature in providing for the
stability and security of the Country, and for the extension of
its power, to make it safe against both Invasion and Rebellion,
that these measures are not to come from the Legislature.
They are Legislative measures, and must come from the Legislature alone; though when they are consummate as laws, they
must fall within the Executive department in every particular
in which that department has anything to do with them, by
force of the laws or the Constitution. But in the case of actual
rebellion and actual invasion, the declaration or proclamation of
the facts, is not Legislative, but executive; and so is the decision
of what the public safety requires, for that is a conclusion of fact
from other facts, within the range of the same Executive duty.
The perfectly untrammelled judgment of the President, has
been resorted to by Congress, not by their own Legislative prescription, but under the Constitution, to estimate the dangers of
insurrection in all degrees of force up to rebellion, and to estimate the military forces which safety requires. What does
safety require, but that the offending force of every description,
overt and in ambush, shall be unmasked, assailed, and overpowered, by a greater force on the side of the Government and
the law? And these are facts, and conclusions of fact, which it
is specially and officially the power and duty of the Executive
office to investigate and make. Congress may abide by his
judgment or not in regard to the amount of military forces, and
may supply the means of safety or not, at its pleasure ; though
this only saying that they may be untrue to their trust at pleasure. These are their powers under the Constitution, and they
have many others. But it is impossible fairly to deny, that the
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department which holds and directs the Executive power of the
Government-which is charged with the execution of the laws,
and with the command and disposition of the military forcewith the whole Executive power of the nation, subject to the
exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in the Constitution, of which there are none that touch this question-is
trusted by that instrument with the supervision of the Union,
with the power to estimate what is its danger and what is required by the public safety in time of rebellion, and of deciding
and executing his decision, to the extent of all the means at his
lawful command.
These remarks meet the objection, if it shall be raised, that
a.n y of the conditions under which the suspension of the privilege
of the Writ, or the denial of that privilege for a season, is authorized by the Constitution, require legislation or the exercise
of the power of the Legislature except as to the means. They
do not require it as to the subject. Both the fact of rebellion
and what the public safety requires, to the defeat or suppression
of rebellion, arc of Executive cognizance and decision, and of
execution also, to the whole extent of the lawful means of that
department. It is a breach of the President's duty, not to decla.re the fact, when the laws are opposed, and the execution of
the laws is obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the usual course of judicial proceedings, and the
Marshal's posse. It is his special function and obligation under
the Constitution to decide it, and to the extent of his means, to
provide for the safety of the public, which he cannot do without
saying what it requires.
From this plain and natural view of the Executive department, there is a most obvious and just deduction in regard to his
power to suspend or deny for a season, the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in time of rebellion. The course of justice is
at such a time obstructed. Courts of justice execute their office
imperfectly. In some instances they are closed, and their officers
are put to flight. In some, their judges and officers are parties
to the rebellion, and take arms against their government. In
other instances, the people, the jurors, the officers of courts, are
divided in their opinions, attachments, families, affinities. Calmness, impartiality, and composure of mind, as well as unity of
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purpose, have departed. It is not a season for the judicial trial
of all persons who are implicated in the rebellion. It cannot be
while the rebellion lasts. To arrest and try even those who are
openly guilty, and are taken with the red hand, would, in many
places, be fruitless, and only aggravate the evil. The methods
and devices of rebellion are infinite. They are open or covert,
according to necessity or advantage. In arms, or as spies, emissaries, correspondents, commissaries, proveditors of secret supplies and aids, their name is sometimes legion ; all treasonable,
and many of them disguised or lying hid. A part of this disguise may sometimes be detected, and not often the whole. An
intercepted letter, an overheard conversation, a known proclivity,
an unusual activity in unusual transactions, in munitions, or
provisions, or clothing,-a suspicious fragment and no more,
without the present clue to detection, may appear-not enough
for the scales of justice, but abundantly sufficient for the precautions of the gua,rdian upon his watch. Such are the universal
accompaniments of rebellion, and constitute a danger frequently
worse than open arms. To confront it at once, in the ordinary
course of justice, is to insure its escape, and to add to the
danger. Yet the traitor in disguise may achieve his work of
treason if he is permitted to go on; and if he is just passing from
treason in purpose to treason in act, his arrest and imprisonment
for a season may save both him and the country.
The obvious andjust deductions from these observations is, that
the power of suspending or denying for a season, the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus in time of rebellion, is a most reasonable attribution to the Executive power, such as the Constitution of the United States has made it; and so indispensable to
that branch of the Government, that without it, the very arms
of the Government might be baffled and its worst enemies
escape.
The Legislature cannot execute the power itself. If the
power is limited to them, they must delegate it to somebody.
All that is claimed for Congress to do, is upon some judgment
of the facts which constitute the danger to the public, to commit
the discretion to the Executive. But why form a judgment,
and then leave the whole judgment to the Executive as they
must? Why claim for Congress the power to suspend, when
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the actual and efficient power as an Executive act, must be with
the President? . It is claiming a power for Congress invidiose,
which the Constitution did not feel, or it would have spoken.
The Parliament of England delegates it to the Crown, because
Parliament alone can surmount the Constitution, or restrict the
operation of the Habeas Corpus Act, or declare an exception to
it. Parliament must act; why must Congress act? But connecting the exception inseparably with rebellion, as the Constitution of the United States does, and leaving the exercise of the
power to that body which can best execute it, and is the paramount director of the public force in time of rebellion, it is a
reasonable conclusion from the whole, that the Executive department is the body to which the Constitution leaves it, and
not the Legislature. The power to authorize suspension is legislative. If Congress has the power to authorize it, they may
possibly authorize the President to execute their law. They may
authorize him perhaps, if the Constitution does not authorize
him. And if Congress shall authorize the President to execute
their law by his warrant against the persons he shall think
within its purview, then, be it remarked, Congress by their
law will leave to the President, the very power of deciding
whether the public safety requires that the privilege of those
persons shall be suspended. Congress cannot do otherwise if
they pursue the course of Parliament, or the only example in
their own body, of a bill to suspend the privilege. No Act of
Parliament has ever passed to deprive arrested persons of bail
or trial, which did not leave to the King the power, by his Privy
Council or Secretary of State, to decide whether the public
safety required the arrest to be made. Unless Congress shall,
by the act itself, designate by name the persons to be arrested,
A. B., C. D., E. F., and make tha,t body itself the executive
officer, the question of what the public safety requires, in regard
to the suspension of this personal privilege, must be decided by
the President, and can be decided by no other person.
Perhaps if Congress has the exclusive power to authorize the
suspension, it may assign this duty to the Presi~ent; but this,
perhaps, if we may advert to an objection which we find in the
Federalist, is constitutionally the subject of as much question as
anything in the case.
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Between the report of the Constitution to the old Congress,
and the adoption of it by the required number of States, among
other objections to it of State Rights origin, was one that the
power of pardon had been given to the President instead of
Congress, and the reply to this was by Hamilton.
"But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case in the Chief Magistrate is this : In seasons
of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments,
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels,
may restore the tranquillity of the Commonwealth, and which, if
suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards
to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature or
one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction,
would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden
opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, or an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed, that a discretionary
power, with a view to such contingencies, may be occasionally
confen·ed upon the President, it may be answered in the first
place that it is questionable whether, in a limited Constitution,
that power could be delegated by law." Federalist, No. 74.
Perhaps it might have been added-especially to the President,
the limitations of whose office were as much the effect of deliberation by the Convention, as the limitations of Congress.
The whole of the paragraph from the Federalist, is as applicable to the power of arrest and detention in time of rebellion,
as it is to the power of pardon.
There are some other objections to this conclusion, which will
be briefly noticed. None of them are of the least weight, except so far as they may serve to make it improbable that a power
of this nature would be placed by the Constitution in the hands
of the President. If the Constitution has placed it there, that
is to say, if it falls to that place by the nature of the Government, and by the Janguage of the clause, they avail nothing.
Forget the analogies of the English Constitution, and reason
from our own, and it will be seen that it falls to that hand, and
to no other in time of rebellion or invasion, when alone the
power can be exercised.
How natural and easy-indeed how inevitable it was-that
4
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the original form of the proposition, which included the Legisla'ture only, should be preserved, if the power was intended finally
for Congress, and not for the Executive department.
In opposition to an intention to leave the power to Congress,
observe the striking departure from parallel, of the second clause
of section nine, article one, from the first clause of the same
section.
First clause : "The migration or importation of such persons,
&c., shall not be prohibited by Congress before the year 1808,
but a tax or duty'' (expressly within the power of Congress, section 8) "may be imposed on such importation."
Second clause : "The privilege of the Writ, &c., shall not
be suspended, unless when, &c., the public safety may require
it."
The word Legislature in l\'Ir. Pinclrney's proposition, abandoned in the second clause, after the express insertion of Congress in the first.
· If there is anything in present position, this change of language is more than a counterpoise.
The Constitution has for obvious reasons enumerated and specified the powers of Congress. If Congress was to have the
power of suspending the Writ, why not specify it with the other
powers in the eighth section?
If it is asked, why not have done the same, if it was intended
for the President, the answer is this : The Executive power is
vested in the President by general terms, by one concise and
comprehensive sentence; those powers of the office are alone
specified or enumerated, which the President exercises in connection with the exercise of powers by other departments and officers, or in control of them, as in the case of making treaties,
commanding the army, navy, and militia, appointing to office,
requiring written opinions from his secretaries, granting reprieves
and pardons, adjourning Congress in case of disagreement, and
the like.
The question comes back-Does suspended in the Habeas Corpus clause mean suspended by law, or simply suspended, denied,
deferred, delayed, hung up for a season ? Is it to be carried
into effect by a la.w of Congress, or by an act of another department, to which, as an executive auth~rity, it appertains?
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The position taken sometimes in regard to other provisions of
the Constitution, that what a Constitution of government ordains
generally, it means to be carried into effect by law, fails in a
great variety of cases.
It fails of course, when, what the Constitution ordains on a
subject, is all the law it requires; as where a power to perform
an executive act is given, and the Constitution by its own terms
declares the effect of the act; which is the case with suspension
of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. The word
"suspended" gives effect to the act when it is executed under
the authority of the Constitution, and by the competent authority under it. It is the only word that could be used to give
character to an Act of Congress to this effect.
It i~ an illogical proposition to assert that whatever a Constitution ordains, is to be carried into effect by ,a law. Such a proposition is founded on an absurd postulate, namely, that everything ordained by a Constitution can be carried into effect only
by a law. It must be untrue to a considerable extent of
every written Constitution. There are numerous provisions in
the Constitution of the United States, which execute themselves,
or are to be executed by acts in pais, without the aid of a law
of Congress,-the choice of senators and representatives-the
choice of officers of each house-the trial of impeachment by
the Senate-the appointment of officers by the President with
consent of the Senate-the mode of passing bills to become laws
-extradition betwen the States, and the like. In the election
of a President, the course is striking: the Constitution ordain~
most of the ceremony itself, and it ordains expressly what Congress may do and what the States shall do.
There is no such principle; and the last clause of the eighth
section of the first article is a proof of it. Congress .can pass
only such laws as are necessary and proper to execute the powers
given to themselves, or such other powers as are vested by the
Constitution in the government, or in some department or officer.
The law must be necessary as well as proper; and it is neither
when the Constitution is the law.
In this matter of suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, the Constitution of the United States stands in
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the place of the English Act of Parliament. It ordains the suspension in the conditioned cases, by the act of the competent department-as Parliament does from time to time. Neither is mandatory in suspending, but only authoritative. Each leaves discretion
to the executive power. The difference is, that Parliament limits
a time and provides for the effect by technical terms. The Constitution connects the suspension with the time of rebellion, and
provides for the effect, as it did for the privilege, by words that
comprehend the right, and deny for a season the enjoyment
of it.
It is further objected that this is a most dangerous power.
It is fortunately confined to most dangerous times. In such
times the people generally are willing, and are often compelled,
to give up for a season a portion of their freedom to preserve the
rest; and fortunately again, it is that portion of the people, for
the most part, who like to live on the margin of disobedience to
the laws, whose freedom is in most danger. The rest are rarely
in want of a Habeas Corpus.
But be the danger what it may, the safety with which such a
power is placed with the President, to be exercised upon his own
responsibility, is greater than if it were lodged with Congress,
and greater than if it were devolved by Congress upon the President. Congress are irresponsible. Congress, in sympathy
with the President by the grant, lessen the President's responsibility. The President, directly and personally responsible for
his own judgment and acts, makes the guarantee more complete
than any other provision. The Executive is confessedly the
weakest department in the government, weaker than is known
in any other national government. Receiving from Congress
all the dangerous strength the President can have, the public
apprehension should look to what he thus receives, and not to
what he derives directly from the Constitution. For the use of
powers which Congress may give him, to be exercised according
to his own judgment, it is only in flagitious cases of wanton oppression, that we can expect Congress to be his accuser, or the
Senate his judges. When his own judgment brings the power
into exercise, and his own application of it_works a wrong in any
degree, he has nothing to fall back upon but his patriotic intentions. As a theorem of republican polity, a most dangerous
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power, if this be most dangerous, should be lodged in the feeblest
hands. In suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus upon his own judgment, the President can have no support
but from his integrity and his patriotism; and he stands directly
before accusers and judges who have had no part in his acts.
We have a striking page of history in our annals to remind us
of this distinction. In the winter of 1807, when there was
neither invasion of our country nor insurrection in its lowest
stage, much less rebe1lion, not an armed force being proved by
competent testimony to exist in any part of the country, to make
Aaron Burr's few followers take the least complexion of treason
from their movements, Mr. Jefferson, favoring the theory that
Congress alone had the power of suspending the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, ,and that he might safely exercise it under their wing, sent a message to Congress, representing that an
emissary of Burr, whom General Wilkinson had arrested and
imprisoned, had been discharged upon a Writ of Habeas Corpus;
and then followed the phenomenon,-we might say the portent,a Senate representing free States under the Constitution, passed,
within closed doors, a bill suspending the privilege of the Writ
for three months, as to any and all persons charged on oath with
treason or other high misdemeanor,: endangering the peace, safety, or neutrality of the United States, and arrested by the warrant of the President of the United States, or by any one acting
under his direction or authority. There was not one word in
the bill like rebellion or invasion, the terms in the Constitution,
nor any words that adumbrated either. There was nothing like
either in the land. Happily there was virtue enough in the
House of Representatives, or enough of alienation from Mr. Jefferson, to make the House reject the bill by an immense majority,
and to open their doors. But we may ai;;k with all confidence,
whether Mr. Jefferson, even with a consciousness of his own
power under the Constitution to suspend the privilege, would
have executed such a purpose, at such a time, upon his own responsibility? We may confidently say no. But if a majority
of the House had acquiesced, and there were nineteen who voted ·
for it, we may recollect whose sentiment it was, upon being told
that his friends were willing to ignore a breach of the Constitution, which he had expressly acknowledged, replied, that "if his

fri'ends were sati'sfied, he wo.uld acquiesce wi'th satisfacti'on.''
This getting powel"' from friends in Congress who are satisfied,
is a prodigious corroborative in the exercise of it, whether it be
Constitutional or not. · All experience teaches us that the only
safe depositary of the power of suspending the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in time of rebellion, is that feeble Executive, which the Constitution has made for us, standing upon
the only basis of the Constitution, with no other support than
the integrity and patriotism of the man who has been elected to
it by the people.
It is also objected that if the President holds the power under
the Constitution, the exercise of it has no limitation of time.
Here again the English analogy breaks in. What the objection requires, is an Act suspending the privilege from session to
session, renewable as Congress shall see fit.
The limitation in England is practically worth nothing. It is
either a show of supervision without the reality, to please the
discontented, and to disarm party opposition; or it is a manifestation of the superiority of Parliament to the Crown; or it is the
cantilena of Parliamentary jealousy of the Crown. The ministers who pass it, can always renew it if they are in power; and
if they are not, a perpetual Act would be repealed upon their
downfall. There was not, it is believed, a single suspension
Act in England, in the time of any of their rebellions, that was
not renewed from session to session, until the rebellions were
suppressed.
It would be even more a form, and an unnecessary form, here.
The power carri'es a lirnitati'on of time wi'th it. It depends for
its existence upon the existence of rebellion. The instant the
rebellion is suppressed, the power is extinguished. While rebellion lasts and the public safety is in <l.anger, the power is
indispensable; and the Constitution supplies it for the whole of
that occasion.
There is, moreover, the ever present liability to impeachment,
to arrest it at the first occasion that it is used corruptly or tyrannically for the purposes of ambition. 'fhe office itself is a
short taper, which shines not very brightly for a brief term, and
then goes out of itself. The exercise of the power would proba~
bly be continued longer by renewable terms, from Congress to
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the President, than the President of his own judgment would
exercise it under the Constitution.
A technical objection to the exercise of the power by the
President, is, that it will stay the issuing of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus by the Federal Courts and Judges, or arrest proceedings
under a writ expressly authorized by Act of Congress, which
can only be stayed or arrested by a subsequent Act.
This is English analogy again. If the power of the President
is derived from the Constitution, it is above the authority of an
Act of Congress. It is the power of the Constitution, together
with the authorized act of denial, that arrests the proceedings
or stays the Writ for a season. But it is.quite unnecessary that
it should prohibit the issuing of the Writ. The Writ may issue
to ascertain the cause of the commitment. The return of the
commitment by the President, if he possesses the power, will
stay further proceedings, as it now does in our Federal Courts,
when the commitment is by the authority of a State.
It is also said, that the exercise of the power by the President,
without oath or descriptive warrant, violates one of the amendments to the Constitution.
·
It would be the same if the power were exercised by Congress.
Non constat, that the President will not require an oath,warrant there always _is. The President may provide for the
oath as well as Congress. If the amendment applies, he must
do it, or the commitment will be irregular. But does the
amendment apply to this kind of arrest in a time of rebellion
and internal war? In Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Taney delivering the opinion, held that it did not
apply to a seizure by military authority under a State law, which
declared martial law. If it did not do that, it does not apply to
a power of arrest given by the Constitution, to be exercised in
the time of rebellion and internal war, and intended to aid in its
suppression.
Either the language of the amendment, though general, speaks
in reference to the normal condition of the country only, when
there is no rebellion or invasion and consequent war, foreign or
civil; or under such circumstances, rebellion or invasion supersedes the amendment for the time. The former seems to be the .
preferable conclusion.
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The democratic tendency of the Constitution, has so completely done its work in enfeebling the Executive office, that
very able men appear to think, that to attribute to the President the power of suspending the privilege, is to deprive the
Legislature of a power which naturally belongs to that body.
That body has in no respect a natural title to it. Strictly
speaking it belongs naturally to no department of the Government. Discretionary imprisonment, however necessary in times
of extraordinary danger and internal disorder, is an arbitrary
ouster from all the benefits of Government; benefits which belong .
to every citizen, until he is accused and convicted of crime. If
the Constitution had not ordained the exception, no department
of the Government could have enforced it, without violating the
fundamental principle of every free Government; and it can
only be enforced now, by that department of Government, which
can alone execute the ordinances of the Constitution, that are
executive in their character, unless some other department be
expressly named.
Yet this seems to many the most irregular exercise of power
that can be conceived. The objection itself is one of those evils
which the Executive department is exposed to, from the predominance of the legislative power under every Democratic Consti·
tution.
,: Maitresses de faire les loi's, on doit craindre qu' elles ne liti
enlevent peu d peu la portion de pouvoir que la con8titution avait
voulu lui conserver." De Tocqueville, I, 204.
" Cette dependance du pouvoir executif, est un des vices inherens
aux constitulions republicaines. Les Americains n' ont pu detruire la pente qui entraine les asserllblees legislatives d s' emparer du, gouvernrnent, mais ils ont rendu, cette pente moins irresistible." Ibid.
" Dan~ tout ce qu' il f ait d' essentiel, on le sou met directement
OU indirectement d la legislature.
Ou il est entierement independant d' elle, il ne peut presque rien." I, 215.
The most intelligent men in our country, have come at length
to be apprehensive of the attribution of power to the Executive,
and have no apprehension whatever of seeing it claimed for that
branch, whose greatly preponderant strength, according to the
opinion of eminent men and lovers of freedom, is the vice of the
Constitution.
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Very singular results from this cause are manifested in the
present day by men of the first ability in the country.
One of them, abstaining from a direct assert~on of the President's civil authority to suspend the privilege of the Writ, claims
a, military power of equal import for the Commander-in-Chief of
the Militia calle<l into service.
Another claims to limit the military power to the capture of
rebels in arms, or of those proximately present and aiding, without arms, and only such, and handing them over to the civil tribunals for trial-expressly denying the President's civil power,
in rebellion, to detain anybody under the Habeas Corpus clause 1
and reducing his military power over captives in :urns, to those
of a district marshal, whose duty is to arrest for immediate trial
before a court.
A third prefers asserting an authority by martial law, to capture and detain at military discretion, superseding the municipal
laws and authorities, ad libitum, during the prevalence of w11r in
the country.
A fourth denies all authority to the President, or to anybody
but Congress, and the laws they ordain over the citizens and
freemen of the country, even in a war of rebellion or invasion,
precisely as in time of full peace. This is the Parliamentary
cloctrine before adverted to.
It is impossible to imagine stronger evidence of the influence
of a democratic Constitution upon the political opinions of men
of great acuteness, some of whom at least are probably not ·democratic in the radical signification, as the Constitution certainly is not, though its spirit is largely democratic, fortified for
the purposes of war, and for self-defen_ce, with some pretty strong:
organic power. They withdraw by an acquired prejudice, from
asserting a civil power in the President, the most clearly executive in its character,-the most clearly indicated in the Constitution by the conditions of its exercise-but the last to be thought
of by them, because it carries power in that direction, which isagainst the gulf stream of Legislative authority, the great channel of the popular will of the moment.
No apprehension of that nature has prevented the writer of
this paper from expressing with moderation, and deference for
contrary opinions, the suggestions of his own mind.
5
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The conclusion of the whole matter is this: that the Constitution itself is the law of the privilege~ and of the exception
to it; that the exception is expressed in the Constitution, and
that the Constitution gives effect to the act of suspension when
the conditions occur; that the conditions consist of two matters
of fact, one a naked matter of fact, and the other a matter-of-fact
conchision from facts, that is to say, rebellion and the public
danger; or the requirement of public safety. Whichever power
of the constituted government can most properly decide these
facts, is master of the exception, and competent to apply it.
Whether it be Congress or the President, the power can only be
de1:ived by implication, as there is no express delegation of
the power in the Constitution; and it must be derived to that
department whose functions are the most appropriate to it. Congress cannot execiitively suspend. All that a Legislative body
can do, is to authorize suspension, by giving that effect to an Executive act; and the Constitution having authorized that, there
is no room f01: the exercise of Legislative power. The Constitution intended, that for the defence of the nation against rebellion
and invasion, the power should always be kept open in either of
these events, to be used by that department, which is the most
competent in the same events to say what the public safety requires in this behalf. The President being the properest and the
safest depositary of the power, and being the only power which
can exercise it under real and effective responsibilities to the
people, it is both constitutional and safe to argue, that the Constitution has placed it with him.
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THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT.
S E C O ND

PART.

THE objections which have been made to the Tract entitled
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution," whether argued or dogmatized, and whether pertinent
or not to the principal matter in question, may, so far as it is
intended to notice them in this paper, be included under the
following heads :
1. That the Habeas Corpus clause in the ninth section of the
First Article of the Constitution of the United States,
does not give authority or power to anybody; that it is
merely restrictive of powers given elsewhere in the Constitution; that Congress have other powers under the
Constitution by which suspension of the Habeas Corpus
might have been authorized by that body at their
pleasure, and under any circumstances, if the clause in
the ninth section of the First Article had not been
adopted; and that the clause is merely a restraint upon
the exercise of those other powers by Congress.
2. That the President has no authority under the Constitution to issue a warrant of arrest and imprisonment, and
therefore, cannot decree the power of arrest and suspension without authority from Congress.
3. That the debates in the State Conventions which ratified
the Constitution, prove that the clause was adopted as
meaning that Congress alone had authority to suspend
the privilege of the Writ.
.,
4. That the Bills of Rights in the State Constitutions which
have the same clause, or clauses of like meaning, prove
that the Legislature alone was deemed to possess the
authority.
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5. That the State Bills of Rights which declare the fundamental principle, that the suspension of Laws, except by
the Legislature, or under their authority, is illegal, prove
the same thing.
OBJECTION I.

The first objection is both pertinent and important. It was not
overlooked in the preceding Tract, but was denied, and left for
assertion and proof. If it is sound, it materially disables the argument which regards the Habeas Corpus clause as a grant of
authority. If it is unsound, it leaves tho interpretation of the
meaning of the clause, as it was stated in the Tract, without any
answer. In that case the clause must give authority or power
to somebody; and to whom it gives the authority, must depend
upon other considerations.
The objection is an affirmative one, and puts upon the writer
who makes it, the duty of proving it. This is not distinctly
denied by anybody, but is tacitly assumed by the objectors; and
it becomes necessary therefore to exhibit, as fairly, and as
nearly in the words of the objectors as possible, their affirmations and their proofs.
A Louisville writer* states his position, and presents his supposed proofs, in these words :
"There is a short process by which to eviscerate tho very gist
of tho question, which seems not yet to have been applied,
simple and obvious as is that process. Let us suppose the Constitution wholly silent on the subject, saying not one word about
the Writ, or its suspension j whore then would have been tho
po,ver to suspend ? No intelligent, candid man will pretend
that it would not be clearly, indisputably, with Congress, or
that by any possible fair construction the power could be assigned to the President."
The President's power is not the present question, but the
power of Congress, ang. the effect of the absence of the Habeas
Corpus clause from the Constitution. The writer proceeds :
"This conceded, then let it be remembered that the clause is

*
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a restrictive and not an enabling one. Without the restriction ,
Congress would have had plenary power, untrammelled discretion over the Writ. It could have created the Writ, or not, at its
pleasure, suspended, or wholly repealed it out of existence, whenever, and as often as it thought proper."
The proposition contained in the short process is not conceded, but was the matter to be proved, and the whole matter;
and therefore, thus far the whole proof of the proposition is in
the writer's assertion, and in the supposed concession. He
proceeds:
"Here, then, this full power, this full discretion over the
vVrit, was what had to be restrained, to accomplish the plain
purpose of the clause, that is, placing tho citizen's privilege of
using the protection of tho Writ upon a surer, more permanent
basis, than it stood in England, where it rests upon the untrammelled discretion of Parliament. Who, then, was intended to be
restrained by this clause? Surely not tho President, who,
under such silence of the Constitution, would have had no possible control over the Writ in any circumstances whatever.
There could be no necessity to restrain his power, when ho
would have none to be restrained. Full surely it must have
been intended to restrain Congress, which alone and exclusively
would have had the power."
Thus end the affirmation and the proof. What follows from
the objector, he calls "confirmation," " if it needed confirmation." It is not difficult to infer or conclude anything, if a
writer is permitted to prove his fundamental proposition by asserting it, or by supposing it to be conceded. The matter to be
proved was the power of Congress, their "plenary and untrammelled" power over the Writ; and the assertion of that plenary
power is all the proof, and the concession of that, is the root of
all that follows. The writer proceeds :
"If this plain view needed confirmation, it could be found in a
contemporaneous discussion in the Virginia Convention. Patrick
Henry contended that the restrictive or prohibitory clauses,
created by implication powers not specially given, Dontrary to
the assertion of the advocates of the Constitution, that tho
Government would have no power but whr.,t was specially
granted. He referred to the Habeas Corpus clause, and said:
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'It results, clearly, that if it had not said so, they could have
suspended it in all cases whatever.' Governor Randolph, to
whom the country is more indebted for the Constitution than to
any other member of the Federal Convention, except Charles
Pinckney, answering Henry, said: Gentlemen, suppose from the
negative restrictions, that Congress is to have powers by implication. I will meet them on that ground. I persuade myself
that every exception here mentioned, is an exception, not from
general powers, but from the particular powers therein vested.
To what power is the exception made to the importation of
negroes ? Not from a general po,ver, but from a particular
power expressly enumerated. This is an exception from the
power given of regulating commerce. He asks where is the
power to which the prohibition of suspending the Habeas Corpus
is an exception. I contend, that, by virtue of the power given
to Congress to regulate the courts, they could suspend the vV rit.
This is therefore an exception to that power."
Thus closes the argument of the writer, that the Habeas Corpus clause is merely restrictive, and gives no power.
So far as the argument between Patrick Henry and Governor
Randolph is concerned, it is an averment by Henry that the
restrictive clauses created power by implication, and a call by
him for the power to which the prohibition of suspending the
Writ of Habeas Corpus was an exception; and on the part of
Randolph, it was a denial of the averment, and an argumentative assertion on his part, that the power was to be found in the
power given to Congress to regulate the courts. Governor
Randolph said that he contended that it was, and he said no
more.
The answer to this objection might be much shorter than we
shall make it. The objection is not proved at all. There is not
a shadow of proof in any part of the quotation. The dispute
between Henry and Randolph was a wrestling-match, a metaphysical disputation about general and particular powers, one of
a class of questions interesting, perhaps, to the Convention of
Virginia, but of little use in the practical construction of the
Constitution. Pressed in an argument by his adversary, Mr.
Randolph resorted for defence to an assertion, which he contended was true, but did not attempt to prove it. It is not
necessary to examine the personal authority of Mr. Randolph
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on such a point, or on any other. He has no such name, either
as delegate to the Convention, or as Attorney-General first, and
then Secretary of State, under Washington, as to dispense with
higher proof of the proposition he contended for.
The answers to the position of the Reviewer, which we are
under no obligation to give, for he has only asserted, and not
proved anything, are these :
1. The Constitution gives no such power to Congress, as a
power to regulate the Courts.
A resort to indefinite language is the common artifice of a
deficient argument; and so it has occurred here. The word
"regulate," or any one of its derivatives, cannot be found in the
Constitution, in tho grant of judicial powers, or in any clause
which relates to judicial tribunals, except in a single instance,
which regards the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In a11 cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, and those in which a State sha11 be a party, the Third
Article of the Constitution says the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction. In a11 other cases before mentioned, that
is to say, those to which the judicial power of the United States
extends, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations, as the Congress sha11 make. This is the only instance in which the word is used in tho judicial relation. The
regulation by Congress of this appellate jurisdiction, so far
as consists with tho existence of that jurisdiction which the
Constitution says the Supreme Court shall have, may be admitted. It is unnecessary to look at the limitations of the
power. Tho appe1late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is the
only subject to which the power of regulation by Congress
applies.
2. The judicial power of the United States does not depend
at all upon the discretion or regulating power of Congress. The
Constitution declares that it shall extend to a11 the subjects,
cases, and controversies which are enumerated or described in
the instrument. Congress cannot add to it nor diminish it. In
the only instance in which the judicial power was deemed to
extend too far, the power of sustaining suits against the States,
it was abridged, and could only be abridged, by an amendment
of the Constitution.
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The judicial power of the United States extends to every
question of personal liberty which arises in any subject, case, or
controversy, to which the power extends-to imprisonment to
which the United States is a party-to which there are any
parties in a case or controversy, within the jurisdiction of the
power. Congress cannot take this power away, or diminish it.
The judicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. CongreRs have by this
language a discretion as to the number, order and jurisdiction
of the inferior courts; but they have no discretion whatever as
to vesting or not vesting the whole judicial power of the United
States in courts of some description.
The very broad assertion of Congressional power and discretion, which lies at the foundation of the objection we are considering, has been made in a judicial controversy, and received a
judicial answer, in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheaton; Story on
the Const., sec. 1590, &c., 3d edit. "If Congress possess any
discretion on the subject, it is obvious that the Judiciary, as a
co-ordinate department of the government, may at the will of
Congress be annihilated, or stripped of all its important jurisdiction; for if tho discretion exists, no one can say in what
manner, or at what time, or under what circumstances, it may
or ought to be exercised."-" The language of the Third Article
throughout" (the judicial article), "is manifestly designed to be
mandatory upon the Legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that Congress could not, without a violation of its
duty, have refused to carry it into operation. The judicial
power of the United States shall be vested (not may be vested)
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish. Could Congress
have lawfully refused to create a Supreme Court, or to vest in
it the constitutional jurisdiction? The judges both of the Supreme and inferior Courts shall hold their offices during good
'behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a
·compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Could Congress create or limit any other
tenure of the judicial office? Could they refuse to pay at
stated times, the stipulated salary, or diminish it during the
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continuance in office?"-" The judicial power must therefore be
vested in some Court by Congress; and to suppose that it was
not an obligation binding on them, but might at their pleasure
be omitted or declined, is to suppose that under the sanction of
the Constitution they might defeat the Constitution itself. A
construction which would lead to such a result cannot be sound."
-" If, then, it is the duty of Congress to vest the judicial
power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power. The language, if imperative as to one part, is imperative as to all. If it were otherwise, this anomaly would
exist, that Congress might successively refuse to vest the jurisdiction in any one class of cases enumerated in the Constitution,
and thereby defeat the jurisdiction as to all; for the Constitution has not singled out any class on which Congress are bound
to act in preference to others.''
The excellent sense of this judgment, it may be observed,
need be developed, but a single step further, to demolish the
very foundation upon which the objection of Judge Nicholas is
built.
The. duty having been thus prescribed to Congress by the
Constitution, an express power is given to Congress in the
Eighth Article, to perform it, and to execute the mandate.
"The Congress shall have power-to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
The obligation to vest the judicial power, and the whole judicial power, in tribunals of some description, being mandatory,
it follows necessarily, that it is equally mandatory upon Congress, to constitute the tribunals, in which, together with a Supreme Court, the whole judicial power shall be vested.
The whole question that remains, is what is meant by constituting tribunals. It clearly can mean nothing else, than to erect
judicial tribunals or courts, and to give them such constitution
or organization, as will enable them to exercise the judicial
powers vested in them. The mere erection of a tribunal by
name is nothing. The erection of a court, and vesting jurisdiction and judicial power in it, would be nothing, without more.
A judicial tribunal is not constituted, unless it is endued with
the active powers which are necessary to the exercise of its judicial powers. It must have the means of bringing parties before
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it, in order to hear them; in some cases, to bring the subject in
dispute before it, or within its power; and after hearing and
judging, to enforce and execute its judgments and decrees. It
must have the power of issuing writs, of committing to officers
its mandates to be executed, in just such kind, number, and variety, as its judicial powers demand. These it must have, to be
constituted a judicial tribunal.
To admit that it is mandatory upon Congress to create tribunals, in which the whole judicial power may vest, and yet argue
that it is within the absolute discretion of Congress to give or to
withhold the instrumental powers which are indispensably necessary to the exercise of the whole, is to argue without color
or semblance of reason. Those instrumental powers are part of
the constitution of a judicial tribunal. Congress cannot withhold or take away any one of them, that is necessary, unless
they supply another, without destroying, for the term of this
privation, the exercise of the judicial power to that extent. If
Congress can do this in any one case, they may successively do
it in a class, and in every class, of cases, and defeat the jurisdiction in all. The Constitution has not singled out any class or
case in which Congress may so act at their plenary and untrammelled discretion.
Congress executed this duty faithfully, in words completely
corresponding with the extent and necessities of the judicial
power: "All the beforementioned courts of the United States
shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus,
and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law." -Act
to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 24 Sept.
1789, sec. 14. Congress needed not to give any more, they
could not give any less, than those writs which were necessary.
The very word adopts and confirms the argument. There is no
power of Congress which touches or can touch the co-ordinate
power of the Judiciary. They can only sustain it by constituting courts for the exercise of it. The Judiciary is an independent department throughout. It is created and established by
the Constitution. The Legislature, so far as regards this department, is the organ or agent of the Constitution, to give the
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judicial povrnr its place of abode or seat, and its active powers.
The instrumental power of Congress is a trust for this purpose.
Congress have, in this matter, no discretion. Congress can no
more withhold tribunals, than withhold the vesting of judicial
power-no more withhold the instruments by which the tribunals can act, than withhold the tribunals-no more do any of
these things, than lawfully abdicate or defeat the Constitution.
The error, the vulgar error, of Governor Randolph, was in
not distinguishing between instrumental or mechanical power, and
constitutional or moral power. Everything that it is the province
of legislation to do, the Legislature or law-making power alone
is competent to do ; and the Legislature may in one sense act or
not act at its pleasure. But the Legislature is also a moral and
constitutional power, and cannot by any form of law effectually
do anything that is contrary to the mandate of the Constitution,
nor omit to do what it is commanded to do by the Constitution.
It may affect to do the wrong thing, but it cannot do it effectually. It may omit to do the right thing, but it violates the command of its creator by so omitting, and brings on the dcstructio=n
of its own being. There are infinite things which are within its
discretion to do or not to do; but to give the necessary organization to the Judicial department, is not within its discretion to do
or not to do, for that would have been a discretion to destroy the
Constitution. Congress are constitutionally bound to do what is
necessary to enable the Judicial department to exercise its powers.
It is the condition upon which their own co-ordinate power exists.
Forms of process and execution they may select; but they must
select such as will enable the courts to exercise their whole judicial power. Whether they will grant to the courts the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, may be so far within the discretion of Congress, as that they may substitute a writ or writs of another
name, of equivalent authority or command. Writs are the arms
and hands of the judicial power. They are the instruments by
which alone it touches the parties and subjects of its power. It
can command nothing and enforce nothing without them. The
judicial power without them would be paralytic in every limb,
or rather it ·would have no limbs. It would be a living power in
the intellect, but inert and dead in its capacity to act, or to execute the judgments of its intellect. Congress violate the com-
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mand of the Constitution, if they do not constitute the judicial
tri~unals with these means of exercising their judicial powers
and jurisdiction in cases or controversies involving imprisonment
and personal liberty within their jurisdiction, and especially
with the means of that great Writ which Mr. Hallam has called
"the principal bulwark of English liberty." The want of that
Writ, or of an equivalent one, would strike that principle from
the protection of the Judicial department of the Government and
of the Constitution.
If Congress could take this Writ away forever or for a day,
or withhold it altogether, the same thing might be done with
writs or process necessary to exercise judicial power and jurisdiction in cases involving personal security, and personal or real property-in fine, with every necessary instrument of action, in every
case to which the judicial power extends. Such failures of duty
would be nothing less than not constituting the tribunals, which
Congress are commanded to constitute; for without such powers
of action the Courts would have no constitution at all. They
would have neither life nor action, in which judicial power
consists.
How inconsiderate is this attribution of plenary and untrammelled discretion to Congress, in any case where a mandate of
the Constitution requires that body to act to a certain and definite end. The mandate is the trammel.. The power in such
cases is a trust to act; and a trust to act, created by the Constitution, is a command to act, and is violated by not acting, or
by acting in opposition to the end and purpose of the trust and
command. If the instrumental power of legislation is subject
to an untrammelled discretion in such cases, Congress may
repeal the whole Judiciary Act and pass no other-refuse to
make an appropriation for tho salary of a single judge-refuse
to appropriate for any of the expenses of the department. If
this be constitutional, Congress may constitutionally destroy the
Constitution.
Without looking, then, at all at personal liberty as being under
the special protection of the Constitution, or entering upon the
higher inquiry into the principles which limit or restrain the
Constitution itself, in regard to this and other most sacred rights,
this position of the Louisville Reviewer is overthrown by the
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mandate of the Constitution in its creation of the J udicjal department. An act to deprive the courts of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, or any other writ which is necessary to the exercise of
the judicial power, would be an unconstitutional assault upon a
co-ordinate department, against the mandate of the Constitution.
It would be an insurrection of the creature against its creator.
It is grossly illogical to make an unconstitutional power, or an
unconstitutional use of power, as the mis-acting or non-acting
in such a case would be, the ground of inferring that the Habeas
Corpus clause in the Constitution is merely restrictive upon
Congress.
3. But if an arbitrary discretion existed in Congress to withhold or repeal the Writ of Habeas Corpus, this would be infinitely short of the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus. The privilege is a subject totally different from
the Writ. The repeal, either total or limited, absolute or suspensive, of the judicial power to issue the Writ, would be the
denial or loss of the specific remedy to the prisoner, and nothing
more. Grievous it would be undoubtedly, and especially if it
proceeded from mere legislative will; but the wrong of an arbitrary imprisonment to the prisoner would remain; the right
of the prisoner would remain ; and the prisoner's remedy by
action for the wrong would remain; and the public remedy for
the wrong to the country would remain, by indictment for assault
and battery, or for conspiracy, or other public offence involved
in the lawless and arbitrary imprisonment. It would not be
even an approach to the suspens1on of the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, which in the sense in which the Constitution
uses these words, and as the States use them in Bills or declarations of Rights, is the suspension by supreme authority of the
right as well as the remedy in time of rebellion or invasion, if
the public safety requires it.
We deceive ourselves, as has been already said, by analogies
drawn from acts of Parliament, in regard to the denial of Bail
and Trial. We suffer popular English expressions, in regard to
these acts, calling them " suspensions of the Habeas Corpus
Act," to lead us astray in the interpretation of the language of
our own Constitution.
In this matter of the power of Congress as a legislature, we
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delude ourselves by a supposition, that it is by the ordinary
power of legislation, the same in Congress as in Parliament,
that Parliament does that which is popularly called suspending
the Habeas Corpus Act for a limited time. It may be useful to
look more closely at what Parliament does in this matter-at its
manner of doing it-and at the nature of the power which Parliament exercises in doing it. If we give the subject our attention, it will completely dissipate the vision of an analogy, in this
respect, between Parliament and Congress.
Those Imprisonment Acts of Parliament are very different
things from suspensions of the privilege of the Habeas Corpus
Act. They are not passed in virtue of such powers as exist in
Congress, apart from the Habeas Corpus clause, but from much
higher and greater, and such as a Constitution of enumerated
and limited powers cannot have unless expressly granted; such
as the people thought too dangerous to include in the powers of
the Federal Constitution; and as the people of no State have
thought proper to grant in their State Constitution. The acts
of Parliament referred to do not affect to touch the privilege or
right of the suspected prisoner, but only the fact of bail or
trial, if demanded by him within the time limited. They do not,
in terms of any kind, deny or delay, or suspend his rjght of
freedom, or his right to a remedy for the wrong which may be
done to him by arbitrary imprisonment. They make particular
exceptions to the enjoyment of bail and trial, and they so far
arrest that provision of the Habeas Corpus Act which makes
this enjoyment general or universal; and they do no more in
this respect.
The power by which Parliament arbitrarily denies bail and
trial to a prisoner, is that imperial power by which the King
and tho two Houses of Parliament, the Commons representing
the whole people of England, provide for the public safety, as
paramount to the existing Constitution, alter that Constitution
if they see fit, change the succession to the Crown, substitute
new stocks of inheritance, engraft new principles upon the Constitution if the old prove defective, dela,y and even extinguish
constitutional rights, when the public safety demands it. It
were idle to say that this is not a constitutional power of the
English government. It is part of the English Constitution,
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however imperial it may be; and while with consummate caution
it is rarely exercised, except in cases of commanding public necessity, to touch any of ~he great principles and rights, public and
private, which form the Constitution in the general apprehension,
it does touch both, freely and decisively, upon occasions of great
public concern, and especially in cases of combinations to overthrow the Constitution, to destroy the person of the king, or the
laws and liberties of England.
All the acts of Parliament, which we have called Imprisonment Acts, and which are popularly called "suspensions of the
Habeas Corpus Act," recite that the enactments are necessary
"for the public safety," or "to secui·e the peace, laws, and liberties of the kingdom," or to that effect.
·
Their first an1 principal enactment follows pretty much this
formula: " Tha,t all or any persons that are or shall be in prison
within that part of the United Kingdom called Great Britain,
at or upon the day on which this Act shall receive his Majesty's
Royal assent, or after, by warrant of his said Majesty's most
honorable Privy Council, signed by, &c., for high treason, suspicion of high treason, or treasonable practices, or by any of
his Majesty's Secretaries of State, for such causes as aforesaid,
may be detained in safe custody without bail or mainprise until,
&c. ; and tha.t no Judge or Justice of the Peace shall bail or try
any such person or persons so committed, without order from
his Majesty's Privy Council, signed, &c., until the day aforesaid,
any law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding." Examples of this form may be seen in 19 George II, c. 1; 34 George
III, c. 50; 38 George III, c. 36; 41 George III, c. 26; 57
George III, c. 3~ c. 55.
These statutes say nothing about the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, nor of the rights of the prisoner, nor of the
immunity of anybody for or on account of the arrest and imprisonment, or on account of advising or combining to bring
them about: and this is the scope of a Parliamentary "suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act" of 31 Charles II.
Whether, if the Habeas Corpus clause had not been inserted
in the Constitution, the power of Congress would have extended
to make such enactments as the acts of Parliament referred to,
it would be a waste of time to inquire. They are entirely
2
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beyond the scope of such a Constitution as ours. The authority
to ma.k c them is an exercise of the pre-potent authority of Parlia,ment, which holds the Constitution of England in its arms.
But these acts take away no right from the prisoner, but the
present enjoyment of personal liberty, and of bail or trial. The
complements of such acts remain to another day, when they are
followed by what are called Acts of Indemnity-not of compensation-but of extinguishment of all the rights which the arrest
and imprisonment may lrnve wronged, and of all claims, demands,
actions and proceedings on account of the same. The formula
of such Indemnity Acts is the following:
"That all personal actions, indictments, &c., brought or hereafter to be brought, &c., and all judgments thereupon obtained,
if any such there be, and all proceedings whatsoever against any
person or persons, for or on account of any act, matter or thing
by him or them done, or commanded, ordered or directed to be
clone, since, &c., for apprehending, imprisoning, or detaining
any person in custody, charged with or suspected of treason,
&c., shall be discharged and made void; and that any person by
whom any such act, &c., shall have been done, &c., shall be held
discharged and indemnified, as well against the King's Majesty,
his heirs and successors, as against the person or persons apprehended, imprisoned, or detained in custody, and all and every
other person or persons whomsoever." And the proceedings in
suits, prosecutions, &c., instituted, or that may be instituted,
are ordered to be summarily stayed. For an example, see 58
George III, c. 6.
These Indemnity Acts are other instances of the pre-potent
authority of Parliament working out tho safety of England, and
the securing of her peace, laws, and liberties, by this exercise of
supreme law.
The Imprisonment Acts, it has been remarked, say nothing
expressly about the Habeas Corpus Act. Perhaps it may be
thought that they do not contradict expressly any principle of
the Constitution of England. Magna Carta and .the Petition
of Right of 3 Charles I, say that no freeman may be taken or
imprisoned, but by the la1vful judgment of his peers, or by the
law of the land; and these Acts of Parliament may be said to
be laws of the land. But they are not laws in the spirit of
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Magna Carta, or of the Petition of Right, or of the Resolutions
of 1628. There are no laws, principles, or acts of Parliament,
which declare that suspicion of treason or treasonable practices
shall be lawful cause of imprisonment and denial of bail; and
these Imprisonment Acts themselves do not enact or declare that
suspicion of treason or treasonable practices, shall be lawful cause
of imprisonment in the case of the prisoners, who they say may
be detained in custody without bail or trial. They are in substance
sentences of imprisonment for a cause unknown to the laws of England, and are opposed to the letter as well as to the spirit of the
first resolution of the House of Commons in 1628, adopted upon
the motion of S_ir Edward Coke, which asserted that no freeman
ought to be committed or detained by command of the King or
Privy Council, or any other, unless some cause of commitment
or detainer be expressed, for which by law he ought to be com. mitted or detained; and against the spirit of the second resolution, which asserts that the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought to be
granted to every man that is committed or detained by the
King, the Privy Council, or any other. The prisoner is not denied the Writ of Habeas Corpus, but he is denied the fruit of it,bail, trial, or discharge. The acts are a positiye authority to
detain individuals in prison by warrants of the Privy Council,
which do not express a cause of commitment or detainer, for
which, by law, he ought to be committed or detained without
bail; and they implicitly deny to the prisoners the benefit of the
Writ of HabeM Corpus, which was the sole and exclusive meaning of the second resolution of the Commons.
Yet no subject of England can make a question of the validity
of these acts, and their conformity to the Constitution of
England in that high and imperial principle which provides for
its own safety. At the same time, the Commentator of the laws
of England, has shown the nature of that principle, and the
source of it. His words are these :
"But the happiness of our Constitution is, that it is not left to
the Executive power to determine when the danger of the State
is so great as to render this measure expedient; for it is the
Parliament only, or the Legislative power, that whenever it sees
proper, can authorize the Crown, by suspending the Habeas.
Corpus Act for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected
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persons, without giving any reason for so doing. As the Senate
of Rome was wont to have recourse to a dictator, a magistrate
of absolute authority, when they judged the republic in any
imminent danger." 1 Black. Comm., Book I, 136. It is the
power of the Dictator-of absolute authority, which is lodged in
the King, and in the Estates of the Realm assembled in Parliament, and is thus used in times of imminent danger for the
safety of the Kingdom and of the Constitution; and it is the
same absolute power which indemnifies the _wrongdoer, and extinguishes the wrong itself, and the _private right to compensation for it, and the public right to redress for the wrong done
to the public by a combination to commit wrong. The Parliament of England is perfectly conscious of the principles of
English Liberty, and of the bearing upon them of these enactments; but the same imperial power which puts them aside for
the season, silences all attempts to raise a claim for the violation
of them.
This is the state of the law and practice of Habeas Corpus suspension in England. The principles of personal liberty, and the
ackno·wledgment of them by the Constitution, would be called,
in the absence of the Habeas Corpus clause, the same in the two
countries; at least nobody has hitherto been found to assert that
they are less or narrower in the United States than anywhere
else, or that they enter less into the Constitution of the United
States, or are less secure under it, or that the powers of the
Government of the United States are less limite~or controlled
by them. And if this is so, then before a power can be asserted
for Congress, in the absence of such a clause, as the Habeas
Corpus clause, to delay, deny or suspend the right of personal
liberty by authorizing arbitrary imprisonment for a moment, it
is not enough that formal power should be shown to repeal the
Writ, it must be shown that the Constitution gives or contains
power to silence the right and all its remedies, to extinguish the
wrong of invading and defeating it, and to .exercise in fine that
high and ultimate power of the Senate of Rome, or of the Parliament of England, to take care, dent operam consules, ne quid
respublica detrimenti capiat-the Senatus consultwn ultimce necessitatis-the supreme law of last necessity.
It is extravagant to argue that the Constitution of the United
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States, without a Habeas Corpus suspension clause in it, ·would
have authorized Congress or anybody to exercise this ultimate
power against the liberty of any man; for no people in any country have more ·s trenuously asserted, from the first days of their
colonization, this special right of personal liberty, against the
colonial policy of England, and as an exception from the powers
of government in all free Constitutions; and nothing has passed
more completely into a primary truth, than that the Constitution of the United States is a Government of enumerated and
specific powers, confined to the exercise of such powers and
their necessary and proper means, all others being reserved to
the States or to the people; and consequently that the power
ultimre necessitatis does not exist in this limited government, in
any form of it, unless in the modified form of the Habeas Corpus
clause, which the Louisville writer says gives no power whatever,
but only restrains the untrammelled discretion of Congress.
It is unnecessary to quote authorities for this fundamental
doctrine. Any person may take the initial chapter of the 2d
volume of Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American Law,
and find the assertion of ·fundamental rights traced historically
from the first settlement of our people. Magna Carta, and the
Common Law so far as it was applicable to their local circumstances, and the Petition of Right in the third year of Charles
I, were birthrights of this people. The Declaration of Rights
by the first Congress of 177 4 asserted it. From the foundation
of the Colony of Plymouth down to the epoch of the Constitution, and continually since, as new States have been added
to the Union, the great fundamental right of personal liberty,
and the right of Bail and Trial, have been asserted for all freemen of the States, and the imprisonment of freemen without
due commitment for legal cause denounced as illegal and arbitrary. This and various other fundamental rights have been
declared to be exceptions out of the general powers of government-even in the States, whose powers of government within
their own jurisdiction are otherwise unlimited. The Habeas
Corpus clause is the only one that gives control of such fundamental rights as regard personal liberty, in times of convulsion,
from specific dangers to the public rnfety.
Judge Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, Book III,
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ch. xxiv, give all the adjudications and arguments on the powers
of Congress in this behalf. Nothing can be suggested in argument that is more licentious than the position that Congress, in
the absence of the Habeas Corpus clause, would have had plenary
and untrammelled power and discretion to suspend the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Congress have express powers,
and the incidental and instrumental powers necessary and proper
to carry them into execution. That is the whole extent. The
first five words of the First Article of the Constitution, and the
last six words of the Tenth and last Amendment proposed by
Congress, encircle, and bind in, these enumerated powers as with
hoops of steel. The last clause of the Eighth Section of the
First Article gives all incidental and instrumental powers, and
they would have been implied without it. "It neither enlarges
any power specifically granted, nor is it a grant of any new
power to Congress, but it is merely a declaration for the removal
of uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution the
powers expressly granted are included in the grant. Whenever,
therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a
particular power, the first question is, ·whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question is decided.
If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be, whether it is
properly incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, then it may be exercised by Congress. If not,
Congress cannot exercise it.'' 2 Story on Const., 3d ed. sec.
1236-1243. It is not required that the incidental or instrumental power should be strictly and indispensably necessary;
nor is it sufficient if the relation of the incident to the principal
be so obscure or vague as to be only within reach of the most
subtle ingenuity. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to the end, and which are not
prohibited, but are consistent with the letter and spirit of the
instrument, are constitutional." Sec. 1255. What a caricature
of argument it would be, to allege that the withholding, repealing, or suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus, is an appropriate
means of constituting a judicial tribunal!
The power to withhold, suspend, or repeal the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, in the absence of the Habeas Corpus clause, still less
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the power by so doing to suspend the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus) does not exist as an express power ; and as an
incidental or instrumental power, it has not one of these ingredients. In the absence of the Habeas Corpus clause, the end
is not legitimate. It is to defeat a fundamental principle of the
Constitution, as it would then have stood, and to weaken and
incapacitate a co-ordinate department of the Government in the
exercise of its judicial power and jurisdiction. It is not within
the scope of the Constitution. The scope of the Constitution is
to protect, defend, and secure the blessings ofliberty, universally,
and without exception, unless an exception is declared in the
instrument. It is not appropriate, or plainly adapted to the
end-even the unconstitutional end of suspending the privilege
of the Writ of Habeas -Corpus, if the Habeas Corpus clause
does not give the power. Repealing, suspending, or withholding
the Writ, does not suspend the privilege or right, either of freedom or of remedy. The arrest and imprisonment would be a
wrong. They would make the advisers, agents, and parties
wrongdoers, and amenable to the law for damages and punishment. r_l1he right or privilege existed before the Writ was given
by law; it would continue to exist after the Writ was thus suspended by the legislative power.
The Constitution of the United States has, it is true, no Bill
of Rights. Such a declaration was proposed in the Convention,
and lost by an equally divided vote, in perfect congruity with
the common apprehension, that the advantages and mischiefs of
such a declaration were about equally balanced. If it were full
and accurate, it might save argument in putting down constructive usurpation. If it should be incomplete, it would be a snare
to take and destroy all Rights which were not expressly enumerated. If it should be redundant, and include too much, it
might trammel Government in the execution of its fair and
necessary powers, or injure the rights therein acknowledged, by
the doubtful or bad character of their associates. The Federalist, No. 83, investigated the subject of such Ilills, and held
that they were unnecessary, and even dangerous. Several of
the State Conventions expressed a desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of powers, that further declaratory
clauses should be added to the Constitution which they had rati-
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fied; and Congress proposed the ten amendments, which stand
next to that instrument in our copies of the Constitution. They
are explanations, and not additions. They assert what all admit
to have been implied in the Constitution itself. They answered the
good purpose of giving confidence, and quieting apprehensions.
Judge Story, strongly inclining to regard Bills of Rights as
useful in many ways, and making a very able argument for
them (sec. 1863-1868), does not point out any of the Amendments as an alteration of the Constitution, though valuable as
an exposition of its principles. . In the Fifth Amendment,
which, among other things, declares that no man shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
we see no more than a recognition of one of the great principles
of Magna Carta which our ancestors brought with them as their
birthright, and which are fundamental rights, incorporated -in
all our Constitutions, and the invasion of them specially excluded by the limited grants of power in the Constitution of the
United States. If the Habeas Corpus clause had not been
inserted in the Constitution, and given the power to suspend the
privilege of the Writ when the public safety required it in cases
of Rebellion or Invasion, no one could have found either word
or principle in the Constitution, which could give color to the
proposition, that the powers of Congress include the despotic
power of suspending the privilege at any time, and for any
cause, and that the exclusive power of Congress at this day to
suspend the privilege asserted, is not even now derived from the
clause, but is saved out of the general powers in the Eighth Section of the First Article. It may be properly called an enormous
proposition; for although the Habeas Corpus clause ma,kes such
a power comparatively harmless in regard to personal liberty, the
argument which makes it a mere restraint in this respect, leaves
Congress, if the proposition be true, to be the absolute masters
of the country in regard to every other judicial instrument,
process, writ or execution by which personal security and pro ..
perty of every description are protected by the Judicial department. It is unnecessary to argue this point further. We shall
add but a few words to show that what Governor Randolph
contended for, without a word of proof or argument, ~s in direct
conflict with the opinion and design of the Convention, as stated
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and declared in that day, in the most formal manner, by a delegate of the Convention to his constituent State.
~I.1he only authentic statement we know of, in regard to the
design of the Habeas Corpus· clause, represents that it was to
give the power of suspension to the Government of the United
States, and not to restrain a power of Congress before given.
Mr. Martin (Luthe1· Martin), a delegate from Maryland to
the Convention, and an anti-constitutionalist, who did not sign
the Constitution, from his apprehension that it would extinguish
State Rights, made a Report to the Legislature of Maryland on
the 27th January, 1788, giving general information relative to
the proceedings of the Convention, and particular elucidation of
the principles and clauses he opposed. After noticing the first
paragraph of the Ninth Section of the First Article, in regard
to the importation of slaves, to which he had objected, his statement proceeds:
"By the next paragraph, the General Government is to have
a power of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act in cases of Rebellion
or Invasion."
"As the State Governments have a power of suspending the
Habeas Corpus Act in these cases, it was said there could be no
reason /01· gi'ving such a power to tlte General Governrnent, since,
whenever the State which is invaded, or in which an insurrection
takes place, finds its safety requires it, it wm make use of that
power; and it was argued, that 1/ we gave that powe1· to the
General Government, it would be an engine of oppression in its
hands, since, whenever a State should oppose its views, however
arbitrary and unconstitutional, and refuse submission to them,
the General Government may declare it to be an act of Rebellion,
and, suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, may seize upon the
persons of those advocates of freedom, ,vho have had virtue and
resolution enough to cause the opposition, and may imprison
them at pleasure in the remotest part of the Union, so that a
citizen of Georgia might be bastiled in the furthest part of New
Hampshire, or a citizen of New Hampshire in the furthest
extreme to the South, cut off from their family, their friends,
and their every connection. These considerations induced me,
sir, to give my negative to this clause." ( Secret Proceedings and
Debates of the Conventi'on, p. 67, Albany, 1821.)
No one will doubt Mr. Martin's ability to understand the
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design of the clause, and that it was to give to the General
Government the power that is in question.
But further, when the vote in Convention was taken, ·while,
upon the division of the clause the delegates were unanimous in
affirming the first member of it, "that the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be su_spencled," the three States
· of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia voted against
the second member, "unless in cases of Rebellion and Invasion,
when the public safety may require it." Could they have voted
against the clause under the impression that the general and
unlimited power was already given to Congress? There is no
rational interpretation of the vote, but that the first member of
the Resolution was deemed to be declarative of a general prohibition of the power, and a confirmation of the general principle
of Magna Carta, and of the Petition of Right, and of all that
had been previously declared; and that the second member
granted power to the General Government in the excepted ca,ses.
North and South Carolina to the day of the Rebellion had no
clause in their Constitutions which mentioned the Writ of Habeas Corpus, or the exception. They rested upon the exclusion
of all power over the right of personal liberty in their State
Constitutions, by the fundamental principles retained in them,
South Carolina having repeated, in the Ninth Article of her
Constitution, the substance of the thirty-ninth clause of Magna
Carta, and North Carolina having given peculiar emphasis to
personal liberty in the Thirteenth Article of her declaration,
'' that every freeman restrained of his liberty is entitled to a
remedy, to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove
the same if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be
denied or delayed."
Finally: in the only judicial reference we know of to the
origin of the power to suspend the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus under the Constitution of the United States, the
clause in the Ninth Section is alone and emphatically decla.recl
to be the source of it.
Chief Justice Taney, in Merryman's case, expressly says:
"The clause in the Constitution which authorizes the suspension
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, is in the Ninth Section of the
First Article.''
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Thus, then, stand the answers to this first objection, so far
as it is said to be supported by the power of Congress to regulate the Courts. It is unnecessary to recapitulate them.
The conclusion results, that the Habeas Corpus clause is not
a mere restriction of the powers of Congress, or of any other
body, but is a confirmation of the general immunity of freemen
of the United States from the suspension of the privilege, and
a grant to the Government of the power to suspend it, in the
excepted cases. And this we are entitled to say, must have
been the sense of the Convention, as it is the sense of the clause,
and justifies the derivation by Chief Justice Taney of the authority to suspend the privilege of the Habeas Corpus, from
that clause in the Ninth Section of the Constitution.
It is hardly necessary to notice on this point other Reviewers
of the Tract on "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
under the Constitution," who, following Judge Nicholas in his
opinion, that the Habeas Corpus clause is merely restrictive of
the power of Congress, and is not a grant of power to anybody,
differ from him as to the particular power of Congress, under
which the privilege may be suspended.
It is clear from the preceding remarks, that the manda,te of
the Constitution covers the whole judicial power, and the
Federal Courts, from the arbitrary discretion of Congress universa1ly, in respect both to the judicial power, and the necessary
means of exercising and administering it. If Congress ca.n
under any power take away the necessary Writs, by the same
power they can annihilate the Judicial department. The power
does not exist anywhere, because the judicial power is independent of Congress, and is constituted directly or indirectly by
the Constitution itself.
It profits not, therefore, the covey of reviewers from the
Philadelphia Bar, which has been flushed and put upon the wing,
by the Tract on the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, to
look about for some other branch of Congressional power to
alight upon, with more security than the Louisville reviewer.
There is no choice left. All the branches are cut away by that
mandate of the Constitution which ordains the constitution of
tribunals to administer the whole judicial power. The question
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of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, is a question of the judicial
power. No power of Congress can mutilate that department.
But it may not be without local interest at least, to see how
the mere restriction of the Habeas Corpus clause has been defended by other critics.
In asserting the same construction as the writer just noticed,
that the Habeas Corpus clause is altogether restrictive, and not
a grant of power, another Reviewer* gives Governor Randolph a
compliment in exchange for his opinion on the source from ·
which Congress derives the power of suspension, and rejects his
opinion.
Whether the Reviewer's argument against Governor Randolph's selection of the power is conclusive for the reason he
alleges, is perhaps not clear; but this is altogether a collateral
matter, foreign to the present question, and will not be considered. The Reviewer rejects Governor Randolph on this
head, and that is sufficient. He proceeds to say that," While the opinion of Governor Randolph is entitled to as
much weight as that perhaps of any one who has ever expounded that instrument, it is contended, that in this instance,
he has fallen into an error as to the clause under which the
power of suspension is granted."
"A different interpretation, and, with all due respect for the
opinions of Governor Randolph it is suggested as being a much
more reasonable one, is this: that the authority to suspend the
Habeas Corpus is conferred under the power to p1·ovide for the
suppression of i'nsurrection and the npelling of invasi·on. This inference is supported by English analogy. The power was usually
exercised under those circumstances by Parliament. It springs
from tho necessity recognized as existing for the suspension
under these circumstances; and :finally the Habeas Corpus clause
implies its grant under the power referred to, by providing that
it shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it."
" ' Suspension,' 'insurrection,' 'invasion,' are inseparably
bound together. Construe the Constitution in this way, and its
reading is simple, consistent, and natural."

*

Review of Binney on the Habeas Corpus.
1862.

By J. C. Bullitt.

Philadelphia,
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"If, then, it is an error to construe the Habeas Corpus clause
as a grant of power, instead of a restriction, all the rest of the ·
argument must fall when it is removed. There might be some
reason for asserting that it was affirmative rather than restrictive, if there was no other clause in the Constitution under
which the grant of the power of suspension would be properly
implied."

It is something to know, that although Governor Randolph's
authority as an expounder of the Constitution is immensely extolled, it is rejected on the only point to which his exposition
applied. It saves any analysis of his pretensions, which would
be improper upon such an occasion as this.
The love of English analogy has seduced the Reviewer a
little, as has been already shown. It may suffice now to say,
that the Imprisonment Acts of Parliament do not recite the least
connection between the power they ·exercise or confer, and the
ordinary power of suppressing insurrection. They are made,
and they recite that they are made, in the exercise of a vastly
higher povrnr, which has never yet been claimed for the Congress of the United States. The power of calling out the
militia, is a power of the Crown, and not of Parliament. The
power of war, is not a power of Parliament, but of the Crown.
So that the analogy fails altogether. Parliament does not more
usually authorize imprisonment, without bail or trial, in time of
rebellion or invasion, than upon occasions when there is neither.
The first instance of such authority in the time of William III,
and the last in the time of George III, were made when there
wa,s neither. If "suspension," "insurrection," "invasion,"
are inseparably bound together, the Crown ought to have the
power of suspension, and not the Parliament. We must look
more closely to English analogies before we permit them to perform so important a part as to interpret our Constitution.
There is more carelessness than was looked for, from this
source, in the description of the power of Congress, upon which
this writer relies. There is no such power given to Congress as
a power to " provide for the suppression of insurrection and the
repelling of invasion." If he had more accurately quoted the
Constitution, the bearing of the first words might have drawn
his attention to the latitudinary construction he sets up. The
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power given by the Constitution is a power "to provide for
calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Its primary and
predominant object is to keep up, or restore, the full tone of the
laws. It is quite characteristic of these efforts to ignore or
suppress the operation of the great principles which are alone
to settle this question, that while Governor Randolph speaks of
the power of Congress to "regulate the courts," and the Reviewer of a power " to provide for the suppression of insurrection
an<l the repelling of invasion," there is no such power in the
Constitution as the first, and none like the last, but with adjuncts which defeat his construction. It would be remarkable,
indeed, if a power given to Congress to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, an<l repel invasions, was found to contain the germ of an
authority to suppress, for a time or season, the great fundamental
law of human liberty, the right of relief from arbitrary imprisonment, without a word to that effect! It is the power to
provide for the calling forth the militia that is given, and not
for the employing them when called forth, which passes immediately to another department; and if the power of suspending
the Writ is an incident to the suppression of rebellion, would
carry it to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the authority
which provides for the calling forth. Every one of these ends
or purposes of calling forth the militia is part of the Executive
power; and this convenient elision of the express power of the
clause, converts the power of providing for calling forth the
militia into the power of commanding the militia, and the army
and navy, as well as controlling the courts in the administration
of part of their judicial power.
How is the power of suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
incident to a power of calling out the militia to execute the
laws, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion? How would the
power of imprisoning, without bail, persons not insurgents,
nor invaders, be an appropriate incident to the power of suppressing insurgents and repelling invaders? A power that aids
in the suppression by means of the militia, acts by force, military
force, the power of war; and its incidental or adjunct powers
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must be of that nature, and tending to the same effect. Such
a derivation of the power of suspending the Writ identifies the
suspension with military force, and unnecessarily applies it too,
for the force that is military can do the same thing without formally suspending the Writ. Indeed, this has been regarded as
the case with the military arrest of Merryman, and was the
ground of a most able argument, attributed to the Hon. Reverdy
Johnson, against Chief Justice Taney's decision, in the weekly
National Intelligencer of June 20, 1861.
There is no power given to Congress by the Eighth Section,
not even the power "to coin money and to regulate the value
thereof," that is beyond the power of application to the suspension
of the Writ, by the ingenious surmise of ends, or by the suggestion of means. Congress might suspend the Writ to ferret out
a gang of counterfeiters; and it might be very convenient, too,
against that occult faculty. The decisive objection to the argument is, that the Writ of Habeas Corpus is an instrument of
the judicial power for the remedy of a civil right-the right of
liberation from arbitrary imprisonment, the right of bail and
trial; and if a power to beat this right down, or to deny it for
a season, is to be found among the powers of Congress, it must
be sought for among powers which can lawfully control the judicial power, and the means by which it is carried into execution,
if there be any such. To suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
is to suspend the exercise of the judicial power, to the whole
extent that the Constitution has given it. It is an interference
of one department with the constitutional powers of another,
and against a mandate of the Constitution, and must have
some much better authority than loose implication from powers
which have an express general end, of a totally different character, and by totally different means.
To such shifts and evasions, to such a "subtle finesse of construction," as Blackstone calls it, do constitutional critics sometimes resort, instead of coming to the great principles which
bind every department of Government under the Constitution,
and destroy the power of arbitrary imprisonment in every case,
unless it is obtained from the gift of tho people in the Habeas
Corpus clause.
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A third Reviewer* is more at large than the last, and much
more indefinite and obscure on this point. His proposition is
this:
" The second paragraph of the Ninth Section of Article I, like
the other paragraphs, contains no grant of power to anybody.
It is a restr'iction on power either expressly or impliedly given
elsewhere. The Eighth Section is affi~·mativo: it confers certain
and very large powers on Congress, which, without the restrictions of tho Ninth Section, might well cover the subject of the
latter. For instance, the third paragraph of the Eighth Seotion
gives power to Congress to 'regulate commerce,' the first ' to
lay and collect duties.' In order, then, to restrict this general
authority, the first paragraph of the Ninth Section forbids Congress, prior to the year 1808, from prohibiting the importation
'of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit;' that is, negro slaves."
" So in r~ference to tho particular subject we are discussing.
Several paragraphs of the Eighth Section authorize Congress
'to declare war,' 'to make rules concerning captures on land
and water,' 'to raise and support armies,' 'to provide for calling
forth the militia to execute the laws of tho Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions,' and 'to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers,' and then immediately follows the restriction
of the Ninth Section: 'The privilege of tho Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not bo suspended, unle1,s when, in cases of rebellion
or invasion, the public safety may require it.'"
The very first position in the quotation marks the character
of the logic which prevails throughout the whole.
"It is a restriction on power, either expressly or impliedly given
elsewhere." This was the point to be proved-that it was a
restriction on power given). and without making any analysis of
the clause, to exhibit some word of restriction or limitation in
it, or any analysis of the Constitution, to find a power given to
impair the privilege, he takes the restriction and the gift as conceded, in the same manner as the Louisville reviewer, and then
immediately proceeds to inquire whether the clause was restrictive of the President's power.

*

"Remarks on Mr. Binney's treatise on· the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Member of the Bar of Philadelphia." Philadelphia, 1862.

By a

33
As no one had opposed him on that point, that is to say, that
the President had any such power independently of the clause, he
gains an easy victory, and then takes up the power of Congress.
He thus leaves the asserted restriction unproved in his proposition, and seeks to establish it by groping for a power elsewhere; but never returns to the terms of his proposition a
second time.
Not only is the clause totally silent in regard to a power _given
elsewhere, but there is not a word like restriction or limitation
in the first member of the clause, nor a word of limitation in
the second, except of the power which is there given, and not
elsewhere. He might as well have said that the commandment,
"thou shalt do no murder," is a restriction upon power given
or implied elsewhere. Like all other confirmations of a
principle, the first member of the clause is prohibitory, not restrictive-it is an exclusion, and not a limitation; and the second
member is a relief from the exclusion or prohibition in a special
case. The Habeas Corpus clause, in its first member, is the
confirmation of a principle which denies power to the Constitution, in the same manner as Bills or Declarations of Rights do,
and is no more. The last impliedly affirms and allows an exception to it, and that is all. There is not a phrase or word in
the entire clause, which purports to be a restraint upon power
before given. There is no compression of what had been expanded, no drawing in of what had been let out. That which
the Reviewer therefore was bound to prove, he does not prove,
but precisely like the Louisville Reviewer, throws the burden
upon his antagonist of disproving it negatively.
This is, however, of less importance, because, fortunately, we
get a word from him, in his search for the power of Congress to
be restrained, a single word, which resmnes upon himself the
burden of his proposition ; though whether he carries it any
better, remains to be seen. He proceeds to say:
"How stands it, however, with Congress in this respect?
Says the Constitution, all legislative powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States," &c. "Any lf'gislative power which exists under the Constitution, is therefore
vested in Congress." "Is tho suspension of tho privilege of the
·writ of Habeas Corpus properly a legislative or an Executive
3
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Act." "vVe have quoted above the clauses ·which give to Congress the power of legislation over the subject of war, insurrections and invasions-they cover the whole of those subjects.
Congress has the further powe11S 'to provide [that is lJy law, because Congress can only provide in this mode] for the common
defence and welfare of the United States,' and to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any depa1·trnent or office1· thereof." "If any law be at all necessary to
enable the President to execute any power, Congress must pass
it, or the President cannot execute the power." "IIow then
stands this part of the case?" "We have as to both the President and Congress no grant of power in this particular clause,
unless we do as Mr. Binney does, undertake to 'supply an
ellipsis,' which is unvrnrrantable, except the suspending power
would fail of its exercise by reason of the absence of any other
dist?°nct authorization. In such case, we might properly supply
an ellipsis. But if there arc other grants of power in the Constitution, which embrace this suspending power, then unquestionably there is no necessity of supplying any supposed omission in the Habeas Corpus clause, in order to attain the object.
Now that there arc such grants of pmver, in language amply
sufficient to vest the discretion over the subject-matter in Congress, we thinlc may be safely asserted by uny one reading the clauses
confer1·ing upon Congress legislative power in the several particulars we
have recited above."

And here closes the argument that the Habeas Corpus clause
"contains no grant of power to anybody," but "is a restriction
on power either expressly or impliedly given elsewhere."
It was perfectly just to say that this Reviewer is more at
la.rge, and more indefinite on this point, than either of the essays
before noticed. He admits the implication of power from the
Habeas Corpus clause, "if the suspending power would fail of
its exercise by reason of the absence of any other distinct authorization ;" and by this word, for which we are indebted to
him, he resumes again for a moment the duty of his proposition,
that the clause is a restriction upon power expressly or impliedly given elsewhere. But how does he carry it? He lays
it on the table, and pours upon it half a dozen express powers
of Congress, not one of which contains the remotest allusion to
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the Writ of Habeas Corpus, or even to the judicial power, and
saves himself all trouble to show even colorably, how, or by
what process a power over the Writ may be argumentatively
implied from any one, or the whole of them. If this be the distinct authorization he was in pursuit of, his reader is left to
judge for himself, whether the Reviewer has found it, or revealed
the means of finding it.
It is impossible to treat this argument seriously. The writer
has transcribed nearly half the express powers of Congress, and
left his readers a perfectly uncontrolled liberty to select one or
another, or half a dozen, without the least influence from himself, or an intimation of the slightest preference on his part for
one more than for another. Nay, he does not give the least
hint of the nature or mode of application of the incidental or
implied power, which, according to his notion, arises from any
one of these express powers, to suspend the Writ of Habeas
Corpus. He names eight express powers, and there are but
eighteen in the Eighth Section; and it is true to the very letter,
that the member of the Philadelphia Bar neither makes a choice
himself, nor writes a word to influence the choice, of one rather
than of another of them. Ile contents himself with saying,
"that there are such grants of power, in language amply sufficient to vest discretion on the subject-matter in Congress, we
think may be safely asserted by any one reading the clauses
conferring legislative power in the several particulars we have
recited above." This is not argument, but dogmatism.
If it is allowed to a reader, under these circumstances, to
suppose a preference in the writer for one of these powers in
particular, the selection would probably fall upon the largest
and most indefinite, the power "to provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States." It looks
like a promising power for this purpose ; and there seems to fall
a breath of emphasis upon it, in the position he has given it, at
the close of the enumeration of particular powers. It is easy
to imagine incidents of every kind to such a power. But, unfortunately for the Reviewer, there is no such power in the
Eighth Section of the First Article, or anywhere else in the
Constitution. The writer has merely cut out a clause from the·
middle of the first paragraph in that section-the power " ·to,

lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises" -and passed
it off as an independent power, to oppress personal liberty. It
is not easy to account for such a transformation, as that of converting one of the ends or final causes of a particular power,
into a particular power still greater. That excellent work, the
Federalist, especially Mr. Madison's paper No. 41, and Judge
Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, especially Chapter
XIV, sec. 907-920, should. in general be read, before a reviewer
begins to lecture upon the powers of Congress. His error may
perhaps be explained by the fact, that Mr. Jefferson, in his correspondence, did charge upon the Federal party the heterodoxy
of making this sort of Cresarian operation upon the taxing power.
It was notoriously untrue of the Federalists as a party, and true
only of a fraction of that and other parties. The reviewer may
have belonged to that fraction, or may not have left it long
enough to have renounced its heresies. The common defence
and general welfare are more or less the ends of all the powers
in the Constitution; but a particular power of providing for them
generally and independently, would have made the Constitution
one of gener-al and unlimited, and not of enumerated and specific
powers.
It is worthy of ,observation, that the three writers who have
now been referred to as reviewers of the Tract on "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution,"
and have undertaken to show a distinct universal power in Congress over the Writ of Habeas Corpus, have not, in a single
instance, looked at the Constitution with sufficient care or clearness of apprehenBion, even to identify accurately a single
express power of Congress, to which the plenary and untrammelled power of suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus is
alleged to be incidental; and no one of them, except Mr. Bullitt,
has, in a single instance, attempted to develope the instrumentality of the power of suspension even to the mutilated express
powers on which they have re'spectively placed reliance. The
objection and the answers to it will be left here.
Assuming that the objection has been answered, the result of
the refutation is, that the power is given by the Habeas Corpus
clause, without expressly saying which department shall exercise
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it, and with no implication in favor of one more than of the
other, except as the conditions on which the power may be exercised carry it with more reason, or with better effect, to one than
to the other. That they carry it to the President, is the argument of the Tract upon "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus under the Constitution;" and there is no intention to
repeat that argument. But it must be remarked, that when it
is assumed or admitted that Congress do not possess elsewhere
than in the Habeas Corpus clause, any power to suspend the
privilege of the Writ, it is assumed or admitted, at the same
time, that Congress have no power that assists to obtain it from
the clause, other than what the clause expresses or implies. If
the clause implies that the power of suspension is to be exercised only by a legislative act, that is quite sufficient to give the
power of the clause to Congress; if, on the contrary, the clause
implies that it is to be exercised by an Executive act, then the
fact that Congress is the body by which the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, or a Habeas Corpus Act, may be or has been created,
has no tendency to assist Congress in obtaining the power of
suspending the privilege of the Writ. It would be a great misapprehension to suppose that the Tract referred to relied upon
any difference between the privilege and the right. The word
"privilege" in the clause distinguishes the thing that may be
suspended, not from the right, but from the "Writ" itself, and
from a "Habeas Corpus Act," which expressions, being significant of a legislative creation or enactment, might, if either of
them had been used, have supported the construction that the
clause required the act of a legislative body; whereas the word
"privilege" raised the subject above legislative powers, and
placed it on the foundation rock of the Constitution, from which
the Habeas Corpus clause alone removes it to the foundation of
the public safety. The whole power of suspension is therefore
in the Habeas Corpus clause, and whether that gives a legislative or executive power will be left where the Tract placed it.
There remain the other objections, intended to be of a persuasive character, to show the meaning of the Constitution that
Congress alone were to exercise the power of the clause ; and
to these some remarks will be offered in reply.
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OBJECTION II.

That the President has not generally under the Constitution
the means to arrest a suspected traitor or rebel, and therefore
cannot suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, is
not of the first order of logical proofs, that the Habeas Corpus
clause did not mean to give him the power of suspension. The
Louisville writer first referred to, touched this point with only
a short denial, and without any attempt to prove the President's general incapacity to issue a warrant of arrest. Another
writer adverts to it more largely, and attempts to prove it by
citations from English law, which leave the power of the first
Magistrate in England, in like case, untouched.
The only logical form of the objection would be, that because
the President cannot use the means of arrest generally, therefore the clause did not mean to give him a power which depends
upon them in a particular case-a, proposition which would betray its own weakness. If the clause intended to give him the
power of suspension, the means necessarily follow, if they did
not exist previously. The question of general means is irrelevant to the question of intention. ~I.1he particular means and
the power are one and the same question. If the power was
intended for the President, the means follow, whether the
general means existed before, or did not.
OBJECTION III.

The debates in the State Conventions which ratified the Constitution, have been cited to prove, that the Habeas Corpus
clause was adopted as meaning that Congress alone received
authority from it to suspend the privilege of the Writ.
Mr. Madison is supposed to have expressed a preference for
the debates in these State Conventions, above the debates in the
General Convention, as interpreters of the Constitution; and
his preference is thought to appear in a speech in Congress in
1796, of which an extract has been given in one of the pamphlets on this subject, in these words: "After all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who framed our
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Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as
the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution. As the instrument came from them, it was nothing more than a draft of a
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until Ffe and validity were
breathed into it by the voice of the people speaking through the
several State Conventions. If we were to look therefore for the
meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument,
we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed the Constitution, but in the State Conventions which accepted and ratified the Constitution."
.1\fr. Madison no doubt entertained the sound opinion that we
were to look for the meaning of the instrument to its face, and
not to what was said in any Convention concerning its meaning;
but if he meant to say absolutely that what was said in State
Conventions, was any better proof of the meaning, than what
was said in the General Convention, it is not very easy to admit
it. The instrument proposed was the identical instrument
which was ratified; the same in all the Conventions. The debates
in the State Conventions did not breathe life and validity into
it. It was the ratifying vote. What was said in the State
Conventions, was not the instrument ratified, any more than
what was said in the General Convention, was the instrument
proposed. The clauses in the instrument spoke for themselves,
both when they were proposed, and when they were ratified.
There is not a shade of difference in favor of the debates in the
State Conventions. If the proposer is more likely to know his
own meaning, than the interpreter, and as likely to express it
accurately as the interpreter is likely to construe it accurately,
the difference would be the other way; but the fraction of difference is not worth a contest. The true rule is stated by General
Hamilton in his argument upon the constitutionality of the
Bank: "Whatever may have been the intention of the framers
of a Constitution or a law, that intention is to be sought for in
the instrument itself, according to the usual and established
rules of construction.''
But although debates, or what delegates said in debates, in
either Convention, cannot affect the construction of the instrument, it is not equally clear, that the established rules of construction, do not permit a resort to the votes of the General
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Convention to explain a doubtful clause, when they reveal a
mischief in existing provisions of law, or in clauses proposed,
which the body rejected, or refused to adopt. For instance,
Mr. Pinckney proposed formally a resolution, to make the suspension of the Writ an act of the Legislature; and it seems to
have been taken from the words of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. "The Privilege and benefit of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in the most free, easy, cheap,
expeditious, and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by
the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding twelve months;"
and the General Convention rejected it for the Habeas Corpus
clause, as it stands in the Constitution. This was not the
language of debate, but a specific proposition, containing limitations which the Convention rejected by that clause. It is not
clear that it is not competent, by established rule, to regard the
rejected proposition, and the Massachusetts limitation, as mischiefs to be avoided by the clause. In the formation of organic
law, the mischief intended to be remedied cannot well be ascertained in any other way than by referring to examples of a
different law, which .was rejected. But undoubtedly the safer
and better course, is to derive the interpretation from the clause
itself, which contains the means of its own construction, in connection with the entire body of the Constitution.
Nothing can be less consistent with settled rules of construction, than to produce what A. or B. said in a State Convention,
apout the interpretation of this clause; and most especially to
apply it with the boundless license which has been taken by the
writer, who has produced the instances. When Mr. Martin reported to the State of Maryland, that the question was about
giving the power to the general government, it is said that he
meant Congress; and when a delegate in a State Convention,
used Mr. Martin's very language in regard to the clause, the
same writer understands him to have meant Congress; and
when other delegates said that the power was given to Congress,
the writer· understands them to have meant Congress, and not
tlie President. The answer to all this is, that not only was it
the language of debate, which has no authority in it, but it
was language which had no reference to the point, whether the
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power was giyen to Congress or to the President. There was
no such point raised in the State Conventions. There was no
such amendment proposed in the State Conventions, or by any
of the States, or by Congress afterwards, as that the power
should be given to Congress expressly or exclusively. It would
be singular if we must now interpret the Constitution in the
supposed sense of these debates, when there has been neither
administrative nor judicial practice in execution of the clause to
be interpreted, while it seems to have been the judicial opinion
of at least one eminent person, that a practice of more than sixty
years, with concurrent opinions of the highest order to sustain
it, could not interpret the Third Section of the Fourth Article,
which gives Congress power "to make all needful rules and
regulations concerning the Territory and other property of the
United States."
0 B J E C T I O N I V.

The Bills or declarations of Rights in the State Constitutions,
even if they spoke a, uniform language and design, are no proof
of the meaning of the Habeas Corpus clause in the Constitution
of the United States. They are prepared with reference to
States, and not to a National Government. Some of them express, together with fundamental axioms of free government,
opinions on political economy, expediency, and administration,
perhaps questionable, and certainly out of place in Bills of
Rights. The material consideration is, that in these matters
each State speaks for itself, and not for another State, or for
the United States, and in reference to its own jurisdiction,
which is unlimited within its borders, except so far only as
portions of it have been granted to the United States. That
field is also a narrow one, compared with the great field of the
Union. The Executive power in the States is generally more
subordinate to the Legislature, than the Executive of the United
States is to Congress. The field of the Executive of the States,
is uniformly much more limited. The Legislature of a State is
moreover convened and directed with comparative promptitude
and ease. The offences against the State authority, whether re-
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bellion or insurrection, are circumscribed in their extent, and
may be more easily surrounded and suppressed; and when they
become so enlarged as to extend to the United States, the State
relation to them is absorbed by the superior power, and the constitutional powers of the States are only assistant and not directory in the general conflict. Further, in regard to the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the States
speak for their own jurisdiction, and not for the jurisdiction of
the United States; and their concern is with what may answer
for the State, for its means of action, and for its ends and purposes, and not with what regards the whole nation. The Legislature of a State, from the facility with which it may be assembled, and from the extent of its powers, when assembled, may
be competent to do all that it is necessary to do for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion or invasion, and for the
suppression of conspiracies to support or assist them. ~rhe States
model their constitutional powers to suit their own condition and
purposes. The form and bearing of their State declarations of
Rights, have no influence upon the interpretation even of similar
clauses in the Constitution of the United States. The difference
of means, modes of operation, jurisdiction, ends, and designs,
might justly call for different interpretations of the very same
clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions.
But if it were otherwise, the differences in the States themselves, and especially on the subject of the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, are such that there is no uniform bearing of
them on the clause in the Constitution of the United 8tates.
Three of these State Constitutions, to wit, Maryland, North
Carolina, and South Carolina, have no express clause whatever
in regard to the suspension of the Writ. The probable construction of these Constitutions, is, that the suspension stands
prohibited absolutely.
Two of the States, Virginia and Vermont, prohibit the suspension expressly and absolutely.
Two of them, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, give the
power of suspension to the Legislature.
Two of them, Connecticut and Rhode Island, dispose of the
subject as will be presently mentioned.
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The rest of the States have the clause, in the same, or substantially the same, form as it is in the Constitution of the
United States. To say what they mean, even in regard to their
own States, is to beg the question in dispute.
Connecticut and Rhode Island, which were Charter governments for years after they belonged to the Union, framed Constitutions in 1818 and 1842, respectively, and adopted, as far
as it goes, the clause as it stands in the Constitution of the
United States, but with a remarkable addition in each instance.
Connecticut added the words, " nor in any case but by the Legislature," and Rhode Island added the words, "nor ever without the authority of the General Assembly:" so that each of
these States, perceiving that the Habeas Corpus clause in the
Constitution of the United States carried the power to the Executive, or that it was doubtful whether it did or did not, added
a clause which in effect restored the terms of Mr. Pinckney's
proposition, and the article of the Massachusetts Constitution,
which the General Convention refused to adopt. Connecticut
and Rhode Island saw fit to give the power to the Legislature
expressly, as they had a right to do. Let this last go for what
it is worth. In admitting that this proves nothing to silence the
claim of Congress to the power of suspending the privilege of
the Writ, if the face of the clause, in connection with the whole
instrument, makes that the true interpretation, it proves that
the States, speaking on this subject for themselves respectively,
say nothing to affect the interpretation of the clause in the
Federal Constitution.
0 B J E C T I O N V.

Most of the States have declared the same principle in regard
to the suspension of laws, as the English Bill of Rights, in the
first Parliament summoned by William and Mary. In the State
declarations, it assumes some variety of form, but all are substantially the same in meaning as the English Bill of Rights:
"that the pretended power of suspending of lavvs by regal
authority, without the consent of Parliament, is illegal.'' The
principle, moreover, though not declared in the Constitution of
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the United States, rules every department of that Government.
It asserts the authority of law over the personal will of the
Executive, and of everybody.
But it passes comprehension, that if the Constitution gives
authority to the Executive to suspend a particular law, or right,
or privilege, it is a violation of that principle in the Bill of
Rights, and therefore illegal. The Constitution expresses the
highest possible authority for all that it ordains, the authority
of the whole people, the great Legislature of the Nation, the
enacters of its organic law. There are instances of the same
power under the Constitution to suspend or vacate the execution
or operation of laws by the Executive power. The power of
pardon is an instance of that kind. So is the power of removal
from office. The former is expressly given by the Constitution.
The latter is constructively given; and was settled in conformity
with Mr. Madison's views in 1789, in the very dawn of the
Government. The principle is not a restraint upon the Constitution, but upon the agents of the Constitution, so far as they
are not liberated from it by the Constitution itself.
The very word which the Constitution has used in the Habeas
Corpus clause-" suspended'' -derives its political or constitutional meaning from the practice of arresting the operation
of law by Executive authority, without the consent of Parliament.
It has been used immemorially to denote this act of temporarily
suppressing the operation of law by Executive Will. It was so
used in all the contests on the subject between Charles I and
the Parliament. It is so used in the English Bill of Rights,
from which the State Bills or Declarations of Right take it.
It has more adaptation, in the Habeas Corpus clause, to the
Executive function, than to an enactment by Congress. The
power of the Legislature over the Writ of Habeas Corpus, was
limited by its duty in the constitution of the Judicial department. Congress could not, by its legislative powers, withhold,
suspend, or repeal the Writ of Habeas Corpus, without disobeying the mandate of the Constitution. When, therefore, the
Habeas Corpus clause makes exceptions of cases in which the
suspending power may be exercised, the word "suspended"
points rather, if not exclusively, to the Executive power, as
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liberated from the general restraint in the excepted cases. The
suggestion of this principle in the State declarations of Right,
tends therefore to confirm the President's authority, rather than
to annul it.

The design and end of the power to suspend the privilege
have not been specially regarded in any of tho criticisms upon
the Tract, so far as they have come to the knowledge of the
writer; and it is these which induce him to give a little more
development to a remark upon that part of a paper in the Federalist which justifies the grant of the pardoning power to the
President-that its reasoning is as applicable to the power of
arrest and detention in time of rebellion, as it is to the power
of pardon.
The design and end of a law, and especially of an organic
law, are matters of necessary attention in the interpretation of
its meaning, and of the most lawful and usual resort. If one
interpretation tends to disappoint the design and to defeat the
end, and another to effectuate both, there can be no hesitation
·in the choice. The established rules of interpretation rigorously
exact a preference of the latter.
The power of suspension is designed for cases of the highest
possible danger to the Nation; danger which permits no delay;
danger so great and so immediate, that the inestimable right of
personal liberty is regarded as secondary to it : and, in cases
when the personal liberty of individuals, in the judgment of the
Executive officer, endangers the public safety, it deprives them
of it for a time, without legal accusation, at his instance, as the
guardian of the Constitution. It is to his judgment that the
effectual act of suspension, that is to say, the arrest and imprisonment, are ultimately referred in England, and must be referred in the United States, whether the President be the primary or the secondary power.
It is preposterous to suppose, as one writer ~oes, that somebody, not the President, may be selected by Congress to execute
the power. The doctrine that Congress can in any event choose
another Executive, when the President iS' in office, is revolutionary. The President, in any event, must practically, as well
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as officially, execute the power; and whether the Constitution
gives, or Congress authorizes him to exercise it, the power, the
discretion, and the danger are the same.
Constituted as our Government is, such a power in the Legislature as that of suspending the privilege of the Writ, is particularly weak and inefficient. There are too many probabilities
that it will never be exercised by Congress in cases of rebellion,
of whatever emergency. It is quite certain that it can never be
exercised effectually by that body.
Rebellion against the Government divides the people. We
required no example of it to show this. It is far above insurrection in its aims, and vastly more diffusive in its spirit; and
the General Convention knew as much about it as we do. When
the object is to overthrow the Government, neither rebellion nor
invasion can ever show its face, until it has prepared copious
means of attack, and a great line of division is drawn between
the people of the States, to the end of assailing the Government
in its most accessible part, and at the time of its greatest inertia,
when, as it were, its powers are at one of the dead points, a
change of administration, or the departure of what is called one
dynasty and the accession of another. Such a great division,
like every other capital fracture, makAs its rifts and cracks on
each side of the principal line, penetrating extensively into the
country, and making large margins of discontent both ways and
in all directions. As rebellion will have its election of the time,
Congress will never be in session when the train is fired. From
the great extent of the country, it will always require months
to convene that body. When convened, it must become the
centre of all the agitations by all the constituencies, political
party on general subjects mixing with open or concealed sympathy on the question of rebellion, and excited by the most exciting of all topics, the topic of personal liberty, which is naturally and justly made a subject of universal concern, the instant
that it is proposed to deal with it discretionally, in a single
instance, and especially to turn it over with nothing but a shadow
of responsibility, from Congress to the President.
Our forefathers knew all this as well as their descendants do :
and if they looked for a suspension of the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus only by Congress, they must have regarded
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the history of the English Nation from the time of tho Habeas
Corpus Act of Charles II, with less attention than they regarded
the practice of Parliament, though they knew that history as
well _as we do, and probably much better, as it touched them
more nearly; and they must also have had a faith in the action
of Congress, in times of rebellion and invasion, which at least
they did not express, though a single word in the Habeas Corpus clause would have expressed it, and when the very word
was proposed, but rejected by seven States against three.
There is no case better than the case of the first rebellion
against the Government, to illustrate and prove what is thus
suggested.
The necessary inefficiency of such a body as Congress for such
an emergency, can never be more thoroughly demonstrated.
When the present rebellion broke out, the Government was at
one of its dead points. The division line included the centre of
the Federal power, and the possession of that centre was, and
must necessarily have been, the very first aim of treason, to
break or derange its connection with all parts which remained
faithful to the Union. Though the mass of the people of the
District of Washington may have been loyal, the district was
the centre of treason, almost as much as it was the centre of
lawful power; and this is the danger that has always been anticipated, when the subject of disunion has been canvassed,-a
separation of the States by geographical lines, and a contest for
the power of the Union in its very heart. What could Congress
do in this respect to seize at such a time the threads of a great
conspiracy in the centre of the Nation, and to trace its clue to
the bottom, in parts of the Union, which to all appearance were
as yet generally sound? Under that interpretation of the Habeas Corpus clause, which gives the power to Congress, that
body is incompetent to make a previous provision of law for such
a purpose. It is not Rebellion or Invasion that is to be provided for. It is the special danger to the safety of the Nation
from the particular circumstances of either; and if Congress
must be the judge, they cannot delegate the judgment, but can
only appoint the Executive power, after Congress have formed
and declared the judgment. That body is therefore completely
incompetent to act or to authorize suspension, until the danger
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is already developed and in action; and then, for the great object
of the clause, the safety of the Nation, it will be too late.
The argument for the exclusive power of Congress, seems
therefore to end, exactly where the minority in the Conve.ntion
wished it to end,-that there shall be no suspension of the privilege of the Writ in any circumstances; and to that end it is
probable it will come, if the President cannot exercise the
power.
The absence of lawful power in the Crown and Privy Council
of England may be supposed to be an example for us, and of the
sufficiency of the Legislative power; but it is well to attend to
the facts which are developed by that history.
The history of England since the date of the Habeas Corpus
Act of Charles II, is the fullest authority for the inefficiency
even of Parliament, by its imperial power, to supply to the Government the effectual means of safety against the treasons and
conspiracies which attend the first preparation and outbreak of
rebellion, or other combined attack upon the safety of that
Kingdom. Yet England has particular facilities from the moderate extent of the island, and the constant subsistence of the
power of the Crown, to convene Parliament on short notice, and
of the ministry of the Cro-wn, to execute its purposes.
Now it happens, and has happened constantly from the passage of that Habeas Corpus Act, that although neither King
nor Privy Council can claim the least constitutional or legal authority to arrest a suspected traitor, or to detain in custody a
suspected traitor or conspirator, before an Imprisonment Act
has been passed, there is no instance of such an Act, in which
previous arrests by the Privy Council, or Secretaries of State,
are not adopted and protected, even up to the day and moment
of the assent by the King to the Imprisonment Act itself. It
is the universal course of Parliament, springing from the invariable necessity of suppressing conspiracy by instant arrest and
custody of the conspirators, as soon as they are discovered, and
before they have had the opportunity of making their fatal
spring upon the Government. There is no exception to the
practice of the Crown in this respect. In the present session
of Parliament it is reported that Earl Russell spoke of it in the
House of Lords, as the usual course of the Privy Council, to
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arrest before the authority 1s given. The previous exercise
of the power by the Privy Council or Secretaries of State, is
wrongful; yet the wrongful exercise of the power saved the life
of William III in 1696, and frustrated an invasion of England
by France, then watching from the opposite shore the effect of
Barclay's plot. In that case, the King told Parliament that he
had gone beyond his lawful authority, and Parliament thanked
him for it. The ministers of the Crown, day by day on that
occasion, seized and detained in secret and separate custody,
one after another, the important conspirators, few or none but
Sir George Barclay himself having escaped, and thus saved the
life of the King, and frustrated the designs of the enemy, and of
the Pretender to the Crown. Parliament were in session at the
very moment; but the least movement toward a Bill, or even a
secret session of the Houses, would have probably led to the
escape of all the conspirators, and to the loss of all the clues to
the domestic conspiracy in the Kingdom. From that time down
to the last exercise of the Parliamentary power in England, the
Imprisonment Acts adopt and protect the previous arrests and
imprisonments of the suspected traitors, and a subsequent act of
Parliament indemnifies and saves harmless, all who were parties
or advisers, equally in previous and in subsequent arrests.
England is made safe therefore by the implied promise of these
Acts to justify the Privy Council in arrest, and imprisonment,
which the Constitution of England does not permit, and which
it was the object of our Habeas Corpus clause to justify in times
of Rebellion and Invasion. These Imprisonment Acts, uniformly comprehend the prisoners who are, or shall, before the
King's assent to the Act, as well as after, be so arrested by
order of the Privy Council.
This is the inability of the Parliament of England to do at
the precise and effectual moment, what the imminent danger of
the Nation requires. Parliament cannot do it. But their imperial power enables them to destroy the right of action in any
prisoner so wrongfully arrested, and to save harmless the parties
to the wrong. It is thus that wrong is extinguished by law,
though law prohibited it.
4

If any one can show that there is a power in Congress, under
the Constitution, to extinguish the wrong which may be done by
the President's endeavoring to save the Nation, without and
against warrant of law, and to close all the Courts where redress
may be sought for this wrong, he will do more to defeat the construction·of the clause which has now been suggested for the
safety of the country, than anything that has as yet appeared
i11 the several Reviews, which by concert or party impulse have
denied the power -of the Ex-ecutive.
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THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT.
THIRD

PART .

WHEN the first part of the essays under this title was written,
there was but one aspect in which the public in this nation regarded suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, namely, in relation to the department of our Government
that was competent by the Constitution to initiate suspension~
under the conditions annexed to that power. The President,
the head of the Executive department, had, it was understood,
exercised that power in one or more instances, without authority
given by Act of Congress; and the legal competency of his action was, for the time, the exclusive point of view to which the
eye was directed. The suggestions in Part I of these essays
were made to support one hypothesis on this subject, and to
contribute what I could to the collections of thought and remark which were then being made, to settle in the right way a
question that was substantially new, and upon which there were
opposing opinions.
Further thoughts, in a much more important division of the
subject, which has since become prominent, have not altered
my mind on that point; whether reasonably or not, the reader
will judge when he has them before him. One thing, at least,
I think the candid reader must perceive, that in all I have
written, or shall now write, it was not, and is not, the personal
President, or the actual Congress, that I had or have in view,
but the Constitution, and both the efficient and the safe execution of a power given by the Constitution, which must be
ineffectual if it be slow, and unnecessarily dangerous if it
be wholly uncertain, or not attended by proper responsibility,
official and judicia.l, for its constitutional exercise. Equally
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with this had I, and still have in view, the principle of personal
freedom while in the observance of the laws, and of judicial
cognizance and oversight to defend and relieve it, whenever it
is not constitutionally made to give way to the always paramount interest of the public safety.
The first part of these essays regarded, as I have said, the
initiatory or introductory power of suspending the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Its better position in point of
order, and of proof also, would have been after this paper, and
not before it; but it accompanied the question of the day,
which turned exclusively upon the competency of the Executive
department. The present paper will regard the nature of the
power, its extent and range; a vastly greater, it will be admitted, and more important subject for inquiry and consideration; and I write what follows as my contribution to the collection of thoughts, from which is to come the final and true result.
I have reviewed all my suggestions and statements in my
former papers. Considering the narrowness of the point then
before me, I have not as much to qualify or retract as frank
and candid men usually have, in revising a partial view in connection with a more comprehensive one which includes it. But
on this review, which has led to the sketch I shall exhibit of
suspension of Habeas Corpus in England, before as well as after
the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II, I have to acknowledge,
that I may have said too much in praise of the :fidelity of the
English law at all times to the principle of personal freedom
asserted by Magna Carta, and succeeding statutes. Until .I
read the whole case of The King against Sir Thomas Darnell
with the other four gentlemen who were imprisoned by the
special command of Charles I, without any cause shown, and
then read the arguments of Selden, Coke, and others in the
House of Commons, a.n d upon the conference between the Lords
and Commons in regard to that case and to the resolutions of
the Commons which had ensued, as they are related in Rushworth's Historical Collections, I was not aware that the law of
England in the 16th century, and to a late period of the 17th,
connived to the extent that I think it did, at denials of bail, upon
warrants of imprisonment by the Privy Council for undescribed
High Treason; nor did I obtain the true solution of an important
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exception in the second section of the Habeas Corpus Act of
31 Charles II, and of the formula of the subsequent Acts of
Parliament, which are called suspensions of it, and which substantially are temporary relaxations of that exception. I of
course knew very well, as all professional lawyers know, the
statute distinction between bailable and non-bailable crimes; and
also Lord Hale's remark, that the statutes of Magna Carta,
and 25 Edw. III, c. 2, are not concerned in preliminary imprisonments for felony, nor for treason therefore, which includes
felony; and also Sir Edward Coke's position in his third Institute, that if a court of record commit for contempt or the like,
they can discharge at pleasure; but if they commit for treason or
felony or suspicion of it, they cannot discharge until the prisoner
be inquired of, and an ignoramus found, or he be indicted and
acquitted. But until that review, and especially until I had read
Sir Edward Coke's admission, on the very point of the authority
of the Privy Council in matters of State, I was not aware that
the twelve Judges of England had resolved, una voce, in the 34th
year of Queen Elizabeth, that the courts would absolutely remand a prisoner. upon accusatory imprisonments by the Privy
Council, or one or two of them, for High Treason in generality,
that is to say, without a word to specify whether it was compassing the King's death, or levying war against him in his realm,
or counterfeiting the great or privy seal, or bringing counterfeit
coin into the realm, knowing it to be false, with intent to merchandise therewith. I did riot apprehend that the famous resolutions
of the House of Commons, moved by Sir Edward Coke in 1628,
had a saving to this extent understood, for the necessities of
the State against suspected treason. It is this tlfat I have to acknowledge; and if any one shall cast back upon this portion of
Part I, I beg him to make the necessary qualification. The
main point of that essay was not assisted by the oversight: on
the contrary, a juster view of this part of English legal history,
in point of fact, would have exhibited in better light the executive character of the power of suspending the writ of Habeas
Corpus.
I shall have to introduce this resolution at length from the
work in which it is to be found; but I may say in this place,
that when Sir Edward Coke verified it himself in the House of
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Commons, from the original manuscript book of one of the
twelve Judges, who is the reporter, he did not intimate the least
opposition or repugnancy to it; and, although he was a high
prerogative lawyer, he was notoriously one of the staunchest
supporters of Magna Carta, and of the liberties it asserted. He
indorsed the principle of the resolution in the time of Charles I,
when he was a leader in the Commons against the asserted prerogatives of the Crown. He was Solicitor of Queen Elizabeth
when the resolution in the 34th Eliz. was adopted; but he was
desirous of acquitting the Lord Treasurer Burleigh of any participation in the abuses which the preamble of the resolution recites,
and said it was the white staves who made the stir, of which the
paper signed by the Judges was the result. Queen Elizabeth,
through her Lord Chancellor Hatton and Lord Treasurer Burleigh, was seeking to know, "what persons sent to custody by her
MaJesty, her eouneil, some one or two of them, were to be detained
in prison, and not delivered by her MaJesty' s Courts and Judges;''
and the resolution was the definite though covert answer. It was
nearly the full equivalent, and was indubitably the lineal progenitor of what has since been called "suspension of Habeas
Corpus."
While rejecting, in Part I, the analogy of the Suspension Acts
of Parliament as a rule for assigning the power of the Habeas
Corpus clause in our Constitution to Congress, it may also be
thought, that I put these Acts out of view in regard to the
elements and limitations of the power. But nothing was further
from my design. I rejected them as an analogy for the exercise of the power by Congress, and no further. I adhere
entirely to all I said in that paper upon the Executive character
and destination of that power in our government, which was
then the only subject in discussion. The nature of the power
was not in discussion, and hardly under consideration. I have
always taken it to be, what I shall now endeavor to show it is.
I referred to it then, only collaterally and briefly, as a matter
that did not, in my mind, admit of dispute; but I have since
found that in this I was very far away from what was to follow.
One of the most curious facts which political history reveals
to us is, that in ages remote from each other, and under govern-
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ments emphatically professing to defend and maintain liberty,
there has been so much uniformity in the adoption of a disguise,
to cover the creation of that power which is now in question.
Everybody knows, people as well as rulers and framers of Constitutions, that the power is an arbitrary one to a certain extent,
and must be so, to meet the immeasurable danger for which it is
provided; but because the arbitrariness would be disclosed by
defining it, the device of statesmen has been to disguise it in
language more or less vague, and, in our case especially, by
preluding the prohibition of the thing in one sense, which it
intended to authorize in another, neither of which senses was
at the same time explicitly stated. From this timidity, or finesse,
has sprung an exaggerated apprehension among the people,
which would have disappeared, or been reduced to a minimum,
by simple plaindealing. If the power had been described in
our Constitution in the terms in which the members of the Convention were able to describe it, from a regular administration
of it in England, both before and since the Habeas Corpus Act
of 31 Charles II, they would have expressly settled the reasonable limits of the power, liberal and large as they must necessarily be, instead of leaving us to grope in the dark, to find out
whether the power is this or that, or more or less, and perhaps
without ever obtaining absolute certainty as to what it was
designed to be. This historical fact is certainly very striking.
In republican Rome, the power intended to be created was
couched, to use the word in the application of Sir Edward Uolce,
in the gentle phrase, that the Consuls should take care, or do
their endeavor, that the Commonwealth should not incur any
loss or damage,-dent operam Gonsules, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat,-a caution of the same tenor that one now gives
to a gentleman who is to protect a lady in a railroad car or a
steamboat, or to a servant who is to carry a porcelain vessel
through the streets. 11here was no apparent danger to any one
in the power, but only protection to the Commonwealth; but as
the phrase assigned no limits to the protection, so it prescribed
none as to the means of protection. The power, consequently,
was applied and held to extend to the prostration of edifices,
and to the expulsion of owners from houses and lands, to personal imprisonment, exile and death, without observance of the
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usual forms of law. The power was liber exsolutusque legum
vinculis.
In England, before the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II,
1679, the power was disguised under one form, which had the
sanction of the twelve Judges of England, as early as 1592, in
the 34tp. year of Queen Elizabeth. Since the Habeas Corpus
Act, it has been practised under the same form, covered by an
Act of Parliament, which has obtained for it the vague name of
suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. The name did not of course
exist before the act, though the thing substantially did; and even
since the act, although the name occurs in commentaries, and in
books of reports and treatises, yet there is not an Act of Parliament or a Bill of Rights, or a constitutional ordinance, which
names the name of the thing, though many Acts of Parliament sanction the thing which has popularly obtained the name.
During a recognized use of the thing in England for one hundred and ninety-five years before the epoch of the Convention
which reported our Constitution, it, however, became definite in
point of legal description. It has had one form, founded on
offences of one grade, and resulting in personal imprisonment
without bail or trial, to the end of defending the public safety
against treasonable conspiracies and practi'ces; and in this form
it was sanctioned by all the Judges of England before the Habeas Corpus Act, and since the date of that act by Acts of
Parliament from time to time, restraining the personal remedies
of the Habeas Corpus Act. Nothing can be more definite, in
at least a general sense, than the thing itself; yet in imitation
of republican Rome, it has never been defined or described by
express written law.
The statute of Magna Carta was never repealed; and it
never became obsolete by non-user, which is not a doctrine of
English law; neither was it impaired of its legal and constitutional virtue, by repeated and almost constant violations. Its
thirty-five or forty Parliamentary confirmations are irrefragable
evidence of these violations; and the greatest number of the confirmations occurred in the reign of King Edward III, who probably was, of all the kings of great character, the most frequent
violator of its enactments. It is not to be supposed, however,
that the article against arbitrary imprisonment was as frequently
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disregarded by the Crown, in the persons of the humble or the
middle class, as others of its articles which regulated services
and payments; but the confirmations of it in this as well as in
other particulars more emphatically, is a proof that, while personal liberty was not much regarded by the Crown in the first
century and a half after the Great Charter was enacted, the
more frequent violations of it in the reign of Edward III, were
by what was called pre-emption, purveyance, impressment, and
like violations of property, with a view to gain and revenue.
But after the death of Henry IV, who took the crown upon the
death of Edward's grandson, when the kingdom cwas thrown
into convulsions by disputed title, which continued for more
than seventy years, there is no more heard of confirmations of
Magna Carta, not because it was not violated, but because its
violations were no longer regarded; and one of the historians
of England almost excuses the disregard of personal liberty
during that period, and for a much longer time, by remarking,
that "in an age and nation where the power of a turbulent
nobrlity prevailed, and where the king had no settled military
force, the only means that could maintain public peace was the
exertion of such prompt and discretiona,ry powers in the Crown;
and the public itself had become so sensible of the necessity,
that those ancient laws in favor of personal liberty, while often
violated, had never been challenged or revived during the course
of near three centuries." Hume, chap. 50. Undoubtedly, for
a length of time which may be properly spoken of as ages, the
Cro,vn of England imprisoned, and held in imprisonment, whom
it pleased, either upon the plausible pretext of danger to the
State, or of public wrong of equally indefinite character.
This practice was not without frequent example in the reign
of all the Tudor princes; and we obtain, what may be called a
judicial account of it in the reign of Elizabeth, in a report containing the resolution of the Judges, to which I have referred.
The practice had had the natural effect of debauching the sense
of law and liberty in the princes and nobility of the land,
and had led to imprisonment in unlawful and unknown places,
to the frustration of justice, and to the discredit of the courts
of law. But towards the close of the reign of Elizabeth, when
the spirit of moral and religious research was in the highest
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vigor, and English commerce had commenced that career which
enlarged the minds, and quickened the investigations of the
people, in all matters which touched the security of liberty
and property, the Queen herself became concerned to ascertain
as authentically as possible, what were the limitations of law
upon the power of the Crown in regard to arrest and imprisonment without bail, of such persons as the Crown might deem it
important to detain in custody.
I mention it as the concern of the Queen, although the report
is chary in its representations of the royal interference; but as
it records that the Lord Chancellor and Lord Treasurer had
required divers of the Judges to respond upon the matter, it is
quite reasonable to inf.er that the Queen herself had directed
the reference. The case is in an old law book, to be found in
libraries of the legal profession; but as the book is not in much
modern use, and may not be readily accessible to the reader,
I transcribe it here, and translate the first paragraph from its
law French, the rest being extracted from the text of the book.
The case is taken from "Reports of the very learned Edmund Anderson, Knight, late Lord Chief Justice of the Common Bench,
London, 1664," and is found at page 297, placitum CCCV.
" Divers persons were committed at several times to several
prisons, during pleasure, without good cause; part of whom
being brought before the King's Bench, and part before the
Common Bench, were, according to the law of the land, put
at large, and discharged from imprisonment; by which some
(grandus) great men, were offended, and procured a commandment to the Judges, that they should not do the like after that:
nevertheless, the Judges did not stop (surcease), but by advice
between them, they made certain articles, the tenor of which
followed, and delivered them to the Lords Chancellor and Treasurer, and subscribed them with all their hands. The articles
are as follows, scil. :
"We, her Majesty's Justices, of both Benches, and Barons
of the Exchequer, desire your Lordships, that by some good
means some order may be taken that her Highness's subjects
may not be committed nor detained in prison by commandment
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of any noblemen or counsellor, against the laws of the realm;
either help us to have access to her Majesty to the end to become suitors to her for the same.
"For divers have been imprisoned for suing ordinary actions
and suits at the common law, until they have been constrained
to leave the same against their wills, and put the same to order,
albeit judgment and e 4 ecution have been had therein, to their
great losses and griefs.
"For the aid of which persons, her MajestY:s writs have
sundry times been directed to divers persons having the custody
of such persons unlawfully imprisoned, upon which no lawful
cause of imprisonment hath been returned and certified; whereupon according to the laws they have been discharged from their
im prisonm en t.
"Some of which persons so delivered have been again committed to prison in secret places, and not to any ordinary or
common prisons or lawful officer, as sheriff or other lawfully
authorized to have or keep a gaol; so that upon complaint made
for delivery, the Queen's courts cannot learn to whom to direct
her Majesty's writs; and by this means justice cannot be done.
"And moreover, divers officers and serjeants of London have
been many times committed to prison for lawful executing of
her Majesty's writs sued forth of her Majesty's court at Westminster; and thereby her Majesty's subjects and officers are so
terrified, as they dare not sue or execute her Majesty's laws,
her writs, and commandments.
"Divers others have been sent for by pursuivants, and
brought to London from their dwellings, and by unlawful imprisonment have been constrained not only to withdraw their
lawful suits, but have also been compelled to pay to the pursuivants so bringing such persons, great sums of money.
"All which upon complaint the Judges are bound by office and
oath to relieve and help, by and according to her Majesty's laws.
"And where it pleased your Lordsh_ips to will divers of us to
set down in what cases a person sent to custody by her MaJesty,
her council, some one or two of them, are to be detained in prison,
and not delivered by her MaJesty' s courts or Judges, we think,
that if any person by her Majesty's commandment from her
person, or by order from the council board, or if any one or two
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of her council commit one for High Treason, such persons so in
the case before committed, may not be d~livered by any of her
courts without due trial by the law, and judgment of acquittal
had.
"Nevertheless, the Judges may award the Queen's writs, to
bring the bodies of such persons before them; and if upon the
return thereof, the causes of their commitment be certified to
the Judges, as it ought to be, then the Judges in the cases before
ought not to deliver him, but to remand the prisoner to the place
from which he came.
"Which cannot conveniently be done, unless notice of the
cause, in generality, or else specially, be given to the keeper or
gaoler, that shall have the custody of such person.
"All the Judges and Barons, &c., did subscribe their hands
to these articles, T. p. 34 Eliz., and deliver one to the Lord
Chancellor, and one other to the Lord Treasurer; after which
time there did follow more quietness than before in the cases
before mentioned."*

This paper is commonly referred to as the "Resolutions" of
the Judges. It calls itself" Articles." As it has but one answer
to the inquiry of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Treasurer, it

* Mr. Hallam, in his Constitutional History of England, vol. 1, p. 252,
produces from an original manuscript in the British Museum, the copy of a
paper sufficiently resembling in parts the report in Anderson, to represent the
transaction; but in the resolution it is wholly unlike it. The Museum paper
omits altogether the reference to writs of habeas corpus, and the distinctive
feature of high treason in generality, which is the marking fact of the report.
Mr. Hallam supposes that the Museum paper, indorsed June 5, 1591, was
revised before its delivery fo Easter, 1592; and following Anderson's report,
. he says, that though the complaints of the Judges are an authentic recognition of personal freedom against such irregular and oppressive acts of individual ministers, the Resolutions " must be admitted to leave by far too great
latitude to the Executive government, and to surrender, at least by implication from rather obscure language, a great part of the liberties which
many statutes had conferred.''
They remained, nevertheless, for eighty-seven years, the law of Judicial
administration in the case of Privy Council warrants, so long as England had
a King and Privy Council.
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appears to be only a single article or resolution; and so I shall
generally describe it.
It must be admitted that the report has not exactly the ring
of Magna Carta, and 25 Edw. III. The articles were an answer
to a special inquiry for some definite process, by which a Privy
Councillor might commit a person to prison, to be detained, and
not delivered by her Majesty's Court or Judges; and the twelve
Judges concurred in pointing out the convenient mode; the mode
convenient to the Judges, and equally so to the Privy Council.
The mode was an executive warrant from one or more of the Privy
Council, charging, or certifying to the gaoler, the offence of High
Treason, in language that was entirely vague, and which might
comprehend either of the seven branches of that offence defined
in the 25 Edw. III, or by any subsequent statute. It of course
comprehended suspicion of High Treason, as Sir Edward Coke
will be hereafter found to admit, and treasonable practices; for
undefined High Treason is no more than a suspicion of treason,
or a treasonable practice. It met all the exigencies of state,
in the case of a conspiracy against the realm, not fully developed,
nor the parties and witnesses all in hand; and it came within
the range of settled law so far, that the Court and Judges could
commit or remand for suspicion of Treason or Felony. The
peculiarity of the Resolution was, not that they could remand,
but that they ought to, and, therefore, would, definitively and
absolutely. Trial was certainly professed to be at the end;
but when would the end be, without a Habeas Corpus Act, with
a Privy Councillor as committing magistrate, the AttorneyGeneral as prosecutor, and a general charge, requiring a new
detainer, a new commitment, or a new specification by indictment? The imprisonment was practically indefinite.
I shall have to notice this case from Anderson again, in a
very memorable contest.
Thus stood the law under the old Constitution of England, as
to arrests and imprisonments by the Privy Council and Secretaries of State for general and unspecified High Treason.
There was no danger of state, whether there was rebellion or
invasion or not, in which the Crown could not issue a warrant
to arrest and imprison a suspected traitor or conspirator of
treason, and hold him imprisoned with practical indefiniteness;
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and the method, though covered from the eye of the unlearned,
was wholly executive, and definite in the mode of process,
though generally indefinite in the description of the offence
charged in the warrant or certified to the gaoler.
Under the Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Charles II, the device
was frustrated, for the first time, by an express provision in the
second section of the Act, which made all prisoners accessible
by writs of Habeas Corpus, for all criminal or supposed criminal offences, and bailable, unless the commitment was "for
felony or treason, specially and plainly expressed" in the warrant of commitment; and if that act had not been passed at
all, we might not have heard of the words, suspension of Habeas
Corpus, though England would still have had the thing; nor of
Acts of Parliament to remove the impediments of the Habeas
Corpus Act, out of the way of similar commitments by the
Crown in times of public danger. Ever since the Habeas Corpus Act, the commitments by the Crown, which the Acts of
Parliament are necessary to sustain against the operation of
the Habeas Corpus Act, are from the same source, the Privy
Council, in the same form, and to the same effect, and by the
like authentication, as before; and, therefore, remain under the
same cover, although commentators give them the name of
"suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Act," in consequence of the
Acts of Parliament which follow and sanction them, prohibiting
the delivery or trial of prisoners, under Buch commitments, for
a specified time.
I may, therefore, describe "suspension of the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus," as having been under the old Constitution of England, and as being under the new since the epoch
of the Revolution, a proceeding by the Executive power of the
Government, in times of public danger, consisting "of a Warrant of Arrest and Imprisonment for High Treason, suspicion
of High Treason, or treasonable practices;" that is to say,
charging an offence against the majesty of the state, by which
the prisoners were held without bail, before the Habeas Corpus
Aot, indefinitely to all necessary purposes of state, and definitely in point of time since the Habeas Corpus Act, by a
Parliamentary prohibition of bail or trial, which the Habeas
Corpus Act would otherwise allow by force of the exception in
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the second section. I repeat, that, in my apprehension, the
difference of the course and practice in the two conditions of
the English Constitution, old and new, arises from the Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Charles II. The suspension of the
privilege is substantially the same thing in both, in the executive body from which it proceeds, in warrant, in description of
offence on which it is founded, in effect, and in design to protect
the public against extreme danger. Take away the Habeas
Corpus Act, and the Parliamentary interposition would be superseded as unnecessary ; and the power would remain to the
Executive department of the Government, as before, except in
the single point of a. practically indefinite postponement of bail
and trial, instead of a spe'cific and limited one.
If this account of what is called "suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corp~s" is true of the thing in
England, there would seem to have been no difficulty in describing it intelligibly and certainly in our own Constitution, or
in annexing any further conditions to it which may have been
thought proper. In England, it is a discretionary power to
arrest persons for high treason, suspicion of high treason, and
treasonable practices, and to imprison, and to hold them imprisoned, without bail or trial; but it is not limited by any
specific condition of the country,-either rebellion, or·invasion,
or any other overt danger or disturbance; but was exercised
before the Habeas Corpus Act, at the pleasure of the Crown,
and has been exercised since the Act, at any time when Parliament has seen fit to put aside the impediment of the Act.
Such a power, unconditioned by the overt danger of the nation,
might reasonably be thought, and was thought, inadmissible
a.mong us; but the power itself had been deemed a lawful power
before that Act, and was subsequently thought to be an indispensable power in certain conditions of the country, even by
those who did not see fit to leave it in the sole possession of the
Crown. It is a proceeding founded on the alleged crime or
offence of treason against the majesty and safety of the nation;
neither more nor less. It has no other basis whatever, and
never has had. ·This has always been, in England, the pivot or
hinge of denial of bail and trial, and is so at this day, with no
other difference between the day of 34 Eliz. and the present
2
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day, than that between indefinite delay of bail and trial, and a
specific and limited delay, renewable ad libitum; but, from the
critical danger of such a crime at certain seasons, instead of a
charge of special or plainly expressed treason, general or suspected treason has been deemed a sufficient charge to justify
the arrest and imprisonment, in defeat of conspiracies or confederacies against the nation.
All this being known to our forefathers, how remarkable
it is, that they should have treated the subject with such extraordinary coyness, as the record of their proceedings shows,
doing the work by implication instead of distinct and full expressions, and finally bringing it into the Constitution as it
were by a by-way, and under something like a cloak, instead
of a plain and well-fitting vesture, which would have shown its
true shape to everybody.
I have stated in Part I of these remarks, that a suspension of
Habeas Corpus was provided for in a plan or outline of Government, which was laid before the Convention, as the Journal
says, by Mr. Charles Pinckney. Whether the printed Journal is
right _in this fact, is wholly immaterial. Mr. Pinckney subsequently assumed a distinct and particular relation to the subject.
On the 29th May, 1787, the first day of business in the
House, certain propositions of Governor Randolph, of Virginia,
with Mr. Pinckney's plan, were referred to a Committee of the
Whole on the State of the American Union. (Journal, 71.) In
this committee certain of the fundamental propositions of Governor Randolph were discussed, amended, adopted, or postponed, from day to day, until the 13th June, when certain
resolutions were reported to the House. (Journal, 81-122.)
The provision in regard to Habeas Corpus was not noticed in
them in any way. On the 15th June, other propositions were
moved by Mr. Patterson, having no relation to Habeas Corpus,
a,nd were referred to the same Committee of the Whole. (Journal, 123.) On the 18th June, Colonel Hamilton read in the
Committee of the Whole, in the course of his speech, his plan of
government, which did not ~mbrace the subject of Habeas Corpus. (Journal, 130.) On the 19th June the Committee of the
Whole reported to the House the propositions of Governor Randolph, in the form of certain resolutions, and reported also that
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they rejected the propositions of Mr. Patterson. (Journal, 136.)
Until the 26th July the House debated, amended, adopted, or
rejected these-resolutions, and considered from day to day other
motions and propositions, covering the whole field of the Constitution, except what regarded the suspension of Habeas Corpus; and on that day, referred the resolutions of the House,
which had been adopted, in number twenty-two, to a Committee
of Five, to report a Constitution, and with certain instructions
to the committee, contained in a twenty-third resolution, but
not in reference to Habeas Corpus. (Journal, 206-207.) And
this Committee of Five, on the 6th August, to which day the
Convention had adjourned, reported to the House a Draft of a
Oonstitu,tion. (Journal, 2lt).) From the 6th to the 20th of Au.gust, the House was occupied from day to day with the Articles
of the Constitution so reported, amending, supplying, adopting,
or rejecting them, but in no respect touching the subject of
Habeas Corpus. (Journal, 230-263.) On the 20th August,
for the first time, the subject which three months before had
been referred to in the sixth article of Mr. Pinckney's plan, in
these words: "Nor shall the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Oorpus ever be suspended, except in ease of rebellion 01· invasion,"
was, with other propositions, referred to the Committee of Five,
in the words following: " The privilege and benefits of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall be enJoyed in this Government in the
most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended
by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing
occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding - - months.''
(Journal, 264.) On the 22d August, the chairman of the Committee of Five, reported certain additions to be made to their
report before the Convention; but did not in any way notice
the proposition or clause in regard to the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus. (Journal, 277.)
·
Thus for nearly three months of the session, the Convention
and all committees, general and special, had left the subject of
Habeas Corpus without action; and the last committee, who had
reported a draft of the Constitution, may be said to have put it
aside. No one appeared inclined to touch it, except, perhaps,
the delegate who had first introduced it in his pla,n on the 29th
May; although it is Mr. Madison, in his Debates, and not the
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Journal, which makes this certain. The Journal records, that
on the 28th August it was moved and seconded in the House,
and passed in the affirmative, to add the following amendment
to the fourth section of the eleventh article, which constituted
the Judicial power : "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless where in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it" (Journal, 301); which,
substituting when for where, is the precise language which is
now contained in the second clause of the ninth section of
the second article of the Constitution, as it was adopted and
engrossed.
Mr. Madison, in his "Debates in the Federal Convention,"
represents it as being moved on the 28th August, by Mr. Pinckney, in nearly the form contained in that proposition, which had
been referred to the Committee of Five, and upon which the committee had not reported; but he does not say how the motion
was·disposed of. It may not have been seconded. He states
that Gouverneur Morris then moved it in the terms recorded in
the Journal; that the first member of the clause, to the word
unless, was agreed to nem. con., and the remaining part by 7
States against 3: New Hampshire, 'JJIIassachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,-aye 7. North
Carolina, .South Carolina, Georgia, no 3. The Journal has
probably incurred an error of the press in applying this division,
not to the fourth, but to the fifth section of the eleventh article,
which Mr. Madison says passed nem. con., as no doubt it did,
being the article relating to judgment in cases of impeachment.
It is quite consistent with such a history of the clause, that
its final adoption should be attended by no intelligible debate;
for although Mr. Madison is clear in what he reports of it, the
debate itself has not the least tendency to show what, in the
judgment of any delegate, was meant by the clause.
Mr. Morris, who moved the clause, is not reported by Mr.
Madison to have said a word in explanation of it.* The whole
-x- I have heard it surmised that this was one of Gouverneur Morris's judicial amendments or articles to which this eminent man refers in a letter to
Timothy Pickering, to be found in Dr. Sparks's Life and Correspondence of
Gouverneur Morris, vol. iii, p. 322; but this must be wholly conjectural.
Timothy Pickering, while a Senator from Massachusetts, asked Mr. Mor-
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history seems to show that there was, what Mr. Thackeray in one
of his writings calls, a skeleton in the closet_; which he says every
Englishman has, and which every delegate seems to have had,
and feared to see, or to exhibit in its bones and articulations,
lest it should frighten the country. Though it is by no means
an agreeable thing to look upon, there would have been less to
alarm us if it had been shown in its true parts and proportions ;
for the imagination would have had less scope for exaggeration
or perversion. It had been so veiled, however, in the Convention, that the authors of the Federalist did not think it expedient to lift the veil, or to breathe its name, in their great Apology.
Even Mr. Morris's very sound general rule for the interpretation of the Constitution, "that it must be done by comparing
the plain import of the words with the general tenor and object
of the instrument," is not easily followed in the interpretation of
this clause; for if the words are plain, the import of them is not
altogether so to the general reader, and there are very few of
them to reflect light upon each other. The general tenor and
object of the instrument, moreover, do not give particular and
direct aid in the solution; for there is little, in any part of the
Constitution, that has a clear affinity to them. A verbal analysis, without definitions or explanations ab extra, which, after all,
ris, by letter of December 25, 1814, in the same work, his account of the proceedings in Convention in regard to that part of the original money-borrowing clause, which authorized Congress to" emit bills of credit," and which
had been struck out upon Mr. Morris's motion. The whole answer may be
referred to in the Life. The following is an extract of the part which relates to his judicial amendments or articles.
"Propositions to countenance the issue of paper money, and the consequent violation of contracts, must have met with all the opposition that I
could make. But, my dear sir, what can a history of the Constitution
avail, towards interpreting its provisions? This must be done by comparing
the plain import of the words with the general tenor and object of the instrument. That instrument was written by the fingers which write this letter.
"Having rejected redundant and equivocal terms, I believed it to be as clear,
as our language would permit, excepting, nevertheless, a part of what r·elaies
to the Judiciary. On that subject, conflicting opinions had been maintained
;ith so much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to select
phrases, which, expressing my own notions, would not a1arm others, nor
shock their self-love ; and, to the best of my recollection, this was the only
part which passed without cavil."
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may contain the whole marrow of the discordant interpretations,
will amount to nothing, as may very easily be shown.
The .first member of the clause says, that "the privilege of the
writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended;" and the second
member says, "unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion,
the public safety may require it." This we may suppose for
the present, authorizes suspension of the privilege in such cases.
But the express words authorize no more.
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, is
nothing to a man who is not imprisoned; but the clause expresses nothing in regard to imprisonment.
Imprisonment is not predicable in law of anybody without an
offence or cause; but the clause expresses nothing in regard to
cause or offence.
An offence is not amenable to law without an arrest, nor an
arrest without a warrant or authority, or a magistrate to command; but the clause expresses nothing in regard to warrant,
arrest, or authorizing magistrate.
The clause, therefore, in words prohibitR suspension of the
privilege of the writ absolutely, and authorizes it conditionally;
and if it means no more than it expresses, the sense and the
efficacy of the whole are suspended more explicitly than the
privilege of the writ.
But we see, at the same time, that the clause was devised for
the public safety, and that suspension was both prohibited and
allowed for it; and not allowed for the public safety at all times,
but only in times of disorder, during civil commotion and public
resistance against Government, or during public war in hostile
contact with it. It is not a war power, a power to increase military strength or equipment, to assist a military draft or enlistment, or it would have been given coextensively with war. It is
a rebellion and invasion power, to suppress treason and criminal
disloyalty, when an enemy is within our own borders, dividing
us by our interests and fears, and ensnaring us into treachery
against the Government that protects us, and which we in return
are bound to support and defend. It must, therefore, be regarded, consistently with the tenor and object of the Constitution, as a provision for great and rare cases of public or national
disturbance. It must also be regarded, in the field or character
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of its operations, as a definite power, and not an indefinite one,
which is utterly at variance wiph the tenor and object of the
Constitution; a definite one, carrying all the power that is
necessary to make the provision effectual against the danger,
which was its moving cause. And if this can be made out by
reasonable and probable implication from the words, it will be
the same thing as if our forefathers had explained them, as I,
for one, humbly and respectfully think they ought to have done.
It is the expedient of only a timid horseman, to put a blind upon
his horse, to keep him from shying or lashing out at what he is
not accustomed to see. Experience shows that the better way
is to let him see and examine the thing all round and square
before him, and then he will learn how much exactly he ought
to fear it, and will fear it no more than he ought to do.
The elements from which the clause is compounded are not
many, and they must come fully as much from without the clause
as from within it; nay more, for nearly or quite all the aid that
the clause itself affords to explain its meaning, is in the contrast
between its first and second members ; while at the same time
each member of the clause either expressly or by necessary implication contains within itself the unexplained word "suspended," on which the whole question turns, and which can
alone be explained from without.
At the time this clause was moved in the Convention, there
was one exemplar of similar power in England, of which kingdom we had been Colonies. But that power was altogether
unconditioned by the state or circumstances of the nation in
which it could be used. It was exercisable at all times in war,
in rebellion, in peace, and in times of general order and quiet.
In point of source, both before and after the Habeas Corpus Act
of 31 Car. II, that power began with the Executive, the King,
and was exercised by a warrant from the Privy Council, or from
a Secretary of State, charging the person named in it with High
Treason in general terms, or suspicion of High Treason, or treasonable practices, and ordering his arrest and commitment to
close custody. It was intended to meet and frustrate secret or
suspected conspiracies against the safety and majesty of the
realm. When the second section of the Habeas Corpus Act
made all such commitments for general treason bailable, the
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power of the Privy Council and Secretaries of State did not
cease, but the efficacy of their warrant ceased, except as a commitment that would end upon giving a recognizance of bail to
appear and stand a trial; and when it was thought expedient to
prevent bail and trial for a future period definitely, it was necessary that an Act of Parliament should intervene, to arrest the
operation of the Habeas Corpus Act in regard to commitments
or imprisonments under such warrants; and it was from these
Acts of Parliament came the expressions, " suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act," "suspension of the ~Vrit of Habeas Corpus ; '' and like expressions in regard to the Writ, of which the
word " suspension" was the key. Suspension uplifted the Writ
of Habeas Corpus from imprisonments under warrants of arrest
from the Privy Council for general or suspected treason.
There was, at the same time, another exemplar of this power
in the Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1779; and this,
like that of England, was unrestrained by any conditions, in
regard to the circumstances of the State, in which it could be
used; but was confided in terms to the legislature of the State,
to be used only on " the most urgent and pressing occasions,"
and for a term or time not exceeding twelve months. I have
not found any other examples of the clause, anterior to the
Convention which reported the Constitution of the United
States. Of course I have not looked for examples to the
countries of Europe, where personal liberty is generally regulated by forms different from our own,
And to these facts we must add the indisputable fact, that
the Constitution prohibits suspension in the largest sense in
which it had been used, that is to say, without any conditions
manifesting a particular state or crisis of the country; and authorizes it under the conditions it annexes, " when in cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it;" and
that it contains no express reference to the Legislature or Congress, nor any limitation of time, further than Rebellion or Invasion, which limits the suspension, is itself limited by time.
The language of the clause, and these external facts, seem to
be all that can be obtained, and are probably all that is necessary by the usual rules of interpretation, to ascertain the definite
meaning of the provision.
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I repeat, the definite meaning. I must not be understood to
mean absolute1y and in all points so definite, as that the department that was intended to initiate or exercise the power, should
be ascertained from the appointment of the clause itself;· for
although it may be regarded as the general tenor of the Constitution to indicate by classification or otherwise, what department in particular shall execute the power which it grants, and
this is perhaps uniformly the case in regard to legislative and
judicial powers, yet it is not true of executive powers in detail,
the Constitution vesting the Executive power, as a whole, in a
President_ of the United States, and ma,king no detail, except
where the President is to act in conjunction with the Senate, or
in convening the two Houses, or either of them, and adjourning
them if they disagree, or in receiving Em bassadors or other
public ministers. The office of Commander-in-chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, is not an inference from
the Executive power being vested in him, but is conferred by
express grant; and so is the power to grant reprieves and pardons. Whether a power, not given expressly to Congress or to
the Judiciary, is an executive power and vested in the President,
is in general to be determined by the nature of the power itself,
and not by its being expressly assigned to that department.
Without an express appointment, the power will result to the
Executive, if it is an executive power; and so it may result to
Congress, I admit, if it is a legislative power, though Congress
be not expressly appointed to the duty,-a much rarer case
however, under the Constitution.
But by definite, I mean definite as to the power comprehended
by the clause, which if it be nothing but the uplifting of the
privilege of the Writ, without regard to its anteceden.ts, is, as I
have shown, illusory and vain. I mean, consequently, definite as
to the whole power, including its antecedents, the imprisonment,
the cause of imprisonment, and the warrant of arrest and commitment. If it is not this-if some one of the departments is left to
declare or designate afterwards the cause for which, and the warrant of arrest and imprisonment by which, the privilege shall be
suspended-then I apprehend, that nothing can be less conformable to the tenor of the Constitution than such an indefinite
grant of power, and nothing more dangerous to the liberty of
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freemen. Nothing, in my judgment, is more repugnant to the
spirit of the Constitution, than a grant of such indefinite power
as this, whether in cases of Rebellion or Invasion, or in any
season more critical to the state, if such there can be.
My impression is that the clause can be shown, by following
the established rules of construction, to have a clear meaning,
definite, limited, and .-;afe, so far as a power in any degree arbitrary over the liberty of a freeman can be safe; and that no
further legislation by Congress is either necessary or competent,
unless it may be thought more in conformity to our plan of
Government, that Congress rather than the Executive shall
initiate the exercise of the power, or determine its continuance.
I do not myself adopt this exception, but my remarks will not
absolutely exclude it.
I proceed, therefore, to state, perhaps all the questions which
necessarily arise under this clause, and to make the remarks
which they appear to me to call for.

I. The action of the clause.-Does this cla.use give power to
any department of the Government to suspend the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it?
This has been denied. In every paper that I have read,
which has been written in opposition to my own suggestions,
this denial has been the principal, if not the exclusive ground
of remark. It is asserted in these papers that no power is
given by the clause; and that it is exclusively a restriction
upon an implied general power of suspension which the Constitution had previously given to Congress. The clause is
alleged to be a mere restraint upon power, and not a power.
Power, it is said, is denied by the clause, but not created or
given.
This is an extreme position, for which no authority or corroboration has been vouched from a.ny one in high judicial station,
or from the general scope of the Constitution itself. It is assumed principally from the position of the Habeas Corpus clause
in the ninth section of the second article of the Constitution,
which is said to be a collection of restrictions upon powers before given, expressly, or by implication.
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In opposition to this, the late Chief Justice Taney expressly
derived the power of suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus
from this clause, and from no other part of the Constitution.
This he did in his opinion expressed in Ex parte Merryman.
The able and learned Judge Sprague, of the District Court
of the United States for the State of Massachusetts, in the cases
Ex parte Fagan and others, September, 1863, said expressly:
"The Constitution, in declaring that the privilege shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it, has in effect declared that, in such
cases, it may be suspended."
There is no express power in the Constitution to this effect,
except this clause; and as to implied powers, the late Judge
Story, in his commentaries upon the Constitution, has made an
elaborate argument upon the implied and incidental powers of
Congress, which manifests his opinion that such a power cannot
be found there, although he does not appear to have regarded
the supposition as possible, that it was among the incidental
powers. In his remarks upon the subject, sec. 1342, the learned
Judge says: "It would seem, as the power is given to Congress
to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus in cases of rebellion or
invasion, that the right to judge whether the exigency had arisen,
must exclusively belong to that body." I need not remark, at
present, upon the two assumptions in this sentence; but it is
clear, that all the power of suspension that he regarded as existing under the Constitution, is in this clause and nowhere else.
A power, supposed to be either generally or extensively given to
Congress, to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as
a necessary and proper instrument or means to effectuate some or
all of its express powers, is no less than a power to suspend Magna
Carta, in pretty much the only principle in which it survives.
The gift of such a power for such common and ordinary ends,
would be to sacrifice the fundamental principle of free government, as a means of carrying into execution the regular operations of government. All reasonable presumption is against it.
So it has been said, that the writ of Habeas Corpus is a judicial writ, and that a power to give it, includes the power to take
it away, and to leave a party without any remedy for a time,
or indefinitely; that is to say, that a power coupled with a trust

28
to organize tribunals inferior to ·the Supreme Court for the
exercise of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, includes a power
to disorganize them, and to leave them without the means of
exercising jurisdiction. This is extraordinary ground upon
which to raise the implied power in question. But uplifting
the writ, without taking it away, is the implication which is
in question. It is the suspension of action while the writ remains. This is not a legislative nor hardly a judicial power;
it is neither bailing nor · trying the prisoner, but simply doing
nothing but leaving him as he is. It is clearly an executive
act, as much as suspending him to a beam, without any judgment how long he is to hang there. I deny that Congress can
take away the writ, without violating their constitutional trust,
and therefore the power to take it away cannot be implied; but
whether this can or cannot be done, to leave both the jurisdiction and the writ, and to have an implied power to suspend the
exercise of both, as a necessary and proper means of executing
their express power, has as little reason to support it as can be
said of any other proposition whatever.
The power to suspend this privilege is not, properly speaking, a legislative, but a constitutional power; and is not comprehended within the legislative powers of the United States, either
as a means or as an end. Legislative powers are in their nature and design regulative and conservative, to. oppose diminution or injury, or to promote progress, and not to impair foundations of government. This does not mean that the people who
made the Constitution, could not confer such a power, and reasonably confer it, to prevent the overthrow of government; but
there is a violent presumption against the grant of such a power
unless it is plainly granted. So far as the power extends, it is
an unsettling power, and in whatever degree it is used, is so far
destructive. Under a government of granted and limited power
like this, no implication from those powers which reason can
suggest, will carry with it an authority to suppress personal
liberty arbitrarily ; for the right of personal liberty in every
freeman, is the constitutive principle on which the Constitution
itself depends. Such a power is not an incident of anything
that is granted, but it is the reserved foundation of all that is
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granted. The silence of the Constitution, therefore, when it does
not speak plainly upon such a point, is a negation and prohibition of the power.
The clause in the ninth section of the second article, is a plain
grant of the power, under the conditions which it prescribes.
It is plain, according to the well-known and universally accepted
idiom of our language. The whole language of the clause,
taking both its members together, is, according to that idiom,
expressly prohibitive of the power unconditionally, but plainly
affirmative and donative of the same power under certain conditions. The first member of the clause prohibits the power in its
general or unconditioned state, without regard to rebellion or
invasion; and the second member by the disjunctive conjunction
reverses the first, so far as to authorize it under essential conditions. It is a well-known idiom of our language, and of most
languages; and is in common use; when it is intended, in a condensed manner, to affirm and deny something at the same time,
in different aspects; and this is such a use, as the law takes notice of in the interpretation of statutes, and of the most solemn
covenants. It is the "}us et norma loquendi," the " loquendum
ut vulgus," which is a popular and universal right, and held in
respect by the law.
Writers have said that the first paragraph of the ninth section
of the second article of the Constitution is restrictive of the
commercial power of Congress, which is true; and they repeat
the averment, as a sort of consequence, that the second paragraph, the Habeas Corpus clause, is also restrictive of an implied power in the same body. But nothing can be poorer as
reasoning: for the two paragraphs have not the least connection
or dependency.
They also say that the ninth section of the second article of
the Constitution is wholly composed of restrictions; which, if it
were true, would not help the argument. They mqst also
prove, that it is wholly restrictive of powers before granted,
which is not true. The Habeas Corpus clause does undoubtedly
contain a restriction; but it is of no use to their argument.
The second member of the clause restrains the operation of the
first, as it is the nature of a clause of this structure to do al-
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ways, and by so doing to contradict and reverse the first, partially, and to adopt it with a qualification.
The notion that the restrictions in the ninth section imply the
previous grant of a power to be restrained, cannot be better exposed than it is by the last clause of the tenth section of the
same article, which is wholly composed of restrictions upon the
States. "No State shall without the consent of Congress lay
any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of
peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State,
or with a foreign power, or engage in war, UNLESS actually invaded, or in sucli imminent danger as will not admit of delay."
Can these writers show that the Constitution has anywhere
given the States a general power to engage in war, of which this
is a restriction? On the contrary, the prohibition to make war
unconditionally is contained in the first member of the sentence,
and is granted conditionally by the second member of the sentence: precisely as in the Habeas Corpus clause. The State
war-clause is in structure and grammatical effect, precisely the
same as the suspension clause. It prohibits a right in the
States to engage in war, without the consent of Congress, but
affirms it conditionally when a,ctually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. The two clauses are
twin brothers from the same matrix, and were doubtless prepared and fashioned by the same person. It is perhaps the
most common and concise form known to our la.nguage, of prohibiting an unconditioned act or power, and in the same sentence
authorizing it conditionally.
When the nature and the history of the clause are considered,
few, it is presumed, will doubt that the negative form was given
to the first member, mainly to avoid a very open and direct affirmance of this abnormaJ and dangerous power; and that as no
po·wer of suspending the privilege is •given to Congress as a necessary and proper means to carry their express powers into
execution, established principles of interpretation justify the
construction, that the clause does, in the conditions prescribed,
confer upon some department of the Government, a power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, whatever
that may mean.
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IL What is the extent or range of the power that is given

.62

In looking for that meaning, where the words are so imperfectly defined, it is not unworthy of remark, that the negative expression, in the first member of the clause, '' the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,"
seems to imply, that at least somewhere, or at some time, the
privilege had been or might be suspended in manner or form,
or at a time, or under circumstances, which the makers of the
Constitution did not approve, and intended to reject and prohibit. It is not the language which would have been used, if
the thing had been unknown and unprecedented, nor if the
precedent which was known had been altogether approved. A
provision, either adopting an approved precedent, or introducing
a new one, would more naturally have assumed an affirmative
form. And this is made more clear by the conditions of Rebellion or Invasion, which the second member of the clause introduces as a qualification of the negative, to fit it for use
in our own Government. These conditions of the Union,
"rebellion or invasion when the public safety may require it,"
are the only qualifications which the second member of the
clause introduces, to authorize what the first member of the
clause prohibits: and if there was a known precedent, which
wanted these conditions or qualifications, but possessed intrinsically the other elements which constitute suspension of the
privilege, we may reasonably suppose that it was the intention
of the clause to adopt and prescribe these as the intended proceeding, unless we can find some authoritative interpretation of
its language, which we are compelled to follow in the place of
any precedent.
The words suspended and suspension, are not technical, that
is to say, are not so defined in any written law or judicial decision, in regard to . the Writ of Habeas Corpus, or to the privilege of the Writ, as to compel us to follow the definition
as the basis of interpretation. We know that they are not
applied to questions of Bail or Imprisonment, upon Writs of
Habeas Corpus, in the ordinary or normal administration of
the law. A decision upon such questions may be postponed,
adjourned, or appealed to another time, or term, or court; but
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the word suspension or suspended is entirely unknown in reference to such disposals of a question of Bail upon arrest and
imprisonment. If we attempt to interpret the Habeas Corpus
clause by what may be learned from the normal administration
of law, we can get no light whatever to guide us. But historically, politically, and naturally, the words have a meaning, in
reference to abnormal arrests and imprisonments, and to an
uplifting of the privilege or benefit of the Writ, beyond the
reach of parties or ordinary law, and resulting in simple imprisonment and denial of bail and trial, for the safety of the
nation, against suspected persons in times of critical danger.
We come nearest to a true account of it in the first volume of
Blackstone's Commentaries, where he describes the power given
by Acts of Parliament to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, as an
authority "to imprison suspected persons, without giving any
reason for so doing:" 1 Bl. Com. 136. If he had said "persons
suspected of a crime against the majesty and safety of the state,"
the description would have been better. And for such a proceeding the Constitution had a precedent, to which we both
may and must refer: from the want of anything else to refer to,
in pursuit of its meaning. I do not mean that it is a precedent
to be followed literally and with servility, especially in matters
which depend upon the structure of the government in which it
prevailed, or upon special laws of that government, which required them to counteract another law of the same government,
but to be followed in its essential elements, those constituent
parts of offence, of process, and of imprisonment, the cause, instrument, and effect, which are necessary to give certainty of
operation, or certainty of meaning, to the clause in the Constitution. Such a precedent, I say, was to be found in the practice
of England, both before and after the Habeas Corpus Act of
Charles II ; and that this was in the view of the clause, will be
made more obvious by an analysis of the clause itself, and by a
consideration of some of the interpretations of it, which must be
assumed for the purpose of giving a wider power under it, to
some department of our Government.
A material consideration in the analysis of the clause, is its
peculiar structure, to which I have already adverted; and from
which it follows, that whatever be the power or thing that is
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prohibited unconditiona1ly by its first member, the same power
or thing precisely, neither more nor less, is authorized by the
second or last member, under the conditions it prescribes. This
is both clear and necessary by grammatical construction, and
therefore in the design of the Constitution.
If the first member of the clause is to be interpreted in a
universal sense, or abstractly, without reference to cause, condition, or restraint of any kind; that is to say, if it means to
declare that the resort to the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended or denied in any case, or for any ca_use, then the
second member of the clause affirms and authorizes the suspension or denial in any case, or for any cause, when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. If there
is no reference to any case or cause in the first, there is none
in the second. If there is no limitation in the application of
the prohibition, there is none in the application of the power
while the conditions exist.
The same is true if the first member of the clause is interpreted in a general sense; that is to say, largely and comprehensively, but with certain exceptions well known and established,
as crimes, not bailable by law, or certain vocations or professions
of men, which must be excepted by implication, then the second
member of the clause authorizes the suspension or denial, except
in the excepted cases.
Again: if the first member of the clause is to be interpreted
in a special sense, or as referring to a special or abnormal power,
without conditions, then the special or abnormal power is authorized by the second member of the clause, with the new conditions prescribed. And if the meaning of the first member of
the clause is, for any reason, specific or definite, in point of
offences or causes of suspension, then the power authorized by
the last member is definite or specific in respect to those offences
and causes, and extends no further. In other words, precisely
what is unconditionally prohibited by the first member of the
clause, is conditionally allowed and authorized by the second,
neither more nor less.
In this view of the nature or character of the whole clause,
the interpretation of the first member of the clause becomes the
leading and governing inquiry; and the true meaning of the
3
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first member of the clause decides the meaning of the second
under the conditions it annexes.
There is a point for construction in the second member of the
clause, which also requires consideration, though it is not so
materia.l. In the Journal of Convention, and also in Mr. :Madison's debates, the adverb is where. In the Constitution, as it
was adopted and engrossed, it is when,-" unless when in cases
of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." We
must take it as it now stands in the Constitution. Where is an
adverb of place. When is an adverb of time. In th~ Journal
it is more applicable to cases of occasional danger from individuals, or causes, than to the time or season of rebellion or invasion. In the Constitution it is equally applicable to the time
or season of rebellion and invasion, and to special, local, or individual cases of danger. But whichever be the word, when or
where, the probable intention appears best to accord with the
word which is found in the engrossed Constitution, and to require both that rebellion or invasion shall exist, and also that
the public safety shall require the particular exercise of the
power. This, however, is not very important. The judgment
or opinion of the department that executes the power, as to
safety or danger at the time, must govern, within the intended
limits, and be beyond the reach of examination and correction
by any other department.
What was it then which the first member of the clause intended to prohibit?
I will state in general terms my apprehension of the meaning
of the whole clause, not as proved, nor to be granted without
proof, but only as a guide to what follows. "Suspension of the
pri,vilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus," "suspension of the writ
of Habeas Corpus," " suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act,"
are all of them expressions of common import, so far, at least,
as to signify a particular condition, namely, that in which the
government of a State has, or exercises, a power to imprison,
without bail or trial, persons dangerous, or suspected of being
dangerous to the State, and who are well described as being
guilty or suspected of treason or treasonable practices. This
power the first member of the clause means to prohibit at all
times in its unconditioned state; that is to say, when there is
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neither rebellion in the nation, nor invasion by war; and this
specific power the second member of the clause means to authorize, when, under the condition of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.
I am able to conceive of but three interpretations of the first .
member of the clause, as presentable by any one:
1. That the words prohibit the suspension and denial of the
writ of Habeas Corpus and bail, trial, or discharge in all cases;
that is to say, universally, or abstractly, without reference to
cause, condition, or restraint.
2. That they prohibit this suspension or denial generally, except in certain cases authorized by ancient statutes, adopted or
followed in the Colonies, and necessarily implied, and therefore
excluded from their meaning.
3. That the words have a special reference to an abnormal,
and generally unconstitutional proceeding, known in England
under substantially the same name or description, and which,
from its unrestricted use or liability to use when there is neither
rebellion nor invasion in the country, ought to be disallowed
unconditionally in this government.
1. The first interpretation of the first member of the clause,
that the words prohibit the suspension of the writ, and the denial of bail, trial, or discharge, universally, though it is apparently literal, is altogether inadmissible. It is to this effect, that
the writ of Habeas Corpus shall, in all cases and at a11 times, be
enjoyed by all freemen.
Technically speaking, the first member of the clause does not
prohibit the denial of bail, trial, or discharge. It prohibits the
suspension of the right to demand the benefits of the writ. Undoubtedly the result of suspension is, that the party does not
enjoy the benefit _of bail, trial, or discharge; but he is .not denied it, as he is by the normal operation of law, when the bail or
discharge i8 taken away by statute, or by a principle of law; but
because he is within the operation of an exception~.! principle,
which hangs up or uplifts his personal right for the sake of
public safety. It is not denied simply, as it is by ordinary law,
but the privilege is hung up by force of the extraordinary law.
The interpretation first presented puts aside this considera-
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tion, and treats the first member of the clause as a universal
prohibition of the suspension or denial of the full use of the writ
of Habeas Corpus and its benefits. This, I have said, is inadmissible. It offends against laws and facts universally observed
and known, and which it could not have been the design of the
Constitution to repeal or disturb.
It .was perfectly notorious at that time, that there were, and
must always be, masses of freemen in this country and everywhere, under laws derived from England, where the Writ of
Habeas Corpus is known, whose privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus to obtain discharge from confinement is, and must
be, suspended for the time by their vocation and duty, and
this in conformity to the necessary law of peace as well as
of war. I mean the cla.ss of soldiers who belong to the army,
.whether voluntarily enlisted or drafted, or militia called forth
into the public service. The same is also true of those in the
naval service. They are freemen, though they are soldiers,
marines, or seamen, but they are under restraint and confinement to military or naval duty. Whether they are duly or lawfully made soldiers, marines, or seamen, is a question of the law
of the land; and the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is
one of their privileges to investigate the grounds of their denial, if, while under confinement, they deny that they have
been lawfully enlisted, raised and called, or drafted. But if
they are lawfully soldiers, marines, or seamen, they are and
must be subject to the rules and articles of war and of the navy,
and their privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended.
The general benefits of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, as the Convention and the people knew, are uplifted from them, according
to any law either of England or the Colonies; and therefore the
Constitution did not mean by this clause to prohibit the suspension or denial of the Writ, and the benefits of i_t, in all cases universally. So also it was known to the Convention, that before
Magna Carta, and after, though by the common law all offences
were bailable, yet since the Statute of Westminster I, and subsequent statutes of early date, treason and capital felonies were
not and are not bailable by law; and that parties accused and
imprisoned on account of such crimes had not, strictly speaking,
the privilege of bail, or of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, that they
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might be bailed. The same was the law in most, if not all, the
Colonies. The first member of the clause could not have intended
to prohibit the denial of the privilege or right in such cases, and
therefore did not use the language in a universal sense.
But the graver objection to this interpretation arises from the
connection of the first with the second member of the clause.
If the first member of the clause be taken thus largely, so must
be the second. If imprisonment and suspension and denial of
Bail, and of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, are universally and
abstractly prohibited by the first, they are universally allowed
and authorized by the second, in Rebellion or Invasion, when the
public safety requires it. And then, when in cases of Rebellion
and Invasion, the public safety may be thought to require it by
the department to which the power appertains, the privilege
may be suspended or denied for any cause, without any offence
or suspected offence on the part of anybody, and for any purpose,
or to any end, military, civil, fiscal, or political, which that department may think the public safety requires. No condition
of life, no loyalty to the Union, the Constitution, and the Government, is exempt from the operation of the power; no domestic relation, parent and child, guardian and ward, master and
apprentice, persons in tutelage, whom the laws of all lands leave
in charge of their protectors and guides, at least while they
commit no offence; no drafted freeman under or above the age
prescribed by law; no freeman claimed to be enlisted in the
army through fraud, duress, or intoxication; in fine, nobody will
retain the privilege, if the public safety shall be thought to require its suspension. I hope I may say, that when I suggested,
in a former paper, that the President was intended by the Constitution to exercise the whole power that was given by the
clause, I had not a conception that the power was anything like
this. I agree that the Executive office is entirely unfit for it;
but I am equally clear, that no department of Government is
fit for it; that such a power has not a precedent in any history,
English or American, to justify it; and that it is as unnecessary,
either in Rebellion or Invasion, as it is unexampled. The Constitution cannot have intended to give it to anybody. It is
against the spirit of the whole instrument, and of all the foundations on which it is built.
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Whether the conditions in the second member of the clause
be simple or complex; that is to sa.y, whether simple Rebellion or
Invasion be sufficient, or there must also be danger to ·the safety
of the public, this interpretation of the first member, in a universal and abstract sense, puts the whole subject of suspension
into the power of some department of the Government with equal
universality. There is not a word expressed in either member of
the clause to limit this power. It is not confined to any crime,
or suspected crime, that may endanger the safety of the country,
or assist the Rebellion or Invasion. It is not limited to persons,
or individuals, only, but may be applied to entire States, cities,
and districts, or the privilege may be altogether abolished during
Rebellion or Invasion, if the public safety is thought to require
it. It is the omnipotent power of the English Parliament in its
highest constitutional functions, and, if liberty is not a mere
name in England, higher than that. It may be truly called an
exception, which, in time of Rebellion or Invasion, swallows up
the whole general rule of personal liberty. Such a conclusion
from such premises is more than logically absurd; it is constitutionally so. Its ineffable danger is this, that it tends to make
the suspension of the privilege, not a preventive or defensive
power, but a great working power of the laws and operation~
of the country, in time of Rebellion or Invasion, dependent for
its exercise upon the speculations of the law-givers and administrators. It seems impossible to admit that such a power, not
contained in that part of the Constitution which assigns to Congress its powers, nor; in the conception of anybody, affirming in
the clause itself anything more than an exceptional power of
rare application, could have been intended as an instrument of
such terrible magnitude, to be used at the discretion of anybody, in a particular condition of the country, neither impossible nor unlikely to occur, but both possible and probable in
the course of national life, and which would be competent
during that condition to sweep aside the general rule of liberty,
which, by its first words, the Constitution declared its purpose to
secure to ourselves and our posterity.
I am compelled to reject this construction of the first member
of the clause, from both its repugnancy to the known law of
Habeas Corpus, and the enormous consequences which follow it.
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2. The second presentable interpretation of the first member
of the clause is, that it was meant to prohibit suspension, not
universaJ1y, but generally, with certain necessary exceptions
practised in the Colonies before, as in the States since the Revolution, such as I have already alluded to, and perhaps others.
But such an exception out of a prohibition that positively includes all that it refers to, is illogical, and begs the interpretation that it makes. There is no exception in the first member
of the clause. The thing referred to by the first member, is
prohibited in its totality, in all its charncteristics together.
There is no exception of any one of them. The exception is
only in the second member, which adopts generally the charncteristics which the first comprehends, adding conditions which
exclude a part of them. It is, moreover, inadmissible to make,
or allow exceptions out of a constitutional provision which contains none, or to make or a,llow more than it does contain. A
special sense may be attributed to the whole, or to parts; but
such a meaning cannot be given to the :first member of the
clause, if it is interpreted in a general sense.
I therefore conclude that it cannot have been the intention of
the Constitution to prohibit, either abstractly or generally, by
the first member of the clause, the suspension or denial of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, and bail or discharge; but that the true
meaning of that member of the clause was neither universal nor
general, but special or specific; and in this special meaning, the
whole clause remedies the evil it intended to prohibit, and effectuates the good end it intended to secure.
3. The third presentable interpretation of the first member of
the clause remains.
A specific practice or power in suspension of the privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, that is to say, of bail or trial, was
within the view of the clause as practised or permissible in England, when there was neither Rebellion nor Invasion; and this
the first member of the clause prohibits. It is this meaning of
the first member of the clause, to which the second member is
so perfectly adapted as in part to explain the first, and qualify
it by adding the conditions of Rebellion or Invasion when the
public safety may require it.
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I have already described in part, what the practice in England was in its origin. But I must pursue the matter further.
I have shown that arrest and imprisonment and denial of
Bail and an indefinite postponement of trial, which, in aftertimes, with a definite denial of bail and trial, obtained the name
of" suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act," was effected by an
Executive arrant of arrest and commitment from the Privy
Council, or from one or two of its members, for treason in generality. Since the Habeas Corpus Act, it is well known that the
same end is compassed by like warrants from the same Council
or Secretaries of State, for precisely the same kind of offence,
that is to say, "High Treason, suspicion of High Treason,
or treasonable practices," and by an Act of Parliament, to
remove the special impediment interposed by the Habeas Corpus Act, which orders Bail to be a1lowed, and . trial, upon all
commitments for general treason. The suspension of the right
to the benefit of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, in like circumstances, has been exercised in all conditions of the Kingdom,
whether in Rebellion, Invasion, War, or Peace. It could be,
and probably vrns, so used before the Habeas Corpus Act, in
harmony with the resolution of the twelve Judges; and it has
been so used since that Act, in the time of William III, when
there was neither Rebellion nor Invasion, and in the reign of
George III, when there was almost universal peace.
There has been, perhaps, something like affectation in calling
the practice a violation of Magna Carta, though it is a wholesome affectation, for it has served to keep that great Charter in
the veneration of freemen, in its most valuable, and now almost
its only unrepealed provision. But it was not regarded by the
twelve Judges of England, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, as
a violation of Magna Carta, for the Executive head of the Government to arrest and imprison, and to hold in imprisonment,
with a practically indefinite postponement of trial, persons suspected of treasonable practices against the State, though the
crime, or the evidence of it, was so incomplete, that it could be,
or was, only described in general and indiscriminating terms.
The necessity of the State in times of danger, I am entitled to
presume, was thought to be a reasonable exception, not keeping
out of view altogether preparation for trial, though that was
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practically, a very vague kind of preparation, where the crime
was not defined, and definition depended on the pleasure of
the Crown. Neither was it so regarded in the early years of
Charles I, when the Pet.ition of Right was won from him as a
conquest for Magna Carta. Nor even in the sixteenth year of
his reign, when his regal power was nearly prostrate before the
paramount right of the people under the Great Charter, and the
King and part of his subjects were about to submit everything
to the arbitration of the sword; nor until the thirty-first year
of Charles II, when not so much the character of that Prince
as of his presumptive heir, whom it was found impossible to exclude from the succession, induced an ambitious and very able
leader, in opposition to the heir, to put an end to this effect of a
commitment for general treason, by a parenthesis in the Habeas
Corpus Act; the abrogation or suspension of which Act, in any
particular, would afterwards depend upon the pleasure of Parliament, and not of the Crown only.
When our Constitution was in the course of formation, that
practice had existed in England for more than two centuries.
Some provision for the great danger of the State, in a great
crisis, was thought by most men to be necessary in restraint of
personal liberty acting to the ruin or to the great danger of the
State. But the practice in England was not confined to any
overt or notorious crisis, but was open to administration at any
time, if Parliament would remove the impediment of the Habeas
Corpus Act. This unconditioned power, I apprehend, it was the
intention of our Constitution to prohibit absolutely, and to authorize the like power by the like means, and to the like end,
under certain conditions; and this I suppose to be the true and
necessary effect of the Habeas Corpus clause in our Constitution.
The progress and range of this power in England lead me to
advert to a great transaction, involving personal liberty and
royal prerogative in the early years of Charles I.
I have already placed before the reader an exact copy of the
Resolutions or Articles, signed by all the Judges of England,
in 34 Eliz., 1592, in direct response to the inquiry of the
highest Crown Officers of Queen Elizabeth. This authority or
precedent came before the Court of King's Bench in a very
remarkable form, in the great Habeas Corpus cause, in the
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third year of Charles I; and again before the Commons of England in the third Parliament of his reign, and, in the course of
the same proceeding, before the House of Lords, in conference
with the House of Commons, by a Committee of the Commons.
The King, in the interval between his second and third Parliaments, had, by order of Council, instituted a GENERAL DONATION by his subjects, requiring, as a loan or benevolence, the
exact sum from every subject which would have been levied if
an Act of Parliament had granted to the King four subsidies.
The pretext of the .Order in Council was the absence of Parliament, and the want of an immediate supply for the necessities of the Kingdom. Some gave, and many refused to give.
Some distinguished and able men were conspicuous in counselling others not to give. Those who not only refused, but had
counselled others to refuse, were arrested by Warrants from the
Privy Council, purporting to be issued per speciale mandatum
domini regis, by his Majesty's special command, but without assigning any cause whatever, either specially or generally; and
were committed to prison. Some of them compounded with the
King, or apologized, and were discharged; but five of these
gentlemen, whose names have been handed down in English
history, would make no composition, nor ask the King for their
deliverance, but sued out Writs of Habeas Oorpus ad subJiciendum, from the Court of King's Bench, Hyde, being Lord Chief
Justice, and Doderidge Jones and Whitlock, Justices on the
Bench. The whole argument, much in detail, printed in 1649,
may be found in a volume of Old Tracts in the Philadelphia
Library, No. 926, 4to.
It is sufficient to state that the commitment and imprisonment
were defended by Heath, Attorney-General to .the Crown, and
the right to bail or discharge denied, partly on principle, and
partly on precedents produced by him to the Court. The principle asserted by him was, that when the Privy Council omitted
to state in their warrant any other cause than the King's
special command, it must be presumed that it was for reasons of
State, the matter being, as yet, secret, or the evidence not yet
completely in hand; and that in such cases prisoners must be
remanded. Several precedents were produced, which were said
to be to this effect ; and one of them was the precedent, in
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manuscript, of the Resolution in 34 Eliz., which I have on a
preceding page transcribed from Anderson's reports. Heath
reported the resolution of the Judges to be, that "if a man shall
be committed by the Queen, by her command, or by the Privy
Council, he is not bailable." " If your Lordship ask me what
authority I have for this, I can only say, I have it out of the
book of the Lord Anderson, written with his own hand.''
This precedent was cited, and a copy of it was shown to the
Court, near the end of Heath's argument. Lord Chief Justice
Hyde, on referring to it in his judgment delivered at the close of
the case, said: "We have compared our copies, not taking them
one from the other, but bringing them. We have long had them
by us together ; and they all agree, word for word, with that .
Mr. Attorney said he had out of Judge Anderson's book, and it
is to this purpose, to omit other things,-that if a man be committed by the commandment of the King, he is not to be delivered by a Habeas Corpus in this Court; for w:e know not the
cause of the commitment."
Selden, Noy, and other counsel, who argued for the respective
prisoners, produced precedents of an opposite kind; and endeavored to get sight of the precedent in 34 Eliz., Serjeant
Noy expressly asking "that Mr. Attorney may bring the precedent of 34 Eliz., with him;" but it does not appear that they
obtained it then.
The precedent had, no doubt, been falsified by somebody in
the point for which it was cited. All the . prisoners were remanded to custody, by the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice
and all the Judges.
When the Parliament, which the King had been constrained
to call, met in the following year, the House of Commons was
in a flame of resentment against the order in Council, and
especially against the decision of the Court of King's B~nch.
The precedent in 34 Eliz., was produced before Parliament by
Mr. Seldei1~ in Lord Chief Justice Anderson's manuscript book,
in his own handwriting, and was verified by Sir Edward Coke,
as such; and, instead of being to the point for which it had
been cited by the Attorney-General Heath, that a warrant of
imprisonment from the Privy Council, per speciale mandatum
domini regis, without any other cause assigned, precluded in-
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quiry and bail, there was no such point in any part of the case;
but the precedent as produced in the House of Commons, and
as it is now copied in a history of the debate in the House, in 1
Rushworth, 511, was with unimportant literal variations the
very same which now appears in Anderson's reports, as I have
reprinted it.
In the debate which ensued in the House, the decision of the
King's Bench in remanding the five gentlemen, and the argument of Attorney-General Heath, were put to open shame by
such men as Sir Francis Seymour, Sir Robert Phillips, Mr.
Selden, and Sir Edward Coke : 1 Rushworth, 499, 500; and
the Resolutions of Sir Edward Coke, to which I have referred
in Part I of these remarks, were adopted nemine contradicente.
I repeat them here for greater convenience of reference:
I. That no freeman ought to be detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, by the command of the King, or Privy Council,
or any other, unless some cause of the commitment, detainer, or
restraint be expressed, for which, by law, he ought to be committed, detained, or restrained.
II. That the Writ of Habeas Corpus may not be denied, but
ought to be granted to every man that is committed or detained
in prison, or othe1.-wise restrained, though it be by the command
of the King, the Privy Council, or any other, he praying the
same.
III. That if a freeman be committed or detained in prison,
or otherwise restl':ained by command of the King, the Privy
Council, or any other, no cause of such commitment, detainer,
or restraint being expressed, for which, by law, he ought to be
committed, detained, or restrained, and the same be returned
upon Habeas Corpus granted for the same party, then he ought
to be delivered or bailed: 1 Rushworth, 513.
The point to which it is material now to advert in the first
resolution is, that a Warrant of arrest by command of the King
or Privy Council, or any other, is no authority for commitment
or detainer, unless some cause be expressed, for which, by law,
he ought to be committed or detained; and also in the third,
that if a freeman be committed or detained by the command of
the King, the Privy Council, or any other, no cause of such
commitment or detainer being expressed, for which, by law, he
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ought to be committed or detained, he ought to be delivered or
bailed. The resolutions do not touch the question, what is, by
law, a sufficient ground of commitment or detainer. There was
not, in all that thorough, though fiery debate, a single word from
any debater that questioned the resolution of the Twelve Judges
in 34 Eliz.
But, further: the three Resolutions adopted by the Commons were sent to the House of Lords, with a request for a
conference, and a complaint against the Judges of the King's
Bench for their decision in remanding the five gentlemen; and
upon this the Lords agreed upon a conference, and summoned
the Judges to appear and explain the grounds of their judgment, as the House of Commons had previously done; and in
this conference the whole matter was, after the explanations of
the Judges, argued before the Lords and the Committee of the
House by Sir Edward Coke especially, on the side of the House
of Commons, and by Attorney-General Heath on the part of
the King.
It was in this argument that the ground of reason of State
and necessary secrecy was again taken by the King's counsel,
who said, "that the King was not bound to express the cause of
imprisonment, because there may be in it matter of State, not
yet to be revealed for a time, lest the confederates thereupon
may make means to escape the hand of Justice.'' 1 Rushworth,
529. And this was the answer given to it by Sir Edward Coke in
concluding his elaborate argument for the Managers. The objection, as he stated it in his own words, was this: "May not the
Privy Council commit, without cause showed, in no matter of
State, where secrecy is required? Would it not be an hindrance
to his Majesty's service?" And this was Sir Edward Coke's
answer : "It can be no prejudice by reason of the matter of
State, for the cause must be of higher or lower nature. If it
be for suspicion of treason, or misprision of treason or felony,
it may be by general words couched; or, if it be for any other
thing of smaller nature, as contempt or the like, the particular
cause must be shown, and no individuum vagum, or uncertain
cause to be admitted." 1 Rushworth, 532-537.
That noble third Parliament of Charles I, were unanimous in
this matter against their King. They said in debate, as .Festus
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said of Paul to Agrippa, " It seemeth unreasonable to send a
prisoner, and not withal to signify the crimes laid against him;"
and the original Greek word could just as well, and better in
this application, have been translated unfounded or absurd.
Their arguments conclusively proved, that if a man could be
imprisoned without a cause of offence shown, he was a slave.
That was the definition of a slave. If a man did not own himself to a greater degree than that, he could own nothing else.
He had no property, no personality. He was a chattel, and no
better. They protested against it, and unanimously voted
it out of the presence of English liberty. But in all that sharp
and long Habeas Corpus battle between power and law, no one
on the side of the Commons attempted to retract, gainsay, or
qualify Sir Edward Coke's admission, which fully sanctioned,
and in form expanded, the resolution of the twelve Judges, that
High Treason in generality, suspicion of treason, misprision of
treason, assigned in a warrant by the Privy Council, or Executive power of the State, as a cause of arrest and imprisonment,
was sufficient to suspend the liberty of a suspected or guilty
person for the security of the State.
The Petition of Right, which was won as a law in this controversy between King and Parliament, did not in any degree impugn this doctrine. There were several postulates in the Petition
besides that of not issuing warrants of commitment without a
cause ; but commitments for a cause in generality, it left as before, to be determined by the law.
The third and fourth articles in the preamble of the Petition
recited, that by the Great Charter of the Liberties of England,
it is declared ancl enacted that no freeman may be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his freehold or liberties, &c., but by the
lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the law of the land;
and that in the twenty-fifth year of Edward III, "it was declared and enacted by authority of Parliament, that no man, of
what estate or condition that he be, should be put out of his
land or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited,
without being brought to answer by due process of law:" and
then the article proceeds,-" nevertheless, against the tenor of
the said statutes and other the good laws and statutes of your
realm to that end provided, divers of your subjects have of late
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been imprisoned, without any cause showed; and when, for their
delivera,nce, they were brought before your Justices by your Majesty's writs of Habeas Corpus, there to undergo and receive as
the Court should order, and their keepers commanded to certify
the causes of their detainer, no cause was certified, but that they
were detained by your MaJesty's special command, signified by
your Lords of Privy Council; and yet were returned without
being charged with anything to which they might make answer
according to law."
The 10th article, the enacting part of the Petition of Right,
following this recital, then prays the King, among other things,
"that no freeman, in any such manner as is before mentioned, be
imprisoned or detained." This is the simple requisition on the
head of warrants of imprisonment; and, as I have said, left
what was a lawful cause of imprisonment to be determined by
the law; but warrants without cause showed-warrants by his
Majesty's special command, as before mentioned,-were pulled up
by the roots, as being irreconcilable with the principle of personal freedom at any time or in any circumstances. The resolution of the twelve Judges, and the admission of Sir Edward
Coke stood after this as before. The law of denial of the privilege of bail, by imprisonment under warrants of the King and
Privy Council, showing or certifying in generality, the cause of
treason, or suspicion or misprision of treason, treason by general
words couched, was therefore left by the Petition of Right, as
those resolutions had placed it as a power of the Executive head
and Council of the Realm, to secure the State against treasonable conspiracies and confederacies.
At this epoch there was no Habeas Corpus Act in England.
The doctrines of the common law in regard to the writ of Habeas Corpus, and to the power of the King's Courts and Justices
in relation to it, appear to have constituted at that time, the law
of Habeas Corpus. But in the 16th year of the same King,Charles I,-such an act was passed, and this act also left the law
of imprisonment by warrants of the Privy Council for treason
in generality, or suspicion of treason or treasonable practices,
exactly as the Petition of Right had left it.
The statute of 16 Charles I, c. 10, was passed, both to abolish
certain courts, the Court of Star-chamber, &c., and to bring the
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warrants of the Privy Council within the reach of the writ of
Habeas Corpus, for the benefit of all the subjects who, it seems,
were not entitled to it before, in a peremptory manner, but only
at the discretion of the court.
The 8th section of that act enacted, that if any person should
be committed or restrained of his liberty, or imprisoned by command or warrant of the King, or of the Council Board, or of
any of the Lords of the Privy Council, the Court of King's
Bench, or Common Pleas, upon motion in open court, should
without delay upon any pretence, forthwith grant a writ of Habeas Corpus, and bring before them the prisoners, with the true
cause of the prisoners' detention; after which return, the Court
"should proceed to examine and determine whether the cause
of such commitment appearing upon the said return be Just and
legal, or not, and thereupon do what to justice shall appertain,
either by delivering, bailing, or remanding the prisoner."
And thus this statute left the law as to warrants of the Privy
Council for treason in generality, as the Petition of Right had
left it; and so it continued until the 31 Charles II, in 1679,
when a clause in the second section of the Habeas Corpus Act,
put an end to this effect of Privy Council warrants for treason
in generality, by a stroke of the pen.
I have thus stated the matter historically, perhaps too minutely, but accurately and truly as I apprehend it to have been,
in order to show what I conceive to have been the intended bearing of the Resolutions of Sir Edward Coke, of the Petition of
Right, and of the Statute of 16 Charles I, on that doctrine,
which did not disappear as a means of imprisonment, and denial
of bail under Privy Council warrants, until the Habeas Corpus
Act.*
That great and noble Act, however ignoble or ambitious may

* Mr. Hallam, though he admits that the Habeas Corpus Act is a very
beneficial enactment, and eminently remedial in many cases of illegal imprisonment, says, that it "introduced no new principle, nor conferred any
right upon the subject." Const. History, vol. 2, p. 353. It seems probable,
on the other hand, that the single clause in the second section of the Act,
which made a general charge of Treason or Felony an absolute title to Bail,
was a new principle, and did give a right to the subject, independently of
the Resolutions in Anderson. It was an effectual restraint, both on the
power of the Crown, and on the discreti'on of the Judges and Courts.
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have been the motives of the sagacious leader who penned this
parenthesis, divided generally into two classes, all cases of commitments for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, its
second · section comprehending all such cases of commitment,
(" unless the commitments aforesaid were for treason or felony
plainly and specially expressed in the warrant of commitment,")
and entitling them to a delivery upon Habeas Corpus, upon
giving bail by recogniza,nce to appear and take their trial; and
the seventh section, comprehending the commitments for treason or felony plainly and specially expressed in . the warrant of
commitment, directing such proceedings, that, upon the prayer
of the prisoner in open Court to be brought to his trial, he should
be brought to trial or discharged, at furthest in the course of the
second term of the Court after his commitment. The exception
in the 21st section of the Act, in regard to petty treason and
suspicion of felony, has no bearing upon this matter.
A full political history of this Act, which lingered in Parliament for many years after the first effort to pass it, and which
finally passed, as Burnet says, by a trick or joke, on a division
of the House of Lords, by counting a fat Lord in its favor as
ten, (and a note of Speaker Onslow, in regard to the numbers
in the House at the time, seems to confirm him, Burnet's Own
Times, 8vo., vol. 2, 256-7,) would be a most valuable acquisition,
as the history of a conquest for personal liberty, won from an
unprincipled family of kings, in a profligate reign, amid very
general corruption, by mixed motives and efforts of good and evil,
personal ambition, personal rivalry, personal resentment, and
personal fear, with, it is to be hoped, some portion of moral and
political virtue, in which the age did not abound. We have a
much fuller account of the passing of Magna Carta, in the time
of King John. Whether Charles II and his friends did not
observe the exceptive unless, in the second section of the Act,
or were unable to estimate its effect, or whether the King's fears
for the exclusion of his brother, the Duke of York, which the
House of Commons had voted, but the Lords did not agree to,
made him knowingly yield, lest worst might happen, I have
been unable to learn. It is certain, that on the day on which
that act received the royal sanction, a killing frost fell upon
this flower of the Crown and Privy Council; and, in addition
4
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to the multiplied securities which the Act gave to the subjects
of England for their personal liberty, through the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the power of denying or deferring the privilege
of bail or trial upon warrants for treason in generality, suspicion of treason or treasonable practices, passed over to' the
Parliament of England. That body only, from that time to
this, has been able to supersede, or to stay, the full operation of
the Habeas Corpus Act, in any particular, for months, or years,
or a day. But, as I have already remarked, although the effect
of denying bail under these warrants of the Privy Council passed
away, their legality was not destroyed, but continued under the
sanction of Parliament, as means to the same end. This point,
however, was not left open to question in England for any le'n gth
of time.
In the year 1697, in the seventh year of William III, the year
before the Act of 7 and 8 William III, which suspended the
Habeas Corpus Act on Barclay's conspiracy, the authority of a
principal Secretary of State to issue such a warrant for treason
in generality, was brought before the Court of King's Bench, in
the time of Sir John Holt ; and is reported under the title of
" Proceedings between The King and Thomas Kendall, and
Richard Roe," in 4 Hargrave's State Trials, 554.
It was the case of a Habeas Corpus to bring up from Newga.te the bodies of the two prisoners; to which the Keeper returned for cause of their detainer, a warrant under the hand and
seal of Sir William Turnbull, one of his Majesty's Privy Council, and principal Secretary of State, in his Majesty's name
authorizing and requiring the Keeper to receive into his custody,
and to keep until they should be delivered by due course of
law, the bodies of the two prisoners, "they being charged with
High Treason, in being privy to and assisting the escape of Sir
James Montgomery out of the custody of William Sutton, one
of his Majesty's messengers in ordinary, and charged with High
Treason.''
In a very able argument by Sir Bartholomew Shower for the
prisoners, he contended that they were entitled to be discharged,
because a Secretary of State and member of the Privy Council
had no authority to issue such a warrant : and under this head
he denied the Resolutions of the twelve Judges, in 34 Eliz., as
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being extrajudicial and without authority. The Secretary, he
said, as a Privy Councillor, was not a Justice of the Peace, nor
authorized by law to issue a warrant of imprisonment, whatever
the Privy Council might do. He also argued, that the prisoners
were entitled to give bail under the- Habeas Corpus Act, because
the charge of Treason was general, as it did not describe specially what the Treason of Sir James Montgomery was ; and
the escape could only be of the same species of crime as his.
The Attorney and Solicitor-General argued for the Crown.
Lord Holt, in giving judgment, said, "I did always give credit
to the resolutions of the Judges in Anderson." He thought at
the same time that the treason was general, as Sir James Montgomery's treason was so described, and the crime of the prisoners
could not be different. Rokeby, J., said that Walsingham had committed two hundred years ago, (?) and that there was another precedent, Hellyard' s case, 2 Leon, 17 5. * A conservator pacis at the
common law could commit; and it is incident to his power of
committing, that he may give an oath, and take a recognizance.
The Secretaries of State are great officers. They are sentinels
to watch for the King, and the common peace of the Realm.
But he thought the prisoners ought to be bailed, because it was
not expressed in the warrant what was the species of Sir James
Montgomery's treason. Eyre, J., thought upon the whole, the
prisoners ought to be bailed; and they were bailed. The same
question of the Secretary's power to issue a warrant and commit,
presented itself in Money v. Leech, the case of general warrants;
but after the Attorney-General IJe Grey argued in support of it,
Mr. Dunning conceded the point. 3 Burr. 1753, 1763.
We can now understand the course, which with perfect uniformity has been followed in England, in regard to suspension
of the privilege, since the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II.
From the time of the conspiracy by Barclay to assassinate William III, up to the last suspension, in a season of profound peace,
Hellyard's case was a return to a Habeas Corpus from the Common
Pleas, 29 Eliz., by the Warden of the Fleet, that he held the prisoner in
obedience to a warrant by Sir Francis Walsingham, one of her Majesty's
principal Secretaries of State ; but because the return did not state the cause
of the commitment, the Court gave the Warden day to amend his return,
otherwise the prisoner should be ·delivered.
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in 57 George III, the same character of warrant for trea.son in
generality, suspicion of treason and treasonable practices, emanating from :;tt least six of the Privy Council under hands and
seals, or from one of the principal Secretaries of State under
hand and seal, has been used to arrest the guilty or suspected
parties by name, and to imprison them; and this has been either
preceded or followed by an act of Parliament sanctioning the arrest and imprjsonment of those prisoners, and of such as in the
same manner and form should thereafter be arrested, so far as to
deprive them of bail or trial for a prescribed time, without the
consent of the Government. I say preceded or followed, for
I have not been able to inspect all the statutes, in consequence
of the omission to print such expired statutes in the "Statutes
at Large." In the time of William III, the first Act of the
kind, 7 and 8 William III, followed the arrest; for the detection and defeat of the conspiracy depended upon the King's
prompt and secret action in the first instance. On the last
occasion, 57 George III, it certainly followed; for the prisoners
were in gaol, and the purpose of the Government was to try
them upon what the Crown officers thought was sufficient evjdence to convict them of special high treason; but, upon the
failure of the first trial, any further trial was thought to be
desperate in the prevailing temper of the people, from among
whom the jurors were to be selected; and the act of Parliament for staying the privilege of bail and trial was then immediately passed. In the year 1715, the time of the first rebellion for the Pretender, on the accession of George I, I incline
to think, from a letter by Lord Chancellor Cowper to the King,
in the appendix to Lady Cowper's diary, that the act preceded
the arreRts, as there had been ample notice of the Pretender's
.design; but I am not certain. Nor does it matter: for ever since
the full incorporation of the great principle of the modern English Constitution, that the King rules through a ministry which
has the confidence of Parliament, the King, through the ministry, proceeds in this matter as the public safety appears to demand, and is beforehand sure of the confirmation by Parliament
to supersede the Habeas Corpus Act. Practically, therefore,
the Executive power of England at this day arrests for treason
in generality, suspicion of treason, or treasonable practices, when
the ministry advise it, and the act of Parliament follows as an
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expression of the confidence which subsists between Parliament
and the Ministry. Of course this is no arbitrary power of the
Ministry, or of the King through the ministry, but it is a practical acknowledgment of the source from which the precautionary arrests should proceed, and is an effect of the consultative
intercourse between the King's Ministers and a majority of the
two Houses, by whom alone, with the King's assent, the operation of the Habeas Corpus Act can be suspended. And so stood
the practice of suspension in England when our Constitution
was formed.
After all that Blackstone has said in regard to the transcendent power of Parliament in this behalf, ·it is not easy at first
sight to perceive, if the Resolution of the twelve Judges in 34
Eliz., Sir Edward Coke, and Sir John Holt and the Court
.of King's Bench, in 7 William III, were right, how the intervention of Parliament in this matter is much, if any more, than
the exercise of an ordinary Parliamentary power to restrain the
· operation of the Habeas Corpus Act, which Parliament may repeal altogether; or how, if that Act had not been passed, there
could have been any failure of legal capacity in the Privy Council and Secretaries of State, to do without confirmation by Parliament, what they now do when Parliament, before or after
the arrest, uplifts the opposing provisions of the Habeas Corpus
Act. The only difference between the constitutional and the
legislative effect of these Acts, is the difference between imprisonment under a general charge of Treason, which led to
denial of bail and an indefinite delay of trial, and imprisonment
under a like charge without trial for a specific time, renewable at pleasure by Parliament. This, however, may in principle be a great difference. I honor and revere the fundamental
principle of exemption from arbitrary imprisonment; imprisonment without trial. It is a corner-stone of the English Constitution, and of our own; and I have no doubt that the Acts of
Parliament which stay the operation of the Habeas Corpus Act,
and confine prisoners in gaol on suspicion of Treason, with a
denial of bail or trial, are the exercise of a constitutional power,
and not of one that is purely legislative; as they surmount the
provisions of Magna Carta and 25 Edward III, which Englishmen, as well as ourselves, hold to be a part of the Constitution.
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But as our own Constitution authorizes the suspension, with all
its incidents, under certain conditions, when the public safety
requires it, I cannot see by what analogy to English statutes,
an Act of Congress can be required to authorize suspension by
the Executive Department. The Convention which reported
our Constitution undoubtedly considered it as a power which
nothing but the Constitution by the people could give, and
therefore framed the clause in such language as made it independent of a Habeas Corpus Act, whether Congress should
afterwards pass one or not; and by that clause it became, to
my judgment, an Executive power, and not a legislative one.
Whether the power given by the Constitution can be exercised
independently .of an Act of Congress to authorize it, is, however,
no part of the question of construction of the power itself, which
I have been considering. It is certainly a minor question, when
compared with the import of the power itself: for if I have been
at all successful in this sketch of what the substantial character
of the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was in England
at the time our Constitution was adopted, and had previously
been for two hundred years, and have also shown that there was
nothing that constitutional history recalled to anybody when
the subject was referred to in the Convention, but the definite
proceeding by warrant to arrest suspected persons for general
treason against the State, and denying them the privilege of
bail or trial, without any condition of rebellion or invasion to
qualify the power, then it will be seen that there is a reasonable
ground to infer that the true meaning of the Habeas Corpus
clause in our Constitution is to prohibit this unconditioned suspension, without regard to any overt and public danger of the
country, and-to authorize the same thing under certain conditions of this overt nature. At that time it seems certain, that
suspension of Habeas Corpus, or suspension of the privilege of
·the Writ, did not recall to any one any other legal power, proceeding, or effect, than that of arresting persons suspected of
treasonable designs, committing them to prison, and uplifting,
beyond their reach, the writ of Habeas Corpus, as a means of
relief; and if this be so, the reasonable interpretation of the
Constitution is, that this was intended by the clause, and the
power under our Constitution becomes thus as definite and spe-
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cific, though under conditions, as the. practice in England had
been without such conditions; and, under the like judicial cognizance, to see that in form and substance the suspension is what
the Constitution authorizes, though without the least authority
to exami~e or to inquire into the evidence or reasons of state,
upon which such warrants, arrests, and imprisonments are
founded. If the Constitution had authorized, for certain purposes, a Writ of Right or a Writ of Oessavit, two obsolete writs
in English law, we should have had no better guide in English
law books for the form and effect of those writs, .than we have
in English statutes and treatises on legal and political history
and learning, for the meaning, process, and effect of suspension
of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. There is no
special legislation in regard to it in England; none is necessary
on the part of Congress. Nothing that is even descriptive
of its process, cause, or effect, is contained or set forth in the
Act that Congress did pass on the 3d March, 1863. That Act
leaves everything to implication from the Habeas Corpus clause,
except one thing which it interprets, I think, erroneously. The
difficulty is to see how the clause admits of legislation, as the
whole power is a necessary implication from the clause; or we
must reject implication altogether, and turn the power over in
the wildest indefiniteness, to be made by legislation whatever
Congress shall think fit. If, on the contrary, it is left to n·ecessary implication, the whole _proceeding, and the effect of it, become definite, and the power of the President, as the Executive
power, or even one of his characteristics as conservator of the
peace of the United States, is amply adequate to exercise it, in
harmony with the law, and without the aid of any Act of Congress whatever.
I shall add only a few words in regard to the power of the
President, to close my remarks on that head.
As it is not difficult to rais(;l a political argument from the
structure of our Government, to require the fiat, or initial step,
to come from Congress, it is not my intention to canvass the question of constitutional expediency, further than it has been included in the nature and design of the power; or to do more than
add a summary of the heads of remark, by which I have intended
to explain my preference _of the President's power. 1. The

1
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authority of the Constitution is complete in itself, if we interpret the word "suspended'' as an executive act, which it truly
is, instead of an authority to a legislative body to authorize the
act. 2. Tha,t any supposed analogy of the Acts of Parliament
in England, to sanction the denial of bail and trial, is illusory,
because those Acts are passed to arrest the operation of the
Habeas Corpus Act, which requires that prisoners under a general
charge of treason, or treasonable practices, shall, if they ask it,
be discharged upon giving bail to appear and take their trial.
There was no such Habeas Corpus Act here, and there can be
none to defeat the power given by the Constitution. Even if
the Acts of Parliament were necessary in England, on the principles of constitutional law, to defer or deny trial for a definite
period, an Act of Congress is unnecessary to initiate a proceeding to this effect, because the power in the Constitution to su.-spend the privilege, implies and carries the whole power. 3.
That by requiring a fiat by Act of Congress, it is required from
the department which is the least able to judge of its necessity,
perhaps absent at the time of greatest need, and without the
aid of a constitutional ministry in the cabinet of the President,
which, having its confidence, might anticipate the authority,
and rely upon the sanction of Congress, if, with their advice, the
President should take the responsibility of action upon himself:
4. That by requiring the fiat of Congress, the people lose the
responsibility of the President, for his own independent action
under the Constitution, and obtain no responsibility in Congress
to supply its place. 5. That the words o·f the clause, the import of the clause, and its history in the Convention, all tend to
the same conclusion, that the power, being executive in its nature,
the exercise of it was to be executive, and was manifested in
point of intention to be such, by rejecting a reference to the
Legislature, in the exemplar of the State of Massachusetts,
which had been proposed for adoption. The existence of jealousies then known to exist in regard to a single executive,
clothed with any effective power, was sufficient reason for avoiding an express reference to his office, when it was implied in so
many ways.
I thus conclude my remarks upon the extent and range of the
power conferred by the Habeas Corpus clause in the Constitu-
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tion. In the description of the power which I have given, it
is a known power, and, in one respect, a circumscribed power,
known and circumscribed by long-continued, definite, and consistent usage, and, under judicial supervision, to keep it within
its limits. Beyond this, it has no limits or circumscription, and
may be anything which the speculations or imaginations of men
may suggest.
The result of ·the whole is, that the Constitution, by . suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, ca,rries by
implication, the whole that was understood by that expression,not the King and Privy Council, nor the Act of Parliament, nor
the agency, official or Parliamentary, of another nation, but
the fundamental elements of the thing,-the offence, treasonable
design against the na~ion, the warrant of arrest and impriso.nment for that cause, and the uplifting of the Writ from the
offender during the danger. Who or what body is to initiate
or execute the power, the Constitution does not say expressly;
and what it implies in this behalf may be settled by the nature
of the power, and by the tenor of the Constitution, without
affecting the power itself.
If, on the contrary, it is held that the clause gives power .to
Congress to legit,late, as to the cause, instrument, and effect,
then it will follow, that while our seemingly more cautious forefathers did limit this power to times of Rebellion or Invasion,
in restraint and mitigation of the English practice, yet when
Rebellion or Invasion comes, they have enlarged it to comprehend the imprisonment of anybody, in any case, or for any
cause, military, naval, fiscal, or political, that a representative
body may think the public safety requires. This thought or
opinion is the only security against excess, and it is neither
resistible nor examinable by any one else, nor does it turn upon
the bearing of facts in regard to the criminality or criminal
designs of suspected persons, but may turn altogether upon
general speculations concerning the public danger or safety at
large; and if Congress, or anybody else, is to be the regulator,
w.ithout any restraint at all, it is so transcendent a power, and
so overleaping all the barriers which protect the personal liberty
of a citizen, tha,t I cannot personally realize it, though I am
wide awake to the apprehension; neither can I believe that our
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forefathers were wide awake, if they agreed to authorize it without some limitation, even in the most desperate of rebellions like
the present.
·

I have a strong and deep sympathy with every lawful act of
the President and Congress to suppress and cast down forever
the present rebellion, the greatest crime, I think, that is recorded
by History. I have nothing to say about latent beginnings or
excuses on either side. It is not my purpose in this paper to
judge them. But in its treacherous and sacrilegious outbreak,
and in its arrogant and malignant design, no truly impartial man
can doubt, and History, unless it be the lie, which Sir Robert
Wal pole, in spleen or self-defence, said it is, .History will not
deny that it was the flagrant crime of leaders in the South, and
politically of the whole South. If the North and West had not .
risen as one man against this fraudulent and m'urderous outbreak,
equally against Heaven and against the Union, risen for the
sake of the Union and the Constitution, for honor's sake, and
for virtue's sake also, no man, however elevated in these sections of the Union, could thereafter have left the world without
despair for the honor of his country's name, and that of his
posterity. It seemed .to me, and still seems, that not to have
resisted it, and to resist it to the end, would have been, and
must be, to bring the Northern and Wes tern people in our land
into everlasting dishonor and shame.
No matter what England or France may say or do. Every
nation must be the keeper and defender of her own honor· and
virtue; and, if we have honor and virtue, we can, with God's
unfailing blessing upon them, keep both against all the world ;
for virtue, national or personal, is, under His blessing, as invulnerable as the diamond in its mine, and will give out an unquenchable light, even in the darkness of poverty and rags. If
a man has the proper virtue, his honor is safer than a walled city
or fortress. It cannot possibly be taken after he has lost his life
in defending it. And so it is of a nation. · If the people will
keep firm hold of virtue and honor, Zerah, the Ethiopian, may
come out against them "with an host of a thousand thousand;" and they will remember the faith and the prayer of Asa:
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"It is nothing with THEE to help, whether with many, or with
them that have no power!" Let us forego our adventitious
lux•uries, even our accustomed comforts, in defence and preservation of this gem of gems, our virtuous honor, and our posterity
will be saved for the renewal of a national youth, with both virtue and honor untarnished. In my judgment we have had, and
we now have, no alternative, any more than a brave or a good
man has an alternative in private life, to choc,se infamy instead
of an honorable death.
I have therefore never been, though I do not assume the
name of any living :n.3,I'ty but that of the country, a disapproving, still less a discoloring critic, of what Congress or the
President may have done. On the contrary, if it has happened
that I have been unable to concur, I have been generally inclined
to follow the advice of Dante's Master, though not at all for his
re·asons:
'' Non ragioniam di lor ; ma guarda e passa. ''

I honor the President's frankness and plainness of speech, as
badges of veracity and sincerity,-his sagacity, also, the proof
of a self-sustaining spirit, and of strong natural powers of observation. I honor, especially, his benignity of temper, which
bespeaks a heart at peace with all the world, his superiority to
the common and misleading vanity of thinking himself any
greater by his office than he is for it, his exemption from the
stain or imputation of misusing his office to promote unworthy
personal interests or aims, and his cour.age, constancy, and untiring zeal, in ten thousand novelties and embarrassme.n ts, to do
what he thinks his duty, for the restoration of Union and lasting
peace. Both Congress and the President, I a,m convinced, have
meant to do the best for the imperilled cause ; and, in regard
to one great measure of the President, I have never doubted,
that it was desirable for the whole nation to arrive at the point
to which _the measure tended-the freedom of every slave in the
country-whatever may have been the doubts about the right
of way over the field which it crossed to arrive at it.
I must say, at the same time, that I have never been able to
follow the Act of Congress of 3d March, 1863, in relation to
Habeas Corpus, nor the Executive acts which have been in ha.r-.
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mony with its principle, before and since its enactment; and
this inability is wholly irrespective of the question, whether
Congress or the Executive is the proper department to initiate
the suspension of the privilege of the Writ.
This Act of Congress declares or enacts that the President is
authorized, whenever in his judgment the public safety may
require, to suspend the privilege of the Writ "in any case,"
without any qualification of cause or offence, throughout the
United States, or any part thereof; and the Executive proclamations of 24th September, 1862, and 15th September, 1863,
do, in some instances, suspend it, in cases which want the qualification of offence or illegality, unless it is to be taken as an inference from military arrest, confinement, or sentence; and the
Act of Congress suspends all judicial proceedings on writs of
Habeas Corpus, after a certificate on oath by the keeper of the
prisoner, that ·he is detained by the authority of the President,
without any return of the body of the prisoner, as the writ commands, or of the cause of imi::>risonment.
I cannot, at present, follow these acts, legislative and executive, as true constructions of the Constitution. But I mean to
abstain from special criticism of them, as they may be regarded
as still sub Judice; and will confine myself in the remainder of
this paper, to some remarks on the bearing of military and
martial law upon the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, and upon the judicial power of the United
States to visit this species of imprisonment by writs of Habeas
Corpus, where it is within its jurisdiction, and to see that it conforms to the Constitution, and to give relief when it does not.
Some remarks upon these topics are essential to the due application of what I have already written.
I need hardly remark, that the power of suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, is a civil and not a military
power. It is, no doubt, in a special sense, supplementary in the
time of Rebellion or Invasion, to the military power, the direct
object of both being, in such cases, to suppress the rebellion, or
to repel the invasion, to which each power is referable. But
this does not make the two powers one power, nor blend together
their attributes or functions. The suspending power is as much
. a civil power, and a civil power only, whether exercised by the
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President alone, or under the fiat of Congress, as the power of
a judge or justice of the peace to arrest and imprison a burglar
for house-breaking, or a thief for larceny. It is a civil power to
arrest and imprison a criminal or suspected criminal, in one
case as well as in the other. The difference between them is
not in the civil nature of the act or office, but in the design and
effect; those of the suspending power being, at least primarily,
to prevent the success of the crime by imprisoning suspected
persons, and those of the judge or justice being to bring the
criminal to trial upon accusation of a crime, and if he is guilty,
to punishment. Blackstone looks to the Act of Parliament suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, only in the light of a power
"to imprison suspected persons without giving any reasons for
so doing." If we draw our opinions of the power of suspending
the privilege of bail from its history and practice in England,
including the State of Massachusetts, it is unquestionably a civil
power, neither more nor less, and has no more junction, still less
identification, with military power, than all other powers of
government which are designed to maintain the public authority
and rule in the time of Rebellion or Invasion. The two powers,
the civil suspensive power, and the military power, do not run
into each other's fields, interchangeably; they cannot be combined into one power, which is neither the one nor the other,
but something different from both. The suspending power may
doubtless assist the purposes of military power, by operating in
its own field, and the military power in its own field may assist
the design of the suspending power, which is to suppress treason
and rebellion; but the military power cannot suspend the privilege, nor can the suspending power perform military duty.
Each must do its own work upon its own principles and rules,
and nothing can be gained to either of them, or to the country,
by an attempted joinder of them. If the military power holds
an enlisted or drafted soldier, who denies, or whose parent,
guardia~ or master denies, that he has been lawfully drafted or
enrolled, as being under or above age, or as having been forced,
drugged, or inveigled into the army, without, or against, his free
will, or when he had no competency of will, I do not understand
how it can be a constitutional exercise of the power _o f suspension, to suspend his pri-rilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, to
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leave him with the military power, and prevent his submitting
to ·a competent court the question whether he was lawfully
drafted or enlisted. I hold that a military draft, when authorized by act of Congress, is as constitutional and lawful, as a
draft upon the Treasury is, when Congress has made an appropriation. But the draft is not the question. Is it a constitutional use of the power of suspension, to deprive a drafted or
enlisted soldier, his parent, guardian, or master, of the benefit
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, that he may have a decision, by
a competent judicial tribunal, upon the question whether he has
been lawfully drafted or enlisted, or not? If it ·is, the power
of suspension annihilates the law of the draft . . It may be inconvenient to our Government to lose the soldier, 9r to lose the
time. There may be partisans and judg·es who countenance and
promote opposition to the draft, and to volunteer enlistments,
from party hostility ; ~ut this is a partial evil, and such as a
steady and determined execution of the law of the land will
suppress, and finally extinguish. But the total suppression of
the fundamental law of the land, and all laws of the land, at its
election, even in rebellion and invasion, is proba,bly what the
people never thought of, and what the Constitution o;ght to
have spoken more explicitly than it does, to infer such an intention. Whether a man is a lawfully drafted or volunteer soldier,
is a question of law upon the facts; a question of the civil law
of the land, and not of military law. It is a question which
any man may raise for himself, or for his minor son, ward, or
apprentice, without treason, and without the least civil or criminal misconduct; and if he cannot raise it, he has lost the principal attribute of a freeman. The history of suspension in England does not present an instance in which the suspension of the
privilege has been resorted to, to prevent such a question from
being raised, or to silence and overrule it when it was raised.
If, in prosecution of a treasonable design, gravely suspected by
the Executive department, the opposition to the draft is made
by soldier, by next friend, or by magistrate, I do not see the
necessity of military or martial law in the case. The treasonable design, and its acts in consequence of it, bring the guilty
person and persons within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus
clause, ·and the civil power of the Constitution.
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I resort tQ this illustration, to show my meaning, that the
power of suspension and the military power, cannot be mixed
up, so as to enable the two to do what neither of them can do
separately. They may assist each other, each by performing its
own work; they cannot, either of them, perform the work of
the other, or use any power but their own, and that according
to the law of the power. They are distinct and immiscible
pqwers. They may co-operate in their respective spheres; they
cannot be conjoined as one, or in one sphere, to do effectively
what each is incompetent to do alone.
I have already exhibited the course of argument, historical,
legal, and political, from which I think it results, that the
Habeas Corpus clause meant to prohibit, by its _first clause, the
unconditioned power of arresting and imprisoning, without bail
or trial, a suspected traitor, when the nation was at peace, or
was not in a state of rebellion, or invasive war. This was notoriously the suspension power, as it" had been used in England
from the time of William III, and was used in no other country
under the laws of England, nor had it been used in the Colonies, or in a State, except M_assachusetts, in the rebellion of
Shays, by the authority of the Legislature, to arrest persons in
actual rebellion. The great exemplar was, undoubtedly, in
England ; an~ the unconditioned power there exercised, was the
thing prohibited by the first member of the Habeas Corpus
clause, and was by the last member allowed conditionally. It
was allowed, however, without reference to any junction or admixture with the milit~ry power. Nay, it was absolutely separated from that power, in its universal or general use, and was
only allowed for the public safety, when it might be affected, in
cases of rebellion, or .invasive war; and the public safety, thus
intended to be protected, must, by reasonable construction, be
understood to mean the public safety, as affected by unlawful
acts directly dangerous, and not by such as are innocent and
lawful in themselves, but only dangerous upon a general or
speculative view of everything lawful, or otherwise, which
statesmen may possibly take in forecast of the future. A power
to the extent last referred to, may be extended to everybody,
innocent or guilty, and to every act, lawful or indifferent. It
seems to be entirely beyond, and in opposition to, the scope,
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tenor, and spirit of the Constitution ; and no language ought to
be held sufficient to carry such a power, but such only as admits
of no other than the one imperious meaning.
The same that I have said of military law, must be said of
what is called martial law, and with at least equal distinctness.
I need not define or describe martial law, or the limits of its
operation. Whether it is military law raised to a higher power,
or the same power in a larger field, it has strength if it is a lawful power, to do without help what it may lawfully do; and it
can obtain no strength from the suspensive power to do what is
unlawful. If it is lawful by the law of the land, to which the
law of arms in all its conditions is subordinate in a general and
constitutional sense, it has lawful power to perform its own lawful
behests, and wants no assistance from the power of suspension.
If it assumes unlawfully the custody of a freeman, and the case
of the prisoner is not within the range of the power of suspension, so that the latter may act independently by its own power,
the coalition of the two powers can be of no avail to silence the
law, or the Writ of Habeas Corpus. They cannot be joined to
do that lawfully, which neither of them separately is lawfully
competent to do. They are specifically different powers, ap.d
act by different means, and diverso intuitu. The one is the law
of force, applied by military arms, to the overthrow or punishment of resistance to its lawful commands. The other is the
civil law of arrest and imprisonment, applied by civil warrant
to prevent the perpetration of an offence injurious to the majesty and safety of the nation.
What is true in this relation of military and martial law, is
universa1ly true of military courts, or courts martial, in the
same relation.
It deserves particular notice, that the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus does not imply a law without an act, or an act without a law, but an act under a law of
the very highest command. There is no record or account, perhaps there has never been an imagination, of such a thing as a
law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by
positive enactment, generally over a country, or specially over
a district, division or municipality of a country, taking away
for the time, the benefit of this Writ, from all the inhabitants of
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that country or district, and leaving them without this remedy
against wrongful imprisonment by anybody. There was something like this in a suggestion by one of the delegates in the
Convention; but it was accompanied by no explanation, and
must have been uttered in want of familiarity with the history
and character of suspension. Suspension of the privilege of
the Writ does not repeal the Writ totally or partially. It uplifts fo:11 a time the right of certain persons, dangerous to the
State, to claim the fawful benefits- of the Writ. So it has
been always considered from the time it first acquired its name,
and from the earliest day when a resolution of the twelve Judges
of England allowed the thing without giving it a name. As we
used the word in the Constitution, we must be understood to
h~ve used it in the sense in which it had generally been used,
especially as the Constitution explained it in no other sense.
The object is personal, the proceeding is personal, the privilege
is personal, the offence, the arrest, and the imprisonment, are
personal, and the suspension of the prisoner's privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus is personal. There is nothing general
or impersonal in any part of the proceeding that follows the
high authority from which it proceeds. The personality of the
whole thing, from beginning to end, is inseparable from it
throughout. The wor_d suspended has not, of course, its literal
meaning and application in the Habeas Corpus clause. No one
can think of a personal privilege or of a Writ being suspended
as it were upon a hook or a beam. The word is used metaphorically; but its metaphorical sense and application had been
made as definite by use, before we introduced it, as it could be
by practical and legal use for more than a century. A geometrical definition could hardly be more precise. It means the
uplifting from one who is imprisoned by process under the power,
of the privilege of claiming a discharge by bail or trial through
the Writ of Habeas Corpus ; and the process under the power
has always been, and, therefore, must be understood to be, a proceeding by warrant, charging a person with the offence or suspected offence, which the power was created to defeat.
When, therefore, we hear of suspending the privilege of thewrit of Habeas Corpus in a State, or district, we seem to be
carried away from the language of suspension into the language·
5
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of martial law, or into the language which has been used in regard to martial law, but has never been used or known in regard
to this specific civil power of suspending the privilege of the
Writ. Nor can it be used with a corresponding effect in the
suspension itself, without destroying the order and peace of society, and confounding all the domestic and social relations in
the district, which depend for their assurance of safety upon ·
their access to the enjoyment of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
In describing that which I suppose to have been the formal
proceeding in suspension in England, I shall describe what I
regard as in substance implied by our own Habeas Corpus
clause, and implied, a fortiori, from the greater jealousy the
amendments to our Constitution declare, of all deviations from
formality in proceedings against personal liberty.
1. An oath or affirmation, to sustain the verity of the charge,
or the sincerity of the suspicion upon which the warrant is to
issue.
But I cannot say this without a qualification. The general
principle of ,t he law of both countries is, that a freeman shall
not be imprisoned upon a charge of crime, without the oath of a
witness to support the accusation. The law requires so much
to outweigh the standing presumption of innocence ; and there
seems to be no more reason for dispensing with it under the
power of suspension, where allegiance is assumed to have been
broken, than in any other case. Nevertheless, the case of imprisonment under the suspension power, is not within the common rule of criminal proceedings in all points, nor within the
direct operation of the amendments to the Constitution, which
were meant to sustain that rule: It is, on the contrary, an extreme and abnormal case. In Sir Bartholomew Shower's argument, in the case of Kendall and Roe, already referred to, there
is special reference made to such Privy Council proceedings as
originate imprisonment of the person. He admitted that upon
suspicion there might be an apprehension; but insisted that
there could not be commitment with a charge of an offence,
unless there be an indictment, or presentment, or a. witness
against the offender; and that there can be no witness without
:an oath. He could find, he said, no law or precedent for the
..authority of a single Privy Counsellor to give an oath. He
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could find no precedent for the Privy Council's committing to
custody, but only proceeding by summons and citation. The
Court, as I have stated, sustained the resolution of the Judges
in 34 Eliz., and the authority of a single Privy Counsellor to
commit; but whether there had been an oath in that case
was not inquired into, nor did the Warrant allege that there had
been one. The Court bailed the prisoners because the charge
was treason in general, and was not specially expressed; and
did not discharge them; as they would have done, if the Warrant,
on any account, had been i1legal. Perhaps, in the case of Warrants proceeding from so high a source, and in a matter of
State, requiring secret or confidential action, the presumption
may be that the oath, or equivalent knowledge, by the party
who issues the Warrant, may be presumed. There is, certainly,
no difficulty in deposing to the sincerity and verity of a suspicion, as well as to the certainty of a fact; but as the name of
the witness cannot be required in a proceeding of this nature,
and as a suspicion may be entertained by the judgment of the
party himself who issues the Warrant, upon his own observation
or knowledge of circumstances, it may be going too far to assert,
that an oath, or affirmation, is invariably requisite. It concerns the arresting party's own responsibility more than it does
the Court, whose power extends no further than to see that the
power of suspension is formally executed. The Acts of Parliament, in England, which suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, do
not expressly require an oath, nor any formality of proof, to
precede the Warrant; but they expressly require a Warrant,
with special authentication, by hand and seal, and a general
designation of the cause, high treason, suspicion of high treason, or treasonable practices. From anything I have seen, in
my researches into such proceedings, I am unable to say that an
oath or affirmation, sustaining the verity of the charge, or suspicion, is essential, in all cases, to support a warrant of arrest
and commitment under the power; and when the President
acts, or is presumed to act, upon his own view or knowledge, I
incline to think that it is not.
2. The Warrant I apprehend to be essential or indispensable; and, according to the general rule, it must be printed or
written, and signed and sealed by the party authorized to exer-
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cise the power, or by the Secretary of one of the Departments,
by his 'authority, and in his name; arid this Warrant must show
the eause of arrest, which cause must be treason generally, or
suspicion of treason, or an offence of that character or nature, a
high misdemeanor against the safety and majesty of the State;
and must authorize the person to whom it is addressed, to arrest
the party named in it, as charged or suspected of that offence,
and to imprison him, or keep him in custody, until further order,
or until he shall be delivered according to law. And either in
the Warrant, or by some other document from the same authority, it must be shown that the Warrant is in execution of the
power to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
and that the privilege of the Writ is suspended. I mean, as I
have said, to state the substance, and not the order or language
of the form.
I am not to be understood to mean, that the power of executing the Warrant cannot be committed to one who is a military
officer, or soldier, or that the custody of the prisoner cannot be
assigned to a military officer, or the commander of a military
fortress: but the military character of the arresting officer, or
of the keeper in custody, or of the place of custody, can have no
legal bearing or influence upon the case. It cannot be a military
arrest, or a military custody, nor be affected in any way by
military or martial _law, or by the rules and Articles of War; and
for so saying, I think there is the warrant of nearly three hundred years' practice in that country, from whose usages we have
adopted the power, qualifying it only by the conditions of Rebellion or Invasion, when the public safety may require its exercise.
These two characteristics, the second alone, perhaps, are the
sum and substance of the exercise or execution of the power
to suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, as I apprehend it to be. It was entirely so in England before the
Habeas Corpus Act. It has been so since: the effect of the
Warrant, in preventing bail or trial, depending on Acts of Parliament, which expressly deny bail and trial, because the Habeas Corpus Act expressly enacts that commitments upon such
Warrants for treason generally, and not specially expressed in
the Warrant, shall be entitled to bail. If like Acts of Congress
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were necessary in the United States, I should not have suggested that the power could be exercised by the Executive Department only; but as the Constitution authorizes suspension 0£
the privilege in the cases of Rebellion and Invasion, which includes the whole power, an Act of Congress to that effect is surperfluous. Whether an authority from that body must be given
to the President to exercise the power, I leave where it has been
placed.
Supposing the power of suspending the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, to be what I have described it as being, and,
exercisable in the manner described, then it must follow, that
·the Judicial powe1 cann0t be altogether displaced or superseded
by it, though it may be so far abridged as only to maintain the
rights of persons under a limitation, which confines the Judiciary
to the observation of the forms of things rather than of their
substance. Nevertheless, those forms are of infinite value, as
they exclude dangerous substances, though it may be uncertain
what they precisely include; and they decidedly benefit the people at large, though they may not much benefit the pris0ner
himself. Within the more limited area, I am not able to perceive that the Judicial authorities are not as competent as in
other cases, so far as to inquire if the power has been apparently
pursued, and to relieve if it has not. On the contrary, I sub- ·
mit with some confidence, that the Judicial Department is- competent to inquire into the exercise of the power, and to see that
the power has ostensibly been exercised within its prescribed
limits, if it has any; not indeed to examine into the particular
grounds of the suspicion of treasonable design which may be
charged, and to judge whether the imputation upon the party imprisoned be well or ill founded in fact or probability ; n.othing
like this; but to know ·whether the limitations of the power have
been ostensibly observed in the execution of the power.
I will endeavor to illustrate my meaning in connection with
some of my preceding remarks.
If the power is confined to the case of a warrant to arrest
and imprison an individual person, I assert the Judicial power to
be competent to inquire whether there is a warrant, and whether
an oath is necessary; and if the power is limited to arrest and
imprison for some offence within the meaning of the clause com-
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mitted or suspected, it is competent to inquire whether the
offence is alleged in the warrant, or perhaps certified on the
return ; and, if no cause is alleged or certified, to deal with the
case accordingly. I go no further; and I go thus far, as I have
said, with some confidence, for this reason, that under the postulates of my argument, if the case is not apparently or formally
within and according to the limitations of the power, then its
predicament is that of an arrest and imprisonment, without the
authority of the Habeas C-Orpus clause ; and being under or by
color of the authority of the United States, the Judicial power
of the United States extends to it, and ought to be competent
.lit
to inquire into it, and to give relief by Writ of Habeas Corpus.
I suppose, for instance, that there can be no doubt concerning the following position in regard to the Judicial power in
England. In the case of the Resoluti-0n by the twelve Judges
in 34 Eliz., they say in immediate connection with the Resolution to remand in cases of imprisonment for High Treason in
generality, by the Queen's command from her person, or by order
from the Council, or one or two of them, "Nevertheless, the
Judges may award the Queen's writs to bring the bodies of such
persons before them ; and if, upon the return thereof, the causes
of their commitment be certified to the Judges, as it ought to
be, then the Judges, in the cases before, ought not to deliver
him, but to remand the prisoner to the place from which he
came."
Whatever may be thought of the Resolution of the Judges to
remand absolutely and finally, as Anderson reports, it will not
be doubted that the assertion of the Court's power to award the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, and to have a return of the body, and
the cause of commitment by the Queen personally, or by the
Privy Council, is in harmony with the immemorial power of the
Judicial Department, and the principles of the law of Habeas
Corpus. If it was not at the time obligatory upon the Court
by statute to issue the writ in the case of such Privy Council
commitments, it was made so by 16 Charles I, c. 10, and universally in cases of commitment for criminal or supposed criminal offences by the Habeas Corpus Act.
So in the proceedings in the case of Kendall and Roe, in the
King's Bench, after the Habea,s Corpus Act, where the commit-
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ment under the warrant of a Secretary of State was probably
intended to describe the offence in the warrant as a plainly and
specially expressed case of High Treason, and the counsel for
the Crown argued that it was so, and therefore was not bailable,
the Court held that it was not so described, and therefore bailed
the prisoners.
In like manner, there can be no doubt, if under any of the
various English statutes which are called suspensions of the
Habeas Corpus Act, .commitments had been made by the Privy
Council or principal Secretaries of State, by warrants which
omitted to show any cause, or any such cause of imprisonment
as these statutes authorize or admit, or without the authentication of the warrant they require, the Court of King's Bench or
Common Pleas would give relief and discharge the prisoners
absolutely, or upon recognizance of bail if the cause was bailable.
The principle is as clear as possible. The statutes in question
deny bail and trial only in the cases described in them, and in
manner and form, as well as in substance, as they are described ;
and, if the prisoner is otherwise committed than according to
one of these statutes, the Habeas Corpus Act must have its full
operation.
The United States have no Habeas Corpus Act; but the
Courts of the United States have power to issue Writs of Habeas
Corpus, and all other writs which are either specially provided
for by statute, or may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law; and the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the
Judges of the District Courts, respectively, have power to grant
Writs of Habeas Corpus for the purpose of inquiry into the
cause of commitment, with a proviso as to their extent, which
has no effect to abridge it where the prisoners are in custody
under or by color of the authority of the United States.
It is this particular matter, the cause of commitment, as assigned in the Warrant, or certified in the return to the Writ,
that I conceive the Judicial authorities are both formally authorized, and officially obliged to know. All other omissions
may for the present be prretermitted. This is cardinal.
Since the time of Charles I, and the Petition of Right, which
has been regarded as in part a basis of our Constitutions, a war-

72
rant of arrest and imprisonment without assigning a cause of
commitment, general or special, has been repudiated as a badge
of slavery. It is so in effect; for we can conceive of no personal liberty as remaining with an individual or people, where
imprisonment can be enforced without a cause expressed in the
Warrant, or certified in the return of it to a Writ of Habeas Corpus. And it is as necessary in the case of suspension of the
privilege of the Writ as in any other case; nay, more so, if possible, because it is the only fact which justifies or explains the
suspension of the privilege as not being an act of mere will and
force. It is thus inseparably connected with Warrants in suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in England.
It cannot be supposed that the power of suspension, 'or the
act of suspension, is the cause of the imprisonment. Suspension is the ouster of relief on account of the cause.
Neither is the Warrant or order to commit the prisoner to
custody, the cause of the imprisonment. The Warrant is the
mandate to imprison on account of the cause.
Neither is the reason of the imprisonment the cause of it. I
have already stated what Blackstone says of suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act, that it is a power to imprison a suspected
person without giving any reason for it; but he did not intend
to confound the reason with the cause, for there is not an Act
of Parliament to restrain or suspend the Habeas Corpus Act,
that does not require the cause of High Treason, suspicion of
High Treason, or treasonable practice, to appear in every warrant, whether by six of . the Privy Council, or by a principal
Secretary of State. The reason is the motive of State. It is
for the State to give or withhold it at pleasure. The Courts
are not to judge of it.
The danger to the safety of the public is not the cause. That
is the inducement of the arresting power, or the asserted tendency and bearing of the cause.
.
The cause of the imprisonment is the offence or violation of
duty on the part of the real or suspected offender. Lawful imprisonment without a cause, is a legal impossibility, and a contradiction in terms. If a cause is not assigned or certified in
return to the Writ, the imprisonment must appear to the Court
or Judges as the simple result of will and force without cause.

. 73
Unless it be the true· interpretation of the Habeas Corpus clause,
to give an unlimited arbitrary power, without respect to, case or
cause, in time of Rebellion or Invasion 1 the Warrant must assign
a cause, or the return to the Writ must certify it, or it is illegal.
This is my present impression.
It may be argued, that the benefit of knowing the cause of
imprisonment is a part of the prisoner's privilege of the Writ
that is suspended. But this is not so.. It has never been so
regarded in the practice of suspension, ancient or modern. It
is the right of the Court to-know the cause. It is the privilege
of all the freemen in the country to have it known in every
case, that it may be known in their own. It is the privilege of
the offender, or suspected offender, at the time he is arrested and
ordered to be c0mmitted. I am not , able to imagine a reason
why a cause should not be assigned in the· Warrant, or certified
to the Court, considering the great latitude which the proceeding permits for the use of general terms in the charge of the
offence ; and nothing, I apprehend, will satisfy the omission, but
a construction that the Habeas Corpus clause, in cases of Rebellion or Invasion, authorizes imprisonment for that which is
no offence nor suspected offence, if the public safety may require it.
These general remarks upon the distinct fields of operation of
the power to suspend the privilege of the Writ, of the military
power, and of martial law, and of the Judicial authority to know
and maintain the limits of the suspensive power, if there be any,
in behalf of personal freedom, are a11 that I deem it necessary
to add to my observations on the nature, extent, and range of
the power of suspension.

In this paper I have intended to confine myself to one topic,
and to avoid, even in my illustrations of it, a reference to the
merits of any other disputable matter of law, which agitates the
country. Having, three years since, entered upon the consideration of the President's power to suspend the privilege of the
Writ, I have thought it proper, in a moment of greater calm, and
of renewed confidence by the people in the political virtue of the
President, which gives additional vigor to all his lawful power
6

under the Constitution and laws, to show that what I then
wrote, did not proceed from opinions that were hostile to the
personal liberty of freemen, whatever might be their opinions,
w~thin any range that does not include treasonable designs
against the United States; and that it as little proceeded from a
disposition to curtail the Judicial power as the Constitution
creates it, and the laws have organized its tribunals. If the
laws work freely within the scope of the Constitution, for the
defence of our Union and Unity as a Nation, there need be no
fear, that either the Union or the Constitution will break down
in the hearts of the people, by the weight of any extra authority
the Habeas Corpus clause gives to the Government in seasons
like the present, which the calm judgment of the supreme adjudicating power shall deliberately sanction as fairly comprehended by the grant.

